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Shayla Nunnally

University of Connecticut - Storrs, shayla.nunnally@uconn.edu

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Zero-Sum Politics as a Trust Dilemma? How Race and Gender Affect Trust in Obama's and Clinton's Representation of Group Interests

Shayla C. Nunnally
University of Connecticut

This analysis deploys multiple regression Models and uses embedded survey experiments from a 2007 national web-based survey to determine African American, Latino, and Caucasian Democrats' trust in Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama to represent racial, gender, and intersectional interests. Three hypotheses are tested to discern whether respondents' trust varies based on their: 1) race trumping gender, 2) gender trumping race, and/or 3) intersectionality enhancing trust, when their race and gender mirror the candidate's race and gender. Results indicate that Democrats of all racial groups trust Obama more than Clinton to represent African Americans' and African American women's interests. Democrats trust Clinton more to represent the interests of Caucasians, Caucasian women, Latinas, and women, in general. Gender differences between African American men and women indicate that African American women are more trusting than African American men of Clinton representing African Americans' and African American women's interests.

Voters assess politicians prospectively and retrospectively to determine how much they will trust them to represent their political interests (Bianco 1994). When information about candidates is low, voters are more likely to attach stereotypes to the race and gender of candidates in their political assessments (McDermott 1997; McDermott 1998). Hence, politicians' own social groupings matter in voters' political perceptions. As members of social groups, themselves, voters not only perceive *congruent* and *incongruent* political interests (substantive representation) but also *congruent* and *incongruent* demographic characteristics (descriptive representation) between themselves and political candidates (Pitkin 1967).

Scholars recognize the importance that descriptive representation, and hence,

congruent social groupings between voters and candidates can have for enhancing political trust (Mansbridge 1998; Williams 1998). By the same token, incongruent descriptive representation with politicians can have deleterious effects on voters' political perceptions and political behavior, thusly, suppressing their political trust and willingness to participate in politics (Gay 2002). Thus, politicians, themselves, also symbolize the representation and politics of political winners or political losers, and for them, such associations can mean electoral wins or electoral losses. With respect to political trust in politicians' representation of various group's interests, it can mean different segments of the electorate trust them more or less to represent the political interests of certain groups. Whether voters assume political stakes as losers or winners also affects their perceptions of political trust (Hetherington 2005), and when voters perceive that political winners succeed at the expense of political losers, this is indicative of *zero-sum politics*.

Depending upon the vantage point of voters, certain *social* groups may be perceived as political winners, whereas others may be perceived as political losers. Race and gender are two social categories for which people assume political consciousness, and thus, can become easily cued to assess political gains and losses for their own groups versus others. Thus, politicians face a *zero-sum trust dilemma* for which they have to overcome in their campaigns, when voters account for race and gender from the vantage points of their own social groupings, those of the politicians, and those of the groups other than their own in order to extend different levels of trust in politicians' representation. This dilemma leads to an important inquiry: Do the race and/or gender of prospective voters affect the extent to which they perceive that politicians can best represent race-sex groups' interests? Moreover, do (in)congruent pairings of the race and gender of candidates with constituent groups affect how prospective voters trust in politicians to represent race-sex groups?

Indeed, this paper suggests that this is the case via three ways that the race and gender (in)congruency of prospective voters with political candidates can operate in their political trust perceptions about the quality of representation that candidates can offer race-sex groups: 1) race trumps gender 2) gender trumps race and 3) intersectionality enhances trust, when both race *and* gender are congruent between a candidate and a prospective voter. To this extent, this paper recognizes that race and gender can become a conundrum among voters that are sorting through their own social categorizations and identities to relate to political candidates and assess the quality of representation they can offer in elected office.¹

Given the saliency of race and gender in the historic 2008 presidential Democratic Party primaries, it is important to study the aforementioned trust dilemma with respect to the candidacies of, then, Senator Barack Obama and Senator Hillary Clinton and their potential to appeal to (or discourage) various intersections of the American public to trust the representation either can bear for various groups' interests. In this vein, this study examines how voters' race (African American, Caucasian, and Latino) and gender (male and female) influence their trust in Clinton and Obama to represent the interests of African Americans, Caucasians, Latinos,² women, African American women, Caucasian women, and Latinas. Using public opinion data from a national, web-based survey conducted prior to the presidential primary, this paper examines how race and gender operate in political trust perceptions in a low-information, political context that immediately preceded the 2008 Democratic Party's presidential primary.

