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Dwight Waldo

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS*

What I shall attempt today is to sketch some of the major features of the context or environment of public administration in the foreseeable future, and then within that context to suggest some of the problems and prospects for public administration.

The expression "foreseeable future" is, I know, a logically indefensible expression: the future cannot be foreseen. However, no expression captures quite so well the idea that one is dealing with the proximate future with as much care and deliberation as possible. By "foreseeable" future I mean, quantitatively, a period of something like a generation.

I shall first discuss five overarching phenomena, major themes or events that seem to me to "frame" the future. Then, narrowing the focus and becoming more specific, I shall list and say something about ten present and emerging problem areas.

No great significance should be attached to the way I shall "carve up the world," particularly to the numbers of five and ten. We are told that the decimal system is an accident deriving from the fact that the human species has five digits on each extremity. Should we have had six, presumably I would have six items in my first list and twelve in my second.

FIVE OVERARCHING PHENOMENA

1. **Transition from Industrialism to Post-industrialism.** As you are probably aware, Futurism became a "growth industry" in the sixties and has continued important as an intellectual activity in the seventies. It seems at one and the same time to be both absurd — since one cannot study what does not exist — and a sensible and perhaps necessary thing to do, with the idea of anticipating what can and might happen and preparing to act intelligently when the future "arrives."

As you presumably are aware also, a considerable part of the literature of the Futures movement concerns a transition from industrialism to post-industrialism. The theme or thesis is that the condition of man known as industrialism, which has characterized most of the West for a hundred years or more, is passing and that in its place is a new condition of man. "Post-industrialism" is a neutral chronological label only, but those who interpret or project this emerging new world compete with each other to place a label on it, labels such as "technetronic" and

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"mobiletic." If one of the writers does actually succeed in naming the new era, this will be very unusual. For eras in human history are customarily labelled retrospectively: millions of persons lived in the Ancient World and in the Feudal Period without knowing it because they had not read contemporary historians.

Some of the themes and theses of the literature dealing with the transition to post-industrialism are the following.

First, the emergence of *knowledge* as the crucial factor in productivity. In view here is the tremendous surge in scientific knowledge and technological change in the recent modern period. To the classical trio of land, labor and capital, it is held, must be added a new and, in fact, dominant factor: *knowledge*. The knowledge at the center of science and technology are qualitatively and quantitatively so important that a new world is in process of being created. "Knowledge" in this view is primarily coded and transmittable scientific-technical knowledge which centers in the "hard" sciences, but it reaches out to the applied sciences and the "softer" sciences. It is knowledge about how the world — physical, biological, human — is shaped and moved, and how it can be mastered and controlled.

Second, the emergence of new power elites and power centers. Naturally, it is anticipated that new elites are emerging: those who are able to produce the powerful scientific-technical knowledge, and those who store, transmit, and manipulate it will be important, indeed, powerful people. Perhaps it goes too far to say that "think tanks will replace banks" as powerful instruments, but this conveys the general idea. In this view of the new world, of course, universities are important because a great deal of knowledge is produced, stored, and transmitted in universities. It takes only a little bit of, shall I say, cynical objectivity to appreciate there may be a certain amount of egocentricity in this view of things, since it is a view of things projected by people in think tanks and universities.

Third, the emergence of new technologies for gathering, storing, manipulating, transmitting, and applying knowledge. The view focuses here on the older devices of the printing press, the telegraph, the typewriter, the radio, and proceeds to the technical advances of the last generation that are best summed and symbolized by the word: computers. These scientific-technical advances *do* constitute a major new factor in the human situation. They constitute a quantum jump in the human capacity to store, transmit, and manipulate knowledge. In some ways, even, they increase our capacity to *create* knowledge.

Fourth, the decline of the factory and the rise of a new type of production and technology. The factory is viewed as the typical, indeed archetypical, institution of the industrial period. Now, however, the factory, at least in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sense, is becoming obsolete because of new production technologies made possible by mid- and late twentieth century science-technology. Much of what

once required labor by hand, skilled as well as unskilled, can now be automated and done by machines. Production increasingly becomes indirect instead of direct, in the sense that the new knowledge enables us to create machines and processes that perform functions once performed directly by human agents. The fully automated refinery with a continuous flow, with skilled technicians monitoring sensing and measuring devices, and merely adjusting valves or turning switches, is the production model for the future.

Fifth, a shift of emphasis from *production* to *distribution*. In the fifties and particularly in the sixties when the theory of post-industrialism was being formulated, it appeared that the "problem of production," which had been central to all previous eras, had been solved. Indeed, material things were being produced in an abundance without historical precedent. Shortages of raw materials and possibly — even — energy somewhere in the distant future were recognized as possibilities. But immediately it seemed both prudent and humane to argue that attention should be turned away from production and toward distribution, the problem of production being now "solved." The Great Society programs of the mid-sixties were framed and inaugurated, it is significant to note, in the period in which such ideas were prominent in informed thinking.

Sixth, a shift from "production" to "service" occupations. This is related to the foregoing, of course. Now that an abundance of material things is assured, attention should be turned to "quality of life" as against quantitative goods; the need is for more parks, better recreational and cultural facilities, and for the services that render life pleasant, rather than for more automobiles and TV's. Indeed, the shift away from production, especially direct production, was already far advanced. In 1958, it was observed, white collar workers began to outnumber blue collar workers, signalling ever-advancing education, more indirect production, and an increase in the service occupations and professions such as teaching, entertaining, medicine and social work.

Seventh, a general speeding up of the rate of economic-social-political change. All of the above signified, it was often noted, a general speeding up of the pace of life. Mobility of all kinds was seen to be concomitant to the changes observed: geographical (with one American family in six moving every year), social, occupational, economic. In part this was viewed as desirable. But in part it was recognized as having unfortunate consequences. Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock* — undoubtedly familiar to most of you — explored and indeed sensationalized these matters for millions. How could an organism developed over hundreds of thousands of years in a relatively stable environment withstand the stress of continual change and readjustment?

I have sketched post-industrialism as it was pictured in its literature at its apogee, so to speak, in its most self-confident period. But as the seventies have unfolded it has become apparent that "a funny thing happened on the way to the future." The social ferment and

"movements" of the mid- and late-sixties had no part in the original projections and, when they occurred, they necessarily had implications for the scenario. Economic depression, energy shortages, and other events have necessitated second thoughts and readjustments.

Nevertheless — despite the doubts that must now be entertained and the qualifications which now must be made, there is undoubtedly a great deal of substance in the post-industrial predictions. At least I shall assume that this is so as I proceed.

2. *Conflict Between a Revolution of Rising Expectations and a Revolution of Lowering Expectations.* The expression "Revolution of Rising Expectations" came into currency in the early fifties. It signified that hundreds of millions of people in the so-called "underdeveloped" world would no longer be satisfied with grinding poverty, that they had a vision of a different future, one like that of the industrialized West, and that the world would never be the same again because this ambition now existed and would have to be realized. That was now a generation ago; and, on an absolute basis, there is probably more grinding poverty than there was a generation ago. However, there was much truth in the original observation. Indeed, the world will never be the same again, given the forces set in motion by World War II and its aftermath.

Meanwhile, in the United States we had our own version of the Revolution of Rising Expectations. I refer to the civil rights movement and to the hopes raised and ambitions stirred by the Great Society programs. The "abolition of poverty in our time" seemed not only a desirable, but a feasible ambition.

I will observe that the last generation does not take in all the dimensions of the matter. The West has had a *secular* Revolution of Rising Expectations — if "secular" and "revolution" are not entirely antithetical terms. I refer to the fact that for generations, indeed for centuries, it was the confident expectations of people in much of the West that life would improve, that there was "progress" in terms of increasing goods or affluence. What happened in the fifties and sixties was a vast increase, internationally and nationally, in a long-time phenomenon.

In the late sixties, and associated with the "movements" of the time, we were suddenly overtaken by a Revolution of Lowering Expectations. True, for generations an occasional voice was raised saying that we were using up our resources and bespoiling our world. Suddenly, such voices were heard and the message seemed credible. You are familiar with the items that constitute this syndrome: increase in the world's population to the point at which life becomes impoverished, perhaps even impossible; the exhaustion of easy energy sources; the exhaustion of non-renewable raw materials; the pollution of the environment.

At a higher level of abstraction, so to speak, the Revolution of Lowering Expectations is signified by such phrases as: the destruction of the biosphere; Spaceship Earth; quality of life as against quantity; alternative life styles.

Generally the issues and preoccupations of the Revolution of Lowering Expectations follow in time formation of the major tenets of post-industrialism. As I suggested, they necessarily qualify, but do not necessarily negate the latter. What we have is one set of forces being met and modified by another.

One of the more perceptive works dealing with the issues concerned is Daniel Bell's *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*. Bell was one of the foremost, perhaps the foremost, of those projecting an emerging post-industrial era. Now, however, he indicates that second thoughts are in order; as he puts it, his earlier works and the *contradictions*, should be read "dialectically." Bell's central concern in *Contradictions* is that (as he sees it) the expectation of progress, the expectation of constantly increasing production, and amelioration of circumstances, is what has held societies in the West together for generations. In fact, this is no less true for the Communist countries than for the non-Communist countries. Query, what now happens when expectations must be lowered and visions of what is desirable must necessarily be transformed? Centrally, and most disturbingly, if the expectation of "more" has been the glue holding societies together in the past, what in the new situation will provide *Legitimacy*?

3. *Contradictions in and Challenges to the Nation-State System.* My theme here is that the nation-state system, which is the way the world is presently organized politically, is under stress and may be in transition.

There is, after all, nothing inevitable about the nation-state system. Historically, we have seen empires either in competitive or in monopoly positions; we have seen city-state "worlds," both Greek and Renaissance; we have seen feudal periods (our own and others) in which political power is rather thoroughly parcelled out. The *state* system is only three or four hundred years old; and the addition of nationalism, to make it more or less appropriate to speak of *nation-states*, is only about two hundred years old.

The pace of change is so rapid and so many forces are in motion that I think it is appropriate to ask the question: Are we in a period of transition to a new style or system of organizing the "political," and its concomitant geographical, social, economic and other dimensions?

It is difficult indeed to know the answer to the question. Partly, perhaps, it is a matter of definition. One can find evidence to support the thesis that nationalism is declining; and one can find evidence to support the thesis that nationalism is on the increase. *Nationalism* or *ethnicism*? These are two different matters, related as they often are. Perhaps nationalism is being overtaken and displaced by ethnicism as an aggregative principle — a reversal or trend that begins roughly with World War I?

However one answers these questions, it is a significant datum that the number of entities, nominally independent "countries," has roughly trebled since the end of World War II. And there are serious centrifugal

strains and pulls in many of the older, larger entities.

Another dimension of the matter is the very great increase in the number, size and power of trans- and multi-national organizations during the past generation. I refer to organizations, educational, cultural, professional and so forth. But the most significant ones presumably are the large economic entities, the "multi-nationals" that have become so prominent in recent years. Some of these entities are larger, in terms of net worth, annual income, and "population" (members) than a number of the member units of the United Nations. Very recently the multi-nationals have been coming under attack, and it may be that their recent efflorescence is illusory. We shall see. But in any event, they are a remarkable development.

Use your imagination, if you will: What is the potential of some of the trends now in view? Is the nation-state system in transition? If nation-state "disaggregation" is now in progress in significant ways and degrees, what are the possibilities and likelihoods for reaggregation?

4. *Conflict Between, and Emergence of New Patterns of, the Categories of PUBLIC and PRIVATE.* This theme has been implied in the previous three, as a moment's reflection will indicate.

The concepts of *public* and *private* are very central in the intellectual and emotional structuring of our world. A great deal of our thought about government, law, morals and social institutions are related to this distinction which recent Western history has taught us to make. But *public* and *private* are not categories of nature, we need to appreciate; they are categories of history and culture, of law and custom. They are "contextual" and subject to change and redefinition.

There is much evidence to indicate that this important distinction is now becoming blurred. To put before you a generalization for your examination: In the world generally there is a movement *away* from a distinction between *public* and *private*, and *toward* a blurring and mingling of the two.

In total, the matter is one of infinite complexity, hardly for exploration here. But one prominent aspect can be mentioned: the organizational. It is a fact — I would argue — that the past generation has seen a vast enlargement of what I call the "gray area," a mixed area between previously black and white distinctions. Many organizations, nominally governmental or nominally private, are neither. Or rather, they are *both*. Governmental functions nowadays can hardly be performed without private organizations as agency; and the private organizations can hardly exist or function without the support and guidance of government.

Presumably you are aware of the "spin-off" of these matters in contemporary politics. I need hardly tell you that there is a "revulsion" against government that stems in significant measure from a widespread feeling that government is invading the "private." For my part, however, I expect to see little genuine "reprivatization."

As observed a moment ago, the separation of public and private has

been one of the defining features of the modern world. If the distinction is now becoming blurred and confused, and is increasingly less of a distinction, what then? As one with a strong sense of history, I often wonder if "the film is being played backward," because so much that has been defined the modern period as it has emerged is now in question or fading. Are we entering a new "feudal" period? This is scarcely likely (presuming no Catastrophe) if only because of the technological components of modern society. But it is at least theoretically possible that some new condition of man may emerge with some of the qualities of feudalism.

5. **A Challenge to Rationality and a Crisis of Control.** Some would say that these are two matters, not to be confused. However, they strike me as related and overlapping matters, and for the sake of time I link them together.

Neither is a new theme, and there is a possibility of self-deception. These supremacy of reason — to those to whom it matters — no doubt always seems challenged; and presumably it has been a rather rare human feeling to believe that "everything is under control." One thinks, for example, of Emerson's "Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind."

Albeit — my sense of the situation is that there is a widespread mental "depression," very often mild, to be sure, but nevertheless **there**. Certainly I am not the only one to believe that the sense of optimism, the feeling of buoyancy of two or three generations ago, is weakened if not non-existent; this is usually put in terms of a major decline of belief in "progress." Wars, depressions, and disturbances are presumed to be responsible for our sense that reasonable men no longer prevail and that events move toward a dark and clouded area rather than toward a bright and sunny area. Our skepticism, our cynicism, are easily discernible in our political life and in our "humor."

I shall not try to prove my case or to expound my theme (or themes) logically. Let me merely put before you a number of "items," quite different in nature and greatly differing in import, to think about in this connection.

Item: The "failure" of the Great Society programs. The widespread opinion, which I share, is that with these programs, our reach exceeded our grasp, our aspirations *outran* our knowledge, our social technology. I believe that, generally, our "failure" has had an unsettling and depressing effect.

Item: The study by Jay Forrester of urban programs from the standpoint of "systems," and the resulting conclusion that results of many programs are contrary to commonsense expectations, are "counter-intuitive." Housing shortages, for example, are not necessarily cured by building public housing in the center of cities; that moreover, such programs may have a serious adverse affect upon other desired results.

Item: The recently published book, **Organized Social Complexity**, edited by Todd LaPorte, which is somewhat to the same effect: When

highly organized systems meet and interact there are often unexpected and conceivably highly undesirable results. Despite all we know there remains a vast area of ignorance about cause and effect in the area of "organized social complexity."

Item: A number of recently published books and articles, have proclaimed the theme — to use a title to one of the books — *The Age of the Manager is Over!* The argument is being advanced that, granted that the manager could once genuinely manage an operation of some size, this is no longer true, given rapid change, increased complexity, and the environmental complexity and turbulence resulting from conflicting currents. Management, it is argued, "regresses" to an art; one plays the game by personal skills and intuition, moving quickly to avoid becoming a target or a statistic.

Item: The embarrassment and the critiques of economics. Ten years ago I was willing to believe that, just possibly, the economists had achieved a genuine Science. Keynesian economic theory seemed sound, and Keynesian economic policy seemed effective. Certainly the economists generally were confident and, you will recall, spoke of "fine tuning" the economy. But since those days much has happened and the economists are shaken if not beaten. It may be significant also that there are trained and qualified economists who feel that the discipline rests on false foundations and must be rebuilt from true ones.

Item: The generalizability of the concept of "vulnerability." In the literature dealing with national and economic development the concept of "vulnerability" has been publicized. This refers to the "vulnerability" of small and more or less "underdeveloped" communities or countries in the face of modern industrialism and post-industrialism. Such peoples, it is observed, stand to lose their "history," their culture, their way of life. More recently — and this is the point for present purposes — this concept of "VULNERABILITY" HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO DEVELOPED NATIONS. They are, it is argued, also vulnerable to the forces of science, technology, industrialism, with their concomitants. Their history, culture and way of life are also vulnerable and subject to disintegration.

Item: The critique of the rational-scientific and the touting of the emotional-affective in recent years. Much of this is related to the events of the late sixties, but some of it has other roots. In any event there has been an upwelling of criticism of rational-positivist-scientific-technological modes of thought, and an accompanying praise and promotion of the expression of emotion and the expansion of the emotional components of our lives.

I do not want to be understood as believing that all of the rational is good and all of the emotional is bad. The thesis that Western society may have "impoverished" itself or "unbalanced" itself by excessive concentration on the rational and by an obsession with mastery and control I regard as quite respectable, despite the fact that by training and temperament I am on the rational/control "side." Indeed, my personal

ambivalence (if this is the appropriate word) may illustrate my theme.

PRESENT AND EMERGING PROBLEMS

I proceed now to a brief look at some present and emerging problems. I identify ten of them, you will recall. Whether, in identifying ten, I am carving reality into recognizable and appropriate pieces is for you to say. "Out there" in the world everything relates to everything and the "problems" are intertwined. I shall from time to time attempt to relate the ten problems to the five overarching phenomena; but I shall not do it thoroughly and consistently, and part of your task is to carry the analysis further.

1. **How to Interpret ECONOMY and EFFICIENCY under New and Difficult Circumstances.** The interpretation of economy and efficiency, those two related concepts so important for public administration, has never been really easy. However, in simpler times there were simple theories that were accepted as appropriate. I have in mind, for example, prominently, the three circumstances in which Adam Smith felt that public enterprise was appropriate as against private enterprise: defense against external enemies, the maintenance of law and order, and the construction of such "public works" as are not feasible economically for private enterprise.

The fact is that in the United States the government has been involved deeply with the economy from the beginning. I would argue, indeed, the meaning of government is in large part to be found in the setting and legitimating of economic rules. In any case, in the United States government involvement (national, state and local) in economic affairs was highly advanced and very complex by the 1930's. The Great Depression brought, of course, a further major involvement of the federal government in the economy. At the same time Keynesian economics was elaborated and more or less "adopted" to rationalize and guide the new role of government. In the post-war years and especially in the 1960's the involvement of the government with the economy was extended still further: the government now was to be responsible not only for the level and rate of economic activity but for maintaining a high level of social equity. Place these developments, if you please, in the context of the complexity and controversy suggested by the overarching phenomena.

Paralleling the developments I have just sketched is a record of increasing refinement of concepts and development of socio-economic technologies, the object of which has been to enable us to make proper distinctions, weigh alternatives, relate means to ends, and generally make rational decisions relating to economy and efficiency. Not to draw out the matter, one can point to the development of a very concept of a government budget, the development of the executive budget, and the development of what was called Program Budgeting. In the 1960's there came the further major development — as it was thought at the time — of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System.

With the "failure" of PPBS to live up to its expectations, and spurred

by the emerging economic and budgetary problems of the early seventies, attention turned to "productivity" — which really has been for the most part a new name for the complex of concerns designated by the old terms economy and efficiency. Concurrently a concern developed for "evaluation" and this is now prominent in our literature: how can we tell if a program is realizing its objectives, how do we measure the relative utilities of alternatives, and so forth?

The essence of the matter is that we are over our heads in complexity. Our technology, in terms of concepts, methods of measurement, and procedures simply does not enable us to do what we would like to do in making intelligent decisions. My earlier remarks about the difficulties of economics are, I think, relevant. We have relied centrally on economic concepts and technology for our analytical, decision-making tasks; but these do not enable us to do what we need to do.

2. **How to Achieve the Proper Amount, Balance and Mix of PROFESSIONALISM — or More Generally, of EXPERTISE.** It is hardly news that the twentieth century has witnessed an increase in expertise, a rise of professionalism. Many factors have combined to move in this direction. The increase of scientific knowledge and skill bases; the needs and problems of an increasingly complex civilization seem to require what expertise and professionals alone can do; impulses toward mobility and increasing opportunities for education provide the human material and motivation.

In general the problem created for public administration might be stated in these terms: expertise and professionalism are divisive and centrifugal in their effects. How, then, can we keep things together, at least together enough to prevent chaos; coordinated if not unified?

Two or three aspects for quick attention. First, increasing expertise and professionalism contribute to a problem of legitimacy, a "crisis of authority." In the traditional conception public authority — "the public interest" — is represented by elected officials and democratic control is effected through hierarchical authority under these elected officials. But expertise and professionalism create another kind of authority, the authority of **knowledge**. How can these two types of authority be reconciled? This is a general problem, and one with a considerable literature. It reaches beyond public administration into the private area. But special and difficult problems are presented in the area of public administration.

Second, one of the currents generated in the turbulence of the late sixties was "anti-credentialism." Not only — the argument goes — has the divisiveness of expertise and professionalism gone too far, but the need for some sort of "credential" or of "professional" status to perform certain functions has been extended beyond justification; such devices simply make it possible for the more affluent to obtain the better positions and thenceforth to enjoy economic advantages and disproportionate power. This counter-movement, so to speak, has been reflected in public administration in a drive to create the personnel ad-

ministration and administrative arrangements that will accommodate a range of "para" professionals who, it is held, can perform many of the functions that have been reserved for those with more formal education.

Third, involved here is the problem of the rapid obsolescence of knowledge in a society with the characteristics of a post-industrial society. But I shall make a special point of this later.

3. **How to deal with UNIONISM in the Public Sector.** This is a problem that, obviously, overlaps that of expertise and professionalism. On the whole, at least, unions represent skills, and unions of course are organizations with characteristics similar to those of professional organizations.

The upsurge of unionism, collective bargaining, and strikes in and against public organizations is hardly news, or rather, one might say, that such matters are news since they are staples in the daily reportage by newspaper and television. And not only in the United States: unionism in the public services is generally a Western phenomenon and problem.

The rise of unionism in the public services has gone so far to make personnel administration a new "game." For that matter, professionalism has also tended to transform the previous structure of "civil service" norms and techniques. It may go too far and be a prejudicial way of putting it to say that public authority is "eroded" by these developments. Nevertheless, certainly there is an element of what I earlier called "playing the film backwards": power gathered up and concentrated as the state was created now seems to be increasingly parcelled out. One can make a case that this is "good"; but it can hardly be denied that new and difficult problems are presented by the parceling out.

The problems that are presented should be viewed in the light of much that has been reviewed earlier. It is hardly irrelevant to the problems presented and the solutions that have been or can be worked out that the government has become responsible not only for a high level of economic activity, but for the attainment of a substantial degree of social equity; that public and private as traditionally conceived become increasingly blurred and intertwined; that professional and union issues become involved with class, ethnic, regional and other issues.

4. **How to Balance the Values and Mechanisms of Centralization and Decentralization.** How to achieve the proper balance of centralization and decentralization is a problem as old as the Egyptian Old Kingdom and the first Chinese empire. So it is hardly a new problem. But factors that have been reviewed — and factors that have not — create new problems and require new solutions.

My perception is that this problem is worldwide in some of its aspects. I am myself much interested in how the problem is presented and how "solutions" are reached, for example, in Russia and in China. Federal states attempt to solve the problem under special conditions and a case

can be made that these "special conditions" both impose restraints and offer opportunities.

I will observe further only this: "Almost everything" relates to the centralization-decentralization mix, and vice versa. History well illustrates that the problem is difficult to solve with a stable culture and economy, but when many factors and variables are involved, as emphatically they are in our own case, then the problem is extremely difficult to solve satisfactorily. I add: the problem is not one for solution only "within" the state, but involves the growing network of transitional organizations.

5. How to deal with Problems of Racial/Ethnic and Sexual Equity. With regard to problems of racial/ethnic equity in the public services, no doubt most of you are better informed than I. But let me point out and emphasize that this is not a problem of the United States alone. Indeed, it is not simply a problem of those societies one thinks of as "mixed" but those that one thinks of at first blush as being homogeneous. That is to say, a difference of color need not necessarily be involved. Canada, France, and Britain are not without their own version of our problems. Nor for that matter, Russia. Or Nigeria or Kenya.

In the United States the problems concerned are intertwined with the issues raised by professionalism and anti-credentialism, with the problems of centralization and decentralization, and with others. Especially important is the conflict of the Revolution of Rising Expectations and the Revolution of Lowering Expectations: at some point a movement for "quality of life" as against "quantity of life" appears to become a resistance on the part of a privileged white majority against a movement toward more opportunities and equality.

"Women's lib" undoubtedly has many ephemeral or faddish aspects. But I judge it also to be a secular trend and not just a temporary fad.

For both racial/ethnic and sexual equity there are of course so-called affirmative action programs both in the private sphere and in the public sector. Affirmative action again qualifies and rewrites what has been called personnel administration. Both of them, of course, present problems. Nor are they the same problems in all cases. While the two movements to some extent are overlapping, there are also elements of conflict. The center of Women's Liberation is the white, middle class, business or professional female. To the extent that Women's Lib then creates families with two professional salary earners this can be seen as "competition" from the viewpoint of racial/ethnic aspirations.

6. How to Cope with the Problem of Obsolescence of Knowledge in Public Administration. The problem here is related to the rise of the post-industrial society. The great increase of and rapid change in scientific-technical knowledge creates an unprecedented situation. No longer is it possible to become trained in a field of expertise or a profession "for life." The knowledge base for technical, scientific and professional performance is constantly changing due to the "knowledge explosion."

The terminology applied to the decay of radioactivity has been used to characterize the result: a certain field of knowledge is said to have, say, a half-life of ten years. Which means, of course, that ten years after entering upon employment one has only half the knowledge needed for optimum performance unless there has been further learning.

Patently this is not just a public administration problem but a general societal problem. But it is a public administration problem. How do we ensure that the latest knowledge is being applied to decision and action? How do we ensure the continuous infusion of new knowledge — by retraining, rotation, mid-career programs at the work place or in other settings, and so forth? My view is that this is a worldwide problem. All countries have the problem, but it presents itself in strikingly different ways and is often not recognized for what it is. In our own case, I think we have a fairly good perception that there is a problem and some useful ideas about how to proceed. But then, we are far from adequate solutions and in many respects we are fumbling badly.

7. How to Deal with Policy Making in and by the Bureaucracy. This tremendous problem has two general aspects, one legal and symbolic, the other substantive.

On the legal and symbolic side, the problem might be stated this way: By what right, by whose authority, is policy made by non-elected public administrators? I premise, of course, that public administrators do make policy over a wide and important area, and I would not expect any disagreement on that.

But in the United States we have special problems of a legal and symbolic nature in recognizing and legitimizing what happens. The present situation certainly is not foreseen or legitimated by the language of the Constitution itself; it is only partially legitimated by Constitutional interpretation and by usage. Nor is policy-making by public administrators easily and fully legitimated by the formulae worked out to reconcile what takes place with democratic ideology. The most familiar formula is, of course, that commonly referred to as "overhead democracy." According to this rationale, responsibility moves upward to the highest non-elected administrator. He in turn is responsible to an elected chief executive and/or to elected legislators, and thence to the electorate. Authority is seen as following the same channel, but flowing in the other direction. This is not a bad rationale; it has served useful purposes. But it is by no means totally persuasive and it by no means deals with all contemporary problems.

Substantively the general problem can be stated as follows: where, by whom, using what methods is public policy to be made, so far as it is made, in public administration. This takes us back to a number of things previously mentioned, such as how traditional authority can be reconciled with the authority of knowledge.

My perception is that the substantive problems exist around the world,

however differently they are presented in one country from another. Perhaps also one can argue that the legal and symbolic problems exist worldwide. Undoubtedly, however, our own situation is unique. In no other country is there a close equivalent to our Constitution, federal system, continental size, economic development, social complexity, and so forth, combined with a rather well developed devotion to something called democracy which is interpreted in terms of personal liberty and personal equality.

8. How to Balance the Needs (or Should One Say Demands?) of the Present and Proximate Future Against the Needs of a More Distant Future. Centrally involved here is the conflict between the Revolution of Rising Expectations and the Revolution of Lowering Expectations.

One response could well be, Are you talking about planning? And my answer would be, Yes and No. At least as I see the matter, the problem area is broader than that ordinarily thought of as planning, even "national planning."

Obviously much of the Futurist literature reflects the concern for reconciling the two Revolutions. But the matter is not merely one for think tanks and academic discussions. The issues are prominent in our daily life, in political controversy, in economic activity (or inactivity), and even in our popular songs.

Anyone who goes into public administration today and achieves any sort of responsible position will inevitably be confronting issues where the two revolutions meet and create turbulence. I will leave it with that, since some of the matters concerned are at least mentioned in other connections.

9. How to Staff, Manage, Direct and Control New Forms of Organization. What attention I have given to the Futures literature has been motivated in large part by a desire to know what the future might hold for organization and management. For the same reason, I have tried to read everything that deals with the future of organizations as this is seen by specialists on organization theory and behavior. While of course there is a fair amount of disagreement and "fuzziness" there is also, it seems to me, considerable agreement on the following points.

First, the organizations of the future will be less bureaucratic. Actually, this is both a description or projection and a prescription; that is, most writers not only see this trend as inevitable, they see it as good. By "less bureaucratic" is meant that organizations will be flatter, less hierarchical; that authority will be less "authoritarian"; that there will be more fluidity and adaptivity — and so forth. Bureaucratic organizations, it is widely held, were created in and were suitable for the pre-industrial and the industrial world. But they do not accord with the needs and demands of the post-industrial world, with its great fluidity and its need for rapid change and adaptation.

Second, there will be a great increase in "mixed organizations" or organizations in the Third Sector. This evokes echoes of course of my

previous remarks about the fading of the distinction between public and private, the creation of a Gray Area.

Third, as against a universe of separate and discrete organizations each with a well-defined task or function, the future will be characterized by chains, complexes and systems of organizations performing general functions in a highly interdependent socio-economic complex. So great is the complexity of modern society, it is held, that by and large no single organization can have complete control over anything important. In important areas such as health and medical care the future will be characterized by an unbelievably complex joining of different organizations, public, private, and "gray." In this world, I should say, we don't even have a terminology for what is involved: little can be "administered" or "managed" in a traditional sense. "Cooperation" comes closer, but even this term or those like it are hardly adequate for description or prescription.

Fourth, there will be an increase of inter- or multi-national organizations. This would seem to be an inevitable concomitant of increasing complexity and interrelatedness on a large geographical scale; and it would seem also to be a concomitant of the proliferation of states: The world is thereby divided into "smaller pieces" that must somehow then be related one to another. The number of transnational organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, has been steadily increasing for a century; and in the past decade the number of both categories was sharply upward.

While these organizations span the spectrum of functions, the most impressive ones in which ways are, of course, the multi-national economic units. While their rapid growth of the fifties and sixties has now been slowed, nevertheless they are prominent in the future. In this connection I cite an alleged "fact" which recently came to my attention: If the eighteen largest multi-nationals are aggregated they form an economic aggregate that is the fourth largest in the world, after the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the European Economic Community.

To try to draw out the implications of my four points goes far beyond the present opportunities. But patently if the projections are even reasonably accurate, the implications for the future of public administration are great indeed.

10. How to Develop Less Authoritarian, Less Bureaucratic Organizations, Without at the Same Time Permitting or Encouraging Undesirable Confusion, Even Intolerable Chaos. Perhaps this problem is only a drawing out of implications of previous ones, particularly the one just discussed.

Anyhow — much evidence points toward the need for and the evolution toward less bureaucratic organizations. But as bureaucratic forms weaken and disappear, being replaced by "organic, adaptive" organizations, what happens with regard to the bureaucratic virtues:

stability, predictability, precision, responsibility, punctuality, efficiency, and so forth?

Some possible responses to the question are, first, that these virtues existed by definition or imputation and not necessarily, or importantly, in fact. Second, it might be responded that these are indeed virtues and that they were indeed needed in the world to which bureaucracy was the response; but a new world demands a reorientation of values and other values must be weighed against these traditional values. Third, it might be responded that these virtues are indeed real and important but that they are not now obtainable through traditional bureaucratic forms and styles — and that we must think through the whole matter again.

A related and overlapping problem might be stated this way, How to create organizations that develop or at least permit whole human beings rather than creating “deformed” ones. Back of this concern is a large literature dealing with an alleged deformation and impoverishment of persons who find it necessary to fit within the “space” given to them in bureaucratic organizations; and the allegation that much of the alienation and anomie of contemporary society are related to bureaucratic organizational constraints and styles.

These concerns engage the so-called “organizational humanists” who attempt, one way or another, to ameliorate or solve the problem. There is a problem, in my estimation — or rather I would say, a complex of problems; problems personal, organizational, and societal.

Perhaps, however, this is a problem or a complex of problems only of relatively affluent societies? Until basic needs, in a Maslowian needs-hierarchy sense, are satisfied, such problems do not emerge or become salient?

In conclusion, I am painfully aware that I have discussed too many things too loosely. But I rationalize this by saying: Anyone who tried to speak to the present and future of public administration without at least mentioning the things I have set forth would be guilty of trying to deal with the subject in a misleadingly narrow frame.

DWIGHT WALDO is Professor of Political Science and Public Administration, Albert Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities at Syracuse University, and Editor-in-Chief of *Public Administration Review*. He is a consultant to the National Science Foundation, a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and an honorary life member of the International City Management Association. He is an author and contributor to numerous publications. Waldo earned his Ph.D. from Yale.