

June 2015

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### Recommended Citation

Eneanya, Augustine N. (2015) "Terrorism and Global Domestic Insurgency Nexus: A Case of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria," *Journal of Public Management & Social Policy*: Vol. 21 : No. 1 , Article 6.  
Available at: <http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol21/iss1/6>

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# Non-State Armed Islamist Groups' Terrorism and Global Domestic Insurgency Nexus: A Case of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

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*The paper examines the link between Non-state armed Islamist groups' terrorism and global domestic insurgency, using Nigeria as a case study. It adopts a combination of deprivation – frustration – aggression theory, social learning and social identity theories as its framework of analysis. The primary focus of inquiry is on secondary data, purposively sampled from books, journals articles, and reports of periodicals, internet and existing statistics. Qualitative research and secondary data analysis method were adopted. Using discourse, descriptive and explanatory techniques, the paper attempts to establish the relationship between Non-state armed Islamist groups' support and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Findings from the study show that Boko Haram's insurgency is connected with the Non-state armed Islamist groups' support, cooperation and collaboration. Moreover, Boko Haram insurgency is also a direct consequence of cumulative deprivation and frustration caused by inequality, economic deprivation, poverty, unemployment, corruption and bad governance in Nigeria. The paper concludes by suggesting that transitional joint military taskforce should be established with neighboring countries, while the issues of governance, socio-cultural and economic factors that cause poverty, inequality and deprivation should be addressed through good governance.*

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The Global War on Terrorism (GNOT) seized the world's attention in late 2001 as a result of dramatic and destructive attack of World Trade Centre in New York City and overarching military pentagon building in Washington, DC, on September, 11 2001. The terrorist attack was well planned, coordinated and executed. Since then, terrorism took a different form and spreading all over the world. The number of attacks by non-state armed Islamist groups and their collaborations with domestic insurgents around the world increased rapidly over the years. Between 1969 and 1985, for instance, the number of major international terrorist attacks alone jumped from just two hundred to over eight hundred per year, leaving more and more people afraid and polarized in their opinions. According to Homeland Security News Wire (2014), a total of 7,217 attacks were recorded. In 2013, the number increased to 18,524 (150 per cent). Throughout the world, terrorism re-invents itself in new and more dangerous

forms. As older groups are defeated and exhausted, more radical and violent successors often take their places. Domestic insurgencies emerged and linked to non-state armed Islamist group networks.

Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad known as Boko Haram in Nigeria is an extremist Islamic group that has engaged in guerrilla warfare across the Northern part of Nigeria. It's violent and suicide attacks on civilians, churches, government officials and United Nations have turned the country into a theatre of bloodshed and insecurity for lives and properties. It is on record that between January 1, 2012 and April 2014, Nigeria has witnessed over fifty cases of bomb blasts across the county with estimated 10,000 deaths and kidnapping of 270 girls from Government Girl's Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State, that has attracted international outrage (Pernice 2013).

Boko Haram Sect was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 and the organization seeks to establish a "pure" Islamic state ruled by Sharia law, putting a stop to what it deems "westernization". It is suspected to have cells in Northern Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It exerts influence in the North Eastern Nigerian states of Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Bauchi, Yobe, Taraba and Kano. It is suspected to have links with other non-state armed Jihadist groups outside Nigeria. A range of conflicting narratives persist around Boko Haram and the group's origins, motivations and future plans remain a matter of debate

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine the suspected link between Boko Haram insurgency and Non-state armed Islamist groups outside Nigeria. Besides, the paper attempts to identify the cultural, social, economic and political motives behind the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

## **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Against this background, three questions drive this investigation. First, what are the socio-economic, cultural, religious and political factors that motivated Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria? Second, how are Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria linked with Non-State armed Islamists groups' activities? Third, what are the policy implications to public management, political leaders, socio-economic and culture for national development? Before we examine these questions, let us define some relevant concepts for our discussion in order to formulate the theoretical framework and contextualize our analysis.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS**

Terrorism is increasingly understood as a political act meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of acute fear and despair (generally for a political or ideological, whether secular or religious, purpose). The use of violence is to create fear, often through the targeting of third parties and with the elements of surprise and the undermining of very personal security, is a tool used by a variety of historical and contemporary actors (Paret 1964). The term terrorism is difficult to define. However, terrorism can mean the use of violence by states against subjects; isolated extremist acts of violence; the use of violence in liberation and nationalist movements; and emergent transnational configuration which targets western hegemony or values. Terrorism is, in most cases, resentfully a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear for a political or ideological (secular or

religions) purpose. It is also a criminal act and contravenes international law. For the purpose of this paper, terrorism is defined as politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents intended to influence an audience or change a constituted state authority recognized by United Nations by subversion.

The Non-state armed Islamist groups are religious extremists suspected to be collaborating and instigating domestic insurgencies in most parts of the world, including Nigeria in the pretense of pursuing global Jihadist's ideology. For example, twelve (12) top most active non-state armed Islamist groups have been identified in 2013 as having links with domestic insurgencies occurring in most parts of the world. They include: Barisan, Revolusi Nasional (Thailand); Taliban (Afghanistan and Pakistan; Islam Chatra Shir (Bangladesh); Communist Party of India (Moist); Al-Quaida in Islamic M aghreb (AQIM) in Algeria and Iraq; Al-Shabaab (Somalia); Ansaru (Algeria/M ali); ISIS/Khorasan (Syria and Iraq); Communist Party of India (Moist); New People's Army (Philippines); Touareg Fighters (Mali and Niger) and Jabhat ql-Nusra (Syria) Domestic Islamist insurgency activities in most parts of the world have been fingered against these non-state armed Islamists groups (Homeland Security News Wire 2014).

An insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority recognized by the United Nations, when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents (Roberts and Ash 2009). An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency warfare and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population and by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgent's claims against the incumbent regime. However, the nature of insurgencies is an ambiguous concept. Not all rebellions are insurgencies. There are many cases of non-violent rebellions using civil resistance (Morris 2005). Where a revolt takes the form of armed rebellion, it may not be viewed as an insurgency if a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign States and rebel forces. However, when insurgency is used by a State or another authority under threat, "insurgency" also carries an implication that rebels' cause is illegitimate, whereas those rising up will see the authority as being illegitimate. Not all insurgencies include terrorism. Morris argues that the use or non-use of terrorism does not define insurgency, but that organizational traits have traditionally provided another means to describe the two. Insurgencies normally field fighting forces orders of magnitude larger than those of terrorist organizations provide social services and have an overt, even legal, political wing. Their covert wing "carries out attacks on military forces with tactics such as raids and ambushes, as well as acts of terror such as attacks that cause deliberate civilian Casualties" (International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide 2014, 1 - 16). In this paper, we adopt US Department of Defense's definition that insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

Counter-insurgency, on the other hand, has a different type of operation to insurgency. Though, insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN) are two sides of phenomenon, both have been called revolutionary war or internal war. Counter-insurgency is, therefore, defined in this paper as an inter-locking system of actions – political, economic, psychological and military aimed at neutralizing insurgency's intended action of overthrowing established authority in a country.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS**

Among the most important assumptions of the behaviorist school are the belief that the root causes of war lie in human nature and human behavior and that an important relationship exists between intra-personal conflict and conflict that pervades the external social order. Among the prevalent micro-theories that we will review are: instinct or innate theories of aggression, frustration – aggression theory, social learning theory and social identity theory.

Early psychologists often postulate that there was an innate instinctual or biological mechanism which would predispose humans towards aggression. This theory combined elements of early psychological studies (Freud's death instinct) and social Darwinian theories regarding the fight for survival. This theory was subsequently discredited by biologists who did not believe that such a mechanism exist.

Like most pioneering theories, the innate theories gave way to more sophisticated and scientific hypotheses over time. One important development of this work was the evolution of the frustration – Aggression theory. The basic assumption of the frustration – Aggression theory is that all aggression, whether interpersonal or international has its root causes on the frustration of one or more actors' goal achievement. That is, the unfulfillment of personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since the demand for basic human needs has always exceeded the supply, all human conflict can be traced to an actor's failure to obtain what it needs. The frustration-Aggression theory rests on the basic stimulus–response (frustration –aggression) hypothesis (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990). Terrorism can be driven by frustration, oppression, exploitation and social inequalities. The use of terror and violence by terrorist groups is aimed to intimidate or coerce government and the public in order to promote political, social ideological and religious or philosophical objectives. Looking at Boko Haram, terrorist attacks in the Northern Nigeria, one can affirm that the astronomically relative deprivations in terms of western education acquisition and poverty, unemployment generation, and social inequalities, could have been the reasons that trigger terrorism in that part of the country. In this context, aggression may develop as a consequence of having been exposed to an extremely frustrating conditions sufficient enough to provoke a sense of worthiness and hopelessness. Kukah (1993) argues in favor of this position that Boko Haram members face complexities, contradictions and challenges emanating from their inability to meet up with basic human needs like foods, cloth and shelter. Soyinka (2012) agrees with this position and argues that, "economic factors, such as unemployment, wasted resources, social marginalization and massive corruption are responsible for nurturing the current season of violent discontent in Nigeria". It is, however, important to note that the existence of frustration does not always lead to aggression, given that frustration may have other consequences other than aggression. However, the insufficiency of causal link to aggression and other insights into human behavior have led to the discrediting of the frustration-Aggression theory and the subsequent development of the social learning and social identity theories.

Social learning theory is based on the hypothesis that aggression is not innate, instinctual but actually learned through the process of socialization. One acquires aggressive attributes by learning them at home, in school and by interaction with their environment in general. Interaction in society helps to focus and trigger stored aggression against economies. This is an important concept, particularly when the conflict is ethno-national or sectarian in nature. Social learning theorists have tried to understand the relationship of

the individuals in their environment and how this relates to sectarian aggression. Faleti (2006) looks at the causes of terrorist act in Nigeria through the lens of psycho-cultural perspectives. He contends that psychological, religious and other cultural contradictions are the basis of conflict and that such conflicts are intractably perennial. Religious influences in terms of Islamic jihads and solidarity with global Islamic fundamentalists motivate other jihadists. The terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda, Taliban and ISIS in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Mali and Middle East motivate others to learn their mode of operations and military tactics, which are eventually imported for domestic insurgencies (Faleti 2006).

Another theory of interest is the Social Identity theory. This was developed by Psychologist Henri Tajfel in 1998 and offers insight into the conflict in Northern Ireland. The basic focus of the theory is that we create our social relations. There is a human need for positive self-esteem and self-worth, which we transfer to our groups. We also order our environment by social comparison between groups. The concept of in-group and out-group is important in this analysis. The social identity theory has helped Social Psychologists at least to recognize that individuals are different in groups and that it is this difference which produces recognizable forms of group action. For example, ethnic identities are very strong because of their composition as extended in kinship groups. People in similar conditions, such as: abject poverty, unemployment, social inequalities and marginalized groups can be united together to fight a common enemy. The kinship groups are important in the development of in-groups and out-groups. This is a particularly important concept when dealing with ethnic conflict or social inequality. Jerrold (2008) attributed Boko Haram insurgency to psychology of group identity for marginalized or isolated group of people.

The paper, therefore, adopts a combination of deprivation-frustration-aggression theory, social learning theory and social identity theory as the framework of analysis for the subject matter. The deprivation-frustration-aggression theory would be the major focus, while social learning and social identity theories would complement it because of the shortcomings of deprivation-frustration-aggression theory. The deprivation-frustration-aggression theory argues that aggression is the consequence of deprivation with resultant frustration. Individuals are motivated to achieve life ambitions and fulfill certain social expectations, but when these expectations are thwarted, frustration sets in and this leads to some form of aggression. In Nigeria, especially in the North East, majority of the people are deprived of basic infrastructure; there are pervasive unemployment, abject poverty and basic infrastructure. Consequent upon these, frustration and aggression result, which often manifest in the form of militancy, terrorism and insurgency as witnessed mostly in North-East of Nigeria.

The justification for the use of the Social learning theory for this analysis is the attribute that aggression is acquired by learning them at home, in school and by interaction with their environment. The Boko Haram Jihadists were socialized to believe that other religious denominations other than Islam are infidels. Hence, their interactions with other Islamist groups in other parts of the world trigger stored aggression against common enemies. This explains Boko Haram's insurgency against western education, Christians, churches, government officials and security officials.

The Social identity theory in the framework attempts to explain the social division among individuals in different groups. Members of Boko Haram Sect see themselves as

distinct people that would Islamize the Northern Nigeria within Global Islamic Jihad. Hence, this difference produces group action and aggression against other religious groups and Islamic organizations believed to tolerate other religious bodies in Nigeria. The paper, therefore, adopts eclectic approach (that is, combination of deprivation-frustration – Aggression, social learning and social identity theories) for our analysis. This is justified because of socio-economic, religious and cultural identity experienced by citizens in Nigeria, especially in the North East which have contributed to aggression against the state and others perceived as enemies.

## **METHODICAL APPROACH**

In the light of this, the paper adopts qualitative case study design. Data were purposively sampled from secondary sources such as: available statistics from global terrorism index reports, internet, journal articles, newspapers' reports and textbooks. Collected data were coded, categorized and analyzed, using documentary, exploratory and descriptive analytical techniques, (percentages) to explain the link between Non-State armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Historical and discourse analyses were also utilized where necessary for explaining the history, conversations and video messages of Boko Haram and non-state armed Islamist groups leaders. The contemporariness of the Boko Haram issue in Nigeria justifies the use of historical, exploratory, discourse, descriptive and explanatory techniques for our analysis and consequent sets of generalization and conclusion.

## **LIM ITATIONS**

Lack of statistical records, accuracy of data and research reports, especially the collaboration between non-state armed Islamist groups with Boko Haram insurgency are limitations to this inquiry. Besides, the logistics, time, money and lack of access to leaders of Boko Haram sect and classified documents from government's security officials on fatalities that occurred due to the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria are other aspects of limitations of the paper. Furthermore, the findings cannot be generalized to other parts of the world where domestic insurgencies are taking place. However, the paper attempts to achieve its objectives because of the methods adopted for the investigation and analysis. Moreover, the inquiry being a case study would give us an insight into the contributory factors to Boko Haram insurgency and provide us with baseline data concerning the link between non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This would direct us on ways to resolve religious fanaticism and extremism.

## **ANALYSIS**

### **SOCIO-ECONOM IC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES**

North Central/ Eastern states in Nigeria (Kano, Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe), which are currently under the shadow of insurgency are vast areas with great potentials, but still remain the poorest part of Nigeria. Poor leadership, unequal distribution of resources, lack of basic education, over-population, absence of employment opportunities, including environmental degradation have contributed to entrenching abject poverty in the North East. Now, let us examine the socio-economic profile of four Northern states of Nigeria- target of Boko H aram Attacks and three

Southern States not vulnerable to attacks to enable us capture the picture of state of affairs in the socio-economic perspectives.

**TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF UNAFFECTED SOUTHERN STATES AND AFFECTED NORTH CENTRAL/EASTERN STATES IN NIGERIA**

STATES	GDP \$bn (2012)	GDP/Capital	Unemployment (percent)	Secondary School Attendance Rate (percent)
<b>AFFECTED NORTH</b>				
Central/Eastern States	16.8	1,525	28	28
Kano	8	1,631	29.1	8
Borno	4.6	1,233	33.8	11
Adamawa	3.3	1,207	35.6	7
Yobe	31.2	2,916	8.3	85
<b>UNAFFECTED SOUTHERN STATES</b>				
Lagos	11.3	1,859	25.5	75
Rivers	8.9	1,814	12.4	73
Anambra				

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Poverty Profile Report (2012).

## FINDINGS

- (1) An evaluation of table 1 below shows that the North East has been particularly affected by bad governance; social inequality; lack of economic opportunities; lack of school attendance; unemployment and poverty in the region; compared to State from Southern part of Nigeria. Hence, it became a fertile group for youths to be easily recruited into Boko Haram Sect for terrorists' activities in Nigeria.
- (2) Empirical evidences analyzed from video tapes, reports, and statements of Boko Haram leaders, leading to incidents of attacks as illustrated in table 2 and figure 1 show that Boko Haram Sect has links with Non-state armed Islamist groups of AQI M /Ansaru;(A Igeria/Iraq); Al-Qaeda/Taliban (Afghanistan/Pakistan); Al-Shabaab(Somalia); and Touareg Fighters (Mali).

## DISCUSSION

An evaluation of the data in table 1 above shows the backwardness of North Eastern States, the base of Boko Haram insurgency compared to states from the Southern parts of Nigeria. The performances of states from Southern part of Nigeria on school attendance are Lagos (85 per cent), Rivers (75 per cent) and Anambra (72 per cent). They have higher school attendance rates than the states from North East, comprising Kano, which record (28 per cent), Bornu (8 per cent), Adamawa (11 per cent), and Yobe (7 per cent), respectively. The gap between the Northern and Southern states is now complicated by the insidious targeting of education by insurgents. For example, the killing of students and kidnapping

of “270 Chiboks girls” on 5th May, 2014, that attracted international attention. Unemployment rates are also higher in the Northern states than the Southern states. Kano records (28 percent), Borno (29.1percent), Adamawa (33.8 percent) and Yobe (35.6 percent); while, states from the Southern part of Nigeria have lower unemployment rates. Lagos has unemployment rate of (8.3 percent), Rivers (25.5 percent) and Anambra (12.4 percent). The World Bank report of 2013 shows that there are massive and high poverty and unemployment rates in Nigeria, especially in rural areas from 12 percent in 2006 to 24 percent in 2011. North East poverty rates amount to 69.1 percent absolute and relative poverty level of 76.3 per cent, respectively; while the Northern Nigeria’s poverty level is above 70 percent, than that of the South (Report 201 3).

It can be inferred from the analysis of table 1 that North Eastern states have been particularly affected by lack of school attendance and unemployment rates because and lack of economic opportunities and poverty in the region, compared to States from Southern part of Nigeria. Besides, the failure of governance and corruption at the national and regional levels compounded the economic development of North Eastern states made up of Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Gombe Taraba and Bauchi. From Nigerian Poverty Profile Report (2012) the North East, base of the murderous Islamist group Boko Haram, had 69.1 percent and 76.3 percent absolute and relative poverty levels, respectively. While Northern Nigeria’s poverty rate as a whole is above 70 percent- double that in the South. The North East has been particularly hit hard as the lack of economic opportunities in the region drives people into the arm of radical Islamism, leading to a vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment. The problem is now being complicated by the insidious targeting of education by the insurgents, an example of which was the kidnapping of over two hundred (200) Chibok girls.

At the formative stage of Boko Haram movement between 2005 and 2008, the leader, Mohammed Yusuf supported his disciples with one meal a day for each member; established youth employment scheme, which enabled disciples to go into petty trading and wheelbarrow pushing for a living. He also arranged marriage between the sect members to give them personal dignity and self-worth (Shettima 2014). After the death of Mohammed Yusuf on 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2009, as a result of an encounter with police and military operations, nobody took over this responsibility. The national and state governments from the region could not fill the vacuum. Political elites from the region were busy pursuing power at the national level, where they can benefit from corrupt practices in oil rentals, thereby, neglected their region. Leaders at the federal level also failed to create jobs and encourage school attendance for marginalized youths, especially the “Alamajiris” in North Eastern states. This failure by national and regional political elites to create employment, distribute resources equally, encourage school attendance and fight corruption created a gulf between the rich and the poor, and provided a fertile ground for recruitment of these jobless youths into Boko Haram Sects terrorist activities against the states, their institutions and citizens, confirming our economic deprivation-frustration-aggression theory.

## **LINK BETWEEN NON-STATE ARM ED ISLAM IST JIHADISTS AND BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA**

In Nigeria’s context, the linkage between non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram insurgency can be captured from video messages, statements of Islamist groups’ leaders, newspaper reports, maps and available statistics of Boko Haram terrorists’ attacks.

Data from these sources were content-analyzed, coded, categorized and subjected to thematic, historical, discourse, descriptive and explanatory analyses, in order to explain the pattern of linkage and collaboration between Boko Haram and non-state armed Islamist groups. Table 2 and figure 1, below capture incidents of Boko Haram's attacks and adapted for our analysis and illustration.

**Table 2: Terror and Suicide attacks by Boko Haram Insurgency and Fatalities**

YEARS	Suicide Attacks of Civilian deaths	Injured Civilians
2009	817	N/A
2010	84	N/A
2011	167	120
2012	220	78
2013	218	N/A
2014	2,560	235
Total	4,066	433

Source: <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/boko-haram>.

Figure 1 below shows towns annexed in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa as at 1st August, 2014. As these states were annexed, many civilians' throats were slashed and Boko Haram hosted their flag and declared Gwazoa Islamic Caliphate. Boko Haram leaders even administered Sharia law for the Caliphate, as the incumbent Emir of the town fled. This is typical of ISIS operational tactics and methods in Iraq and Syria. Incidents of Boko Haram's attacks target non-Muslims living in the Northern Nigeria and other civilians. However, they are also known for attacking fellow Muslims to enforce their interpretation of Islam. Espousing a strict hatred towards state authority, both to the governor and the police, the group has threatened Jihad against the government. Often targets Igbo civilians, a predominately Christian ethnic group. In 2009, an initiative by the Nigeria military to eradicate Boko Haram led to the death of the sect's leaders, hundreds of their members and the destruction of their communities and properties

**Fig. 1: Boko Haram-attributed attacks in Nigeria since July 2009.**



oppressed Afghanistan....our brothers: Sheikhs in wounded Iraq....our brothers: Sheikhs in wounded Iraq....our brothers: Sheikhs in Pakistan....our brothers: Sheikhs in Yemen...our brothers: Sheikhs in usurped Palestine....our brothers and other places where our brothers are doing jihad in name of Allah” (Roggio 2012).

In that video message, Shekau warned Britain, America, Israel and Nigeria that the killing of Jihadist leaders will not defeat the groups. He further said that Boko Haram is with our Mujahid brothers in their fight against the Jews and the crusader Christians. This video message, according to Bill Roggio, an American commentator on military affairs is similar to tapes issued by Somalia's Al-Shabaab in 2008, when the group was making overtures to join Al-Qaeda (Roggio 2012).

Boko Haram also has close operational relationship with Ansaru, a splinter group of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In many ways, Ansaru is the international component of Boko Haram, although, it may not exist as distinct entity from it. When AQIM retreated during French military intervention in Mali, the two groups integrated (Heras and Zenn 2013). Boko Haram fighters also travelled to Mali in 2012, when the militant Salafist groups AQIM, Mujao, Movement for oneness and Jihad in West Africa and Ansaral-Dine controlled the Northern part of the country and established closer relations with these groups. The French intervention in Mali presented the group with possibilities for training, combat experience and operational cooperation with these organizations. Cameroon recently announced that their troop identified “two (2) Touareg Mali fighters enlisted by Boko Haram among 100 militants killed at her border with Nigeria”(Tchiroma 2014, 3) Touareg fighters fought in former Libya leader Muammar Gaddafi's army and went on to lead the rebellion that in 2013 cut Mali into two. Besides, Boko Haram also relies on donations from Al-Qaeda and AQIM, in the form of money and military hardwares. Islamist groups from Saudi Arabia also donate funds to Boko Haram.

Furthermore, the scale and methods of attack suggested that Boko Haram had adopted the tactics of AQIM and ISIS currently fighting in Syria and Iraq. Boko Haram attacked UN Building in Nigeria in Abuja on 26<sup>th</sup> August, 2011. The bombing mastermind was identified by Nigerian State Security Services as Mamman Nur, a notorious Boko Haram member with a link to Al-Qaeda who returned from Somalia before the attack (Adigun and Gambrella 2011). The Nigerian State Security Service's (SSS) claim fits with June, 2011 statement by Boko Haram that some of its members had gone for training in Somalia: “we want to make it known that our Jihadists have arrived (in) Nigeria from Somalia where they got serious training on warfare from our brethren who made the country ungovernable and forced the interim government to relocate to Kenya..... despite the armoured carriers that they are boasting of, they are no match with the kind of training we acquired in Somalia (Ofedal 2013). Two videos later emerged purporting to show members of Boko Haram preparing for suicide attacks, including Mohammed Abul Barra, the suicide bomber of the UN building, launching a vague warning to “Obama and other infidels”. The voice said to be Shekau calls the UN headquarter, a “forum of all the global evil,” while also offering praise for Osama bin Laden”(Joy Online News 2011) This was similar to AQIM's bombing of UN building in Algeria on December 11, 2007 (Jebnoun 2008). Similar attack was carried on UN building in Baghdad (Iraq), which killed the Chief of Mission, Sergio Vierra de Mello and caused the UN to depart from Iraq.

Again, the December 2013 night attack launched by Boko Haram fighters against

Nigerian Air Force base in the city of Maiduguri, in which a number of security personnel were killed and several aircraft destroyed is reminiscent of attacks by Al-Qaeda's associates on important military bases in other theatres of war- the Taliban's attack on Pakistan Naval Station Mehran in Karachi on May, 2011 and the Afghan Taliban's assault on camp Baston in Helmand on September 2012 (Matziko 2014). The recent annexation of 20 towns in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, slashing the throats of their captors and hoisting of their flags in conquered territories is similar to ISIS activities in Syria and Iraq.

The statements from video tapes, newspaper reports, tactics and methods of operation reflect forms of linkage and collaborations between the non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. The recent military successes registered by Boko Haram from 2013 to 2014, that resulted in 2,778 deaths, 235 injured citizens and abduction of 270 Chibok girls (as shown in violent terrorist attacks in North East of Nigeria, particularly Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, in table 2 and fig.1 below), compared to their operations between 2009 and 2012, violent attacks which resulted to 1,288 deaths is a clear indication that Boko Haram enjoys external military and financial support and cooperation from non-state armed Islamist groups of AQIM, Ansaru, Al-Shabaab, Touareg from Mali and Al-Qaeda/Taliban from Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is justified with our map in figure 1, showing graphical representation of insurgency attacks in North Eastern States between August 1 and 31, 2014. It is obvious that the epicenter of 2013 and 2014 attacks by Boko Haram insurgency and were more significant than pockets of violence recorded between 2009 and 2012. This supports our thesis that religious, cultural (social theory) and psychological (identity theory) factors contribute to Boko Haram's collaboration with Non-state armed Islamist groups to commit terrorist activities in Nigeria.

## **IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT**

Implications arising from the analysis and findings on social policy and management are:

First, the public management implication is that Nigerian government should tackle the political and socio-economic challenges in the Northern part of Nigeria, especially by greater engagement and financial empowerment of the discontented communities. "Marshall Plan" should be formulated for the North Eastern states as was done in US sponsored European Recovery Program of April, 1948 to December, 1951, aimed at rehabilitating the economies of North Eastern states made up of Borno, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, Bauchi and Yobe. Nigeria should also entrench good governance at the national and regional levels in order to equitably distribute resources, create jobs for employment of idle youths, build schools (formal and vocational), and encourage its attendance for skill acquisition and empowerment leading to poverty reduction. Insecurity, poverty and unemployment have significantly affected the members of the society, especially in the rural areas. In failed states index, Nigeria was 14<sup>th</sup> in 2011, worldwide (Failed States Index 2011). Therefore, a new social compact with Nigeria citizens that encompasses an economic program and projects that addresses poverty, unemployment, and should be addressed. Government should partner with such body as UK Department for International Development (DFID) to support the poor, which would help change the lives of many girls, women, youths and assist in closing the huge millennium development goals' gaps. There is need to improve on governance and service delivery as well. Economic Reforms at all levels must be pursued, so that money appropriated for development projects and services actually deliver results. The anti-corruption agencies – the Economic and

## Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and other offences Commission (ICPC) should seriously check cases of frauds through which funds earmarked for development end up in private pockets. Nigeria should also fight corruption seriously by using surpluses from subsidy's relief derived from fuel subsidy program to rehabilitate the economy of North Eastern states. There must be political will to combat corruption and entrench transparency and accountability in governance.

Second, many economic activities have been closed as a result of violent activities of Boko Haram. For instance, "many telecommunication companies have lost their masts and base transceiver stations in Plateau, Gombe, Bornu, Yobe, Bauchi, and Kano. Each costs average of 40 million naira and 160 million to build a single mast" (Bisuga 2012, 4-19). Moreover, agriculture and foreign investments are affected. Many foreign investors are scared of investing in the economy because of insecurity and kidnapping occasioned by Boko Haram terrorist activities. Farmers are scared of going to farm (Bamidele 2012). Insecurity has created food crisis, such that prices of basic food items, like rice, yam, beans and fresh tomatoes have risen (Azinge and Bello 2011). This is a serious economic challenge as the cycle of poverty, hunger and unemployment would further drive the disadvantaged and marginalized people in the area to crimes and religious extremism. The impact of violence on hospitality industry is devastating. People have relocated hotel businesses which have generating revenue from tourists have been relocated to other safe areas in the South. Commercial and business activities have crumbled and some have fled because of high level of insecurity. Banks and their customers are operating under difficult situations and have reduced their business hours for security reasons. About percent of industries have been shut down leading to scourge of unemployment. Small and Medium scale industries have relocated to Abuja. Many people have lost their lives and others rendered homeless. The global implication is that the activities of Boko Haram would affect bilateral trade between Nigeria and other nations of the world, especially: Mali, Cameroon, Niger, Republic of Benin, Ghana and other West African Countries.

Third, the killing, maiming of civilians, destroying churches and calling for expulsion of Southerners and Northern Christians by the Boko Haram members is damaging the North socially and politically. The trust and unity in diversity among Nigerians have been eroded, and given way to mutual suspicion and hatred, which may degenerate into self-determination agitation by minorities. This has political, social and cultural implications for the national development.

Fourth, defense and security implication is that the police and military personnel should be trained in urban warfare, intelligence gathering, and equipped with modern military technological hardware. Inter-Agency rivalry and mistrust among military and para-military service personnel should be eliminated, while, institutional flaws, such as unsound recruitment should be addressed. Links and networks to extremist organizations must be dis-connected through the establishment of multi-national joint task force to patrol and secure porous borders. There is urgent need to disconnect the network of non-state armed Islamist groups' terrorist collaboration with Boko Haram Sects. This can be achieved by establishing transnational and multi-national joint military taskforce with neighboring countries that share common border with Nigeria, for example, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. This joint military taskforce would also help to check transnational crimes such as: human trafficking, illegal migration, arms smuggling and infiltration of non-state armed Islamist

jihadists into domestic militias. This is a big agenda for the government but not insurmountable, if the political will is there to counter Boko Haram's insurgency. This would make external link between Non-state armed Islamist jihadist and Boko Haram Sect to be disconnected in terms of getting arm supplies, mercenaries and funds. This will cut off their supply chains and break the network of command and control. Complicity and collusion between the security personnel, political elites with Boko Haram insurgency should be meticulously investigated and all culprits exposed, prosecuted and jailed, if found culpable. This would deter others in future sabotage and collusion by other sympathizers of Boko Haram Sector.

Fifth, government should tackle the political and socio-economic problems of the North Eastern part of Nigeria through dialogue and negotiation with marginalized communities as alternative conflict resolution strategy to address the grievances of insurgents. Insurgents are regarded as representatives of deeper issues or grievances within a society, such as social inequalities, poverty, unemployment, corruption and bad governance. This strategy if adopted would defeat insurgents' propaganda of oppression, social injustice and marginalization by winning the hearts and minds of the affected target population to the side of government— a process that involves dialogue, compromise and negotiation. Even though, we detest insurgents methods and tactics, their grievances are often seen as legitimate, if pursued peacefully and through political means as done by Philippines and likes of Nelson Mandela, Gandhi and Xanana Gusanao, who renounce violence but seek same objectives through political and peaceful means.

Finally, Government should launch and sustain a concerted Civic education program to halt politicization of religion, educate citizens to respect the rights of fellow citizens. This would promote tolerance and encourage mutual respect in inter-personal relations. Such awareness would help build religious tolerance, mutual respect for each other's rights and unity in Nigeria.

## **CONCLUSION**

From the findings, it is obvious that there is wide discontent among people of North Central/Eastern States of Nigeria, made up of Kano, Borno, Adamawa, Gombe, Yobe, Taraba and Bauchi, because of economic deprivation, social inequality, unemployment, poverty, corruption, and bad governance by both national and regional political elites. This socio-economic deprivation has created a gulf between the "rich" and "poor", snowballing into frustration and leading to aggression on government officials, government agencies, institutions and members of the society. The motivation to muster international support from other oppressed Muslims in other parts of the world, made it possible for Islamist extremists to find a fertile ground to recruit marginalized and frustrated youths in North Eastern states, which has led to terrorist activities against the state with the aim of reforming governance with Islamic or sharia laws. Hence, the collaboration and cooperation between non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Using secondary analysis, the paper has qualitatively and historically described the interplay of socio-economic, psychological, religious and cultural (socio-economic deprivation, frustration-aggression, social learning and identity framework) factors to explain Boko Haram insurgency link with Non-state armed Islamist groups. Thus, the geometric upsurge of unemployment rates, paradoxical poverty in the midst of plenty due to corruption and illogical marginalization, suspicion, social injustice and bad governance

snowballed into insurrection of Boko Haram terrorist attacks with its attendant socio-economic and political implications for Nigeria.

However, we suggest that future study should interview and administer survey questionnaire (if possible) to Boko Haram's leaders to know their grievances, collaborators and sponsors, besides being motivated by Islamic Jihads in other countries. This would enable future researcher verify and replicate this study using quantitative analysis to establish the linkage between non-state armed Islamist jihadists and Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria.

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