The analysis in the paper proceeds with a discussion of the saliency of race and gender as a trust dilemma during the 2008 presidential primary, the influence of race and gender in voters' perceptions of political candidates, and a theory about how race and gender

operate in zero-sum trust dilemmas for the assessment of Clinton's and Obama's representations of groups' interests. The paper culminates in the data analyses of embedded survey experiments and multiple regression models of respondents' political trust perceptions in Clinton and Obama to represent various race-sex groups.

Race, Gender and the 2008 Presidential Campaigns: Obama/Clinton Trust Dilemmas

Race and gender influence constituents' opinions about the quality of their representation, political candidates, and political trust in representatives and the political system (Philpot and Walton 2007; Tate 2003; Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998; Swain 1993). More specifically, as a consequence of these factors' influences on constituents' opinions, African American and/or women candidates have battled stereotypes associated with their perceived leadership styles and political interests (Larson 2006; Hawkesworth 2003; McDermott 1998; McDermott 1997). Candidates who are African American, especially, have historically faced voters' fears about their commitments to representing only their own demographic group interests, and these perceived racial group-related interests also have been characterized as adverse to Caucasians' interests (Orey and Ricks 2007; McCormick and Jones 1993; Bullock 1984). Similarly, candidates who are women have and continue to face voters' concerns about their skills for political leadership and their entrée into public life, for politics has been constructed historically as a public sphere dominated by and exclusive to men only (McDermott 1998; McDermott 1997).

In sum, as historic stereotypes for both groups would dictate, African American and/or women candidates' representation potentially symbolized their political styles in ways that were viewed as incompetent or expedient based on the interests of constituents that shared their African American and/or female demographic group(s), thus, potentially limiting their perceived capacity to represent cross-racial and cross-gendered interests or interests outside those commonly associated with their social groups. An underlying assumption was that candidates with the same demographic backgrounds as their constituents would be partial to those groups' interests only and politically maneuver in ways that were adverse to the interests of people with backgrounds different from their own. In turn, such representatives could be trusted in very limited ways by non-group members because their representation was not seen as universal. Rather, representatives would be perceived as being trusted more to represent constituents with congruent demographic characteristics to their own, whereas political trust, conversely, would diminish for the representation of constituents with incongruent demographic characteristics. Thus, when pundits expressed concerns about whether former Senator Barack Obama, an African American (male) candidate, and former Senator Hillary Clinton, a (Caucasian) female candidate, could garner universal support in the 2008 presidential election, these concerns were grounded in historical legitimacy about American political behavior and public opinion that often proved resistant to the election of candidates from these under-represented groups.

During the 2008 presidential primary season, Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama squared-off in what became a highly contested race towards the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. While several candidates shared candidacies for the presidency under the Democratic Party banner, Obama and Clinton clearly captured the spotlight as front-running candidates prior to the primaries. For both, as noted before, media attention focused on their historic candidacies as viable African American or woman candidates for the presidency. Their viable campaigns, however, would not transpire without controversy over the extent to which their race and gender and the race and gender of prospective voters

would make a difference in their abilities to attract support to help them win the Democratic Party's nomination, and ultimately, a seat in the Oval Office.

As Walsh (2009) notes, the media also were active in deploying racial and gender stereotypes applicable to both Clinton's and Obama's candidacies. By recounting events affecting Obama's and Clinton's candidacies during the 2008 presidential primary, the significance of race and gender in trust dilemmas during their candidacies seems apparent. Moreover, we see how these trust dilemmas relate to perceptions of the candidates by specific race and gender groups. Of special note is the extent to which such trust dilemmas manifest in racial- and gender-oriented ways (as examined in this study) prior to the commencement of the Democratic Party's presidential primary season, in part, because of the stereotypes that prospective voters subscribe to without the political learning that can occur via campaign and media messages that accelerate during election cycles, part and parcel, because of their political function.

Candidate Obama, for example, faced a trust dilemma among African Americans, wherein discourses among African Americans initially questioned the viability, focus, and sincerity of his candidacy. More pointedly, they questioned Obama's ability to represent African American group interests (see Dawson 1994), especially as a bi-racial (racially African American and Caucasian) candidate, because he was not perceived as descriptively "black enough" (Cobb 2008).³ As Obama became increasingly racialized as a "black candidate" throughout the primary, it appeared that his appeal among African Americans increased (Steinhauser 2008), and by the Democratic National Convention, African Americans (men and women) mostly supported him (Newport 2008). With respect to gender, the media also participated in gender stereotyping of Obama through the feminization of him in ways that Walsh (2009) suggests challenged his deviation from commonly held negative stereotypes about African American masculinity.

But, despite Obama's bi-racial background, his "trustability" among Caucasian seemed to be most questionable, as the media exposed his connection to Reverend Jeremiah Wright, Obama's pastor, whose controversial sermons about America and African American nationalism⁴ made Obama seem more radical and "anti-white" by association. In this sense, he was more "black" and "not white enough."⁵ In response to the controversy, Obama eventually made his "A More Perfect Union" speech about race in America, renounced his church membership with Wright's church, and distanced himself from Reverend Wright (Zeleny and Nagourney 2008). Obama tried to run a de-racialized campaign, but inevitably, throughout the campaign season, he became more racialized, "otherized," and stereotyped as racially insensitive to Caucasians and working class Caucasians, in particular (Kenski, Hardy, and Jamieson 2010; Walsh 2009).⁶ Yet, he still was able to garner enough support to outpace Clinton in the Democratic primaries.⁷ In response to Obama's successful primary wins, for example, Clinton tried to use race and class to her advantage.

Following Obama's reference to Americans living in rural areas as being "bitter" about their circumstances and "clinging to their guns," Clinton's campaign attempted to brand Obama as an "elitist" who was implicitly out of touch with Caucasian, working class voters. Subsequently, Clinton garnered landslide victories over Obama in the West Virginia and Pennsylvania primaries, creating what *Newsweek* (May 5, 2008 issue) termed as Obama's "Bubba Gap" (see also Thomas et al. 2008; Seelye 2008).

In order to appropriate her own gender image, Clinton's campaign also made sure that she benefited from a photo opportunity showing her drinking alcohol "with the guys." This image could bolster her support among (Caucasian) men, perhaps to gain their political

trust and to overshadow gender-related stereotypes about her/women's political performance. Walsh (2009) attributes such stereotyping of Clinton's candidacy to the construction of her as a "mythical man," a woman attempting to acquire an inlet with men by challenging traditional roles and stereotypes associated with women. For Clinton and other women candidates, this becomes a trust dilemma in their ability to appeal to voters across gender lines in order to garner trust in their representation, for gender stereotypes detract support from women candidates (Koch 2000).

Clinton also increasingly strategized ways to appeal more to Caucasian women, Latinos, and Caucasian males, more specifically.⁸ As a Caucasian woman candidate, Clinton's trust dilemma also involved broadening her appeal and increasing her trustability to represent fairly the interests not only across genders but also across non-Caucasian, race-sex groups. Otherwise, Clinton could be stereotyped as representing only the interests of Caucasians, women, and particularly, Caucasian women. Clinton initially had large support among African-Americans (male and female), but later lost it perhaps due to several campaign gaffes directly and indirectly related to race and African American political achievements in relation to Obama's presidential candidacy.⁹ Subsequently, her strategy of cross-racial mobilization focused on the Latino vote, especially after her support among African-Americans dwindled later in the primary season.

The presidential primary bid between Clinton and Obama also was very contentious and very closely contested, lasting well into summer 2008, when traditionally by this time, a clear-cut front-runner and party nominee would have been established for either of the two major political parties. When the primary season was coming to a close in early June, before the Democratic National Convention to be hosted in Denver, Colorado August 25-28, 2008, Obama's ultimate trust dilemma seemed to be his trustability to represent the interests of Caucasian women, in particular. Point blank, he lacked both racial and gender congruency with Caucasian women—traits Clinton had, and as Simien (Forthcoming) argues, both candidates represented "symbolic firsts" for which an African American person or a woman candidate would become the first of their historically, under-represented social group to assume their party's nomination for office of the U.S. presidency. Thus, both candidates symbolically represented all the historic challenges and new beginnings that their representation could bear as candidates for the highest office in U.S. politics.¹⁰ Ultimately, the question was, "Who *would* be the first to make history—a black (man) or a white woman?" Within this question also rested all the controversies over the intersections of race and gender that made this a complex question for voters who possessed either one or both social group characteristics of Clinton and Obama and who had the power to elect the nation's "historic first," as Simien describes further.

During the Democratic National Convention, Obama's vie for increased support among Caucasian women met a staunch challenge, as Caucasian women activists expressed ardent disapproval of his becoming the party's presidential nominee, and they previously led efforts to include the Michigan and Florida primary results counting toward the delegate count to promote Clinton's ultimate nomination as the first female presidential nominee of the Democratic Party (Horowitz 2008).¹¹ Even after winning the nomination, pundits questioned whether Obama could heal the seeming fissure between him and Clinton supporters, especially those who were Caucasian women. For some, this problem (one that could even be emblematic of a trust dilemma for Obama with respect to [Caucasian] women's interests) would last even through the general election, possibly even diminishing his chances to win the 2008 presidential election.¹²

The aforementioned primary season issues elucidate how integral race and gender were in voters' perceptions about representation and perhaps political trust in the 2008 Democratic Party presidential candidates to represent various groups' interests.¹³ Even without elite cueing or media framing during the primary season, as commonly noted in extant research, prospective voters possess predispositions and working stereotypes about candidates that can influence their trust in candidates to represent various social groups' interests. Simply put, such predispositions and working stereotypes influence how people characterize candidates and potentially the quality of representation they can bear as elected politicians. To shed some light on how these predispositions and stereotypes affect political perceptions of Clinton's and Obama's candidacies, the next section reviews the literature on candidate evaluations of African American and women candidates. Additionally, it offers meaningful evidence for hypothesizing how race and gender affect political trust in candidates' representation of intersectional, race-sex groups.

How Race and Gender Affect Candidate Evaluations and Stereotyping

In low-information elections, gender and race give voters cues about candidates (McDermott 1998; McDermott 1997), and these demographic cues contribute to negative stereotyping, discriminatory views, and failed electoral support for women and African American candidates, although with contradictory effects (Highton 2004; Reeves 1997; Plutzer and Zipp 1996). For example, voters stereotype women candidates as having beliefs and traits that are distinct from men (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Women also are viewed as more ethical than men (McDermott 1998), more compassionate and sensitive to issues related to children (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993), and more "liberal" as candidates (Koch 2000; McDermott 1998). The "liberal" stereotype also has a more disproportionate effect on reducing electoral support for women, Democratic candidates than for Republican, women candidates (Koch 2000). Aside from gender stereotypes about women candidates, women candidates also are more likely to be preferred by female voters, and female voters are more likely to vote for female candidates and to express voting preferences for female candidates than men express such preferences for male candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2002). This suggests that gender identities are tied to gender voting (see also Plutzer and Zipp 1996). Women candidates, thus, likely face trust dilemmas among prospective voters that involve their building cross-gendered trust. Subsequently, women should trust female candidates more than male candidates, and men should trust male candidates more than female candidates. But, the effect of gender identity on perceptions of candidates can be complicated by intersectionality with race, for, quite frankly, people have both gender and race.

For one, race can perhaps diminish a candidate's gender appeal. African American candidates, for example, historically have faced problems appealing to Caucasian voters who have feared African American politicians becoming racially expedient (Reeves 1997). Despite obtaining more successful office bids in areas with larger African American populations, African American candidates still have less successful bids in areas with more Caucasian (Lublin and Voss 2000), and Caucasian voters are slightly more willing to vote for Caucasian candidates than African American candidates (Voss and Lublin 2001), especially when Caucasian voters have higher racial prejudice attitudes (Terkildsen 1993). It is important to note that Caucasian also characterize African American candidates less positively than Caucasian candidates (Williams 1990), perceiving them as incompetent in policy-management (Sigelman et al. 1995), yet more competent in handling social issues more fairly, compassionately, and fervently, especially if they relate to the causes of the

poor and racial minorities (McDermott 1998).

In addition to perceiving African American conservatives as more moderate than Caucasian conservatives, similarly to women candidates, Caucasians stereotype African American candidates as being ideologically “liberal” (McDermott 1998). African American candidates, who often receive negative media attention about their indiscretions, competence, moral commitments to public office, and connections to people with extreme political views, also face diminished electoral support as a result of such media coverage (Larson 2006). This forces African American candidates to run de-racialized campaigns that de-emphasize race-related stereotypes and beliefs about racial issues, mostly in an effort to increase Caucasian electoral support (Gillespie 2012; Orey and Ricks 2007; McCormick and Jones 1993; Bullock 1984).

These racialized effects elucidate the trust dilemmas that African American candidates have to overcome to appear race-neutral to build cross-racial appeal among non-African American voters who are likely to trust them less in the representation of non-African Americans’ interests. Even partisanship affects how candidates are perceived as supporting the interests of racial or gender groups. Democratic candidates are perceived as being more compassionate on issues related to race and gender, and this partisan stereotype widens the gender gap among voters, reducing support among male voters, in particular (Hutchings et al. 2004). Among Caucasian constituents, they become distanced from the political process and politically trust less when more African Americans serve in their local political offices (Gay 2002), whereas African Americans who perceive that there are more African Americans represented in public service to Congress are more politically trusting (Tate 2003).

While there is mixed support for how the race of politicians affects political trust based on racial, descriptive representation or the lack thereof (Tate 2003; Gay 2002; Howell and Fagan 1988), clearly prospective evaluations of politicians’ loyalties to represent certain groups inform voters’ decision-making. Yet, current studies are limited in their investigation of the combined effects of candidates’ race and gender as an intersectional influence on voters’ political trust in candidates. (See also Smooth 2006 and Simien 2006.) Vice versa, we know limited information about how voters’ race and gender influence their trust in political candidates.

Evidence does support, however, that the intersection between race and gender can affect the ways that elected representatives represent, wield power, and facilitate the politics of Congress, leading to what Hawkesworth (2003) refers to as “raced-gendered institutions.” Moreover, evidence suggests that African American women politicians’ intersectional identities as African Americans and women influence their leadership styles (Walton and Philpot 2007), policy pursuits on behalf of their constituents with congruent social backgrounds (Brown, forthcoming), and mobilization of voters (Stokes-Brown and Dolan 2010) sometimes in ways that are distinctly perceived as different by African American women, in particular, in view of Caucasian women and African American male candidates (Walton and Philpot 2007). Therefore, it is tenable to suggest that the mass public perceives such demographic, intersectional groups and the politics attached to them among politicians, who pursue both their and their constituents’ interests. Politicians’ being African American or Caucasian and being female and male, thus, affect how people perceive the prospective quality of their representation. What this means for trust and the perception of zero-sum politics for the representation of race-sex groups, thus, deserve further research attention.

Zero-Sum Politics as a Trust Dilemma: Demography and Representation

Citizens have in their minds how they want their representatives to represent them, and for underrepresented groups, having a representative who shares social characteristics also can be more poignant and psychologically meaningful (Avery 2009; Griffin and Keane 2006; Tate 2003; Gay 2002; Williams 1998; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Howell and Fagan 1988). With limited descriptive representation, however, groups can feel alienated from the political process and politically trust less (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999; Gay 2002). To illustrate, perceptions of government responses to racial policies (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Globetti 2002) that are associated with non-Caucasians affect Caucasians' political trust and reduce their perceived linkage to the political system. Race, thus, becomes the center of zero-sum politics.

Bobo and Hutchings (1996) frame zero-sum politics with respect to race, wherein perceived gains in representation for one racial group appear to occur at the expense of perceived losses of another racial group. Zero-sum politics, however, does not account for the extent to which gender counterweighs perceived prospective representation by political candidates, who not only are socially categorized by their race but also by their gender. While gender politics have been structured less so in the frame of "zero-sum politics," it becomes of interest to know how race affects the way people process the gender of political candidates in their assessment of how much they can be trusted to represent the interests of intersectional, race-sex groups. Thus, in view of the intersections of race and gender for candidates' and voters' politics, zero-sum politics seems applicable for both categories, especially as far as trusting politicians to represent people's interests.

Zero-sum politics, herein, is an indirect concept involving the extent to which people trust in out-group members' abilities as politicians to best represent their personal, in-group interests and the group interests to which politicians are not a member, themselves—hence, out-group interests. To ask respondents whether they think, for example, an African American candidate will oppose the interests of Caucasian people may elicit a socially-desirable response. However, asking respondents how much they trust an African American candidate to represent the interests of Caucasian people asks them to consider the extent of their trust in the representation in general of this group without evoking racially-sensitive political motives that may suggest the respondent has explicit, racialized group interests in mind that also may appear disparaging to racial groups. Zero-sum politics, thus, suggests that candidates are viewed through myopic lenses, wherein their demographic backgrounds limit them being entrusted to represent universally across others' race-sex groups, and prospective voters' racial and gender backgrounds also influence these perceptions differently.

Mirrored representation based on the same demographic characteristics of a representative and her constituents comprises what Pitkin (1967) refers to as *descriptive representation*, and this type of representation can enhance people's perceived linkages to the political system. Based on general assumptions in the descriptive representation literature, voters with congruent descriptive characteristics with politicians should trust them more. With respect to politicians being able to represent other groups, descriptive representation among politicians will function as follows: (1) being most trustable when the politician's demographic group is congruent with other people who share her group and (2) being less trustable when the representative's demographic group is not congruent with the respective race and gender group(s)' interests of constituents.

Furthermore, by harkening implicit historical references to fear about the intentions

of candidates representing their own social groups' interests only, zero-sum politics suggests that, for example, only Caucasians can be trusted to represent best the interests of Caucasians, only African Americans can be trusted to represent best the interests of African Americans, and only women can be trusted to represent best the interests of women. To reiterate, from the view of zero-sum politics, candidates are perceived as less likely offering cross-racial and cross-gendered representation. Moreover, in view of candidates that are running against one another for the same political office, as was the case for Clinton and Obama in the 2008 Democratic Party's presidential primaries, one candidate may be perceived as best trusted to represent certain social groups more than the other candidate.

More specifically, people with incongruent group memberships with these candidates trust exclusively Obama more than Clinton to represent African American interests and people trust exclusively Clinton more than Obama to represent all women's interests. Yet, both Clinton and Obama have race and gender for which prospective voters can perceive and process in their political trust. Trust, however, will not be as clear-cut as far as intersectional race-sex groups whose cross-racial and cross-gender representations are complicated by cross-pressures from one of their social groups being congruent with one of the candidate's social groups and not both social groups. For example, African American women share race congruency with Obama and share gender congruency with Clinton. For Latinos, this means that both candidates should be trusted less to represent their interests compared to trust in the candidates to represent African Americans and Caucasians interests. Thus, the dilemma of trust deepens, as prospective voters sort through their demographic backgrounds, identities, and desires for representation based on these backgrounds.

Hypotheses

Via the zero-sum trust assessment of constituents' demographic congruency with political candidates, Obama's race will decrease Caucasians' and Latinos' trust in him to represent all non-African Americans' (Caucasians and Latinos) interests, will increase African Americans' trust in him more than non-African Americans to represent African Americans, and will increase the perception among non-African Americans that he can only best represent African Americans. His gender, however, should decrease women's trust in him to represent women's interests. Hence, African American women also should be less trusting of Obama than African American men.

For Clinton, her race should decrease African Americans' and Latinos' trust in her to represent all non-Caucasians' (African American and Latino) interests, increase Caucasians' trust in her more than non-Caucasians to represent Caucasians' interests, and increase non-Caucasians' perceptions that she can only best represent Caucasians. Her gender, however, should increase women's trust in her to represent women's interests. So, for example, African American women should be more trusting than African American men in Clinton to represent their interests.

Latinos, who lack racial/ethnic similarity with Clinton and Obama, in addition, should be less trusting than African Americans and Caucasians of both Obama and Clinton in representing Latinos' interests. Latinas as women, then, should trust Clinton to represent their intersectional interests; however, their trust in Clinton should be suppressed by the lack of shared racial/ethnic backgrounds with her, for which Obama commonly shares a non-Caucasian background with this group. To account for the complexity of intersectionality in the trust for these groups, several competing hypotheses about the influence of race and gender must be examined.

Hypothesis 1: Gender Trumps Race

When the race of a candidate and a respondent differs, shared gender with a candidate will increase political trust, especially as far as representing their gender interests. If gender matters more than race in trust evaluations of representation, Clinton should be trusted more than Obama by all women to represent the interests of all women, regardless of the women's race. Research on African American women's intersectional identities, however, suggests that either race or gender can become foremost or dually affective depending upon cueing or policy issues (Simien 2006; Gay and Tate 1998; Mansbridge and Tate 1992).¹⁴ If gender trumps race, however, African American women also should trust Clinton more than Obama to represent their interests racially and gender-wise. Based on gender trumping race, Latinas also should be more trusting of Clinton than Obama to represent both women's interests (regardless of race) and Latinas' interests because Clinton shares their gender. If gender trumps race for men, all men should be more trusting than women of Obama (as a male) because he shares their gender.

Hypothesis 2: Race Trumps Gender

Despite whether the gender of a candidate and a respondent differs, shared race with a candidate should increase political trust, especially to represent groups with congruent racial backgrounds. If race trumps gender, as a Caucasian candidate, Clinton's appeal to Caucasian voters should be more, regardless of gender, due to her shared race with them. That is, Caucasians should be more trusting of Clinton than they are of Obama, especially with respect to the representation of Caucasian group interests. Because of incongruent race memberships, Caucasians and Latinos also should be less trusting of Obama than African Americans are. African Americans also should be more trusting of Obama than Clinton, especially with respect to the representation of African American group interests. Thus, African American women should be no more trusting of Clinton than Obama because of their shared gender with Clinton, even as far as the representation of African American women's interests.

For Latinos, neither Clinton nor Obama offers race-based descriptive representation. Racially, both candidates can only serve as "surrogate" representatives (Mansbridge 1999). However, both Obama and Clinton possibly could be perceived by Latinos as being "trustable" to represent Latinos' interests, despite their lack of congruent racial memberships. Because of his shared racial minority status with Latinos, Obama should be perceived as more trustable than Clinton. However, research showing greater affinities for Caucasians than African Americans might suggest that Latinos favor Clinton (as a Caucasian candidate) more than Obama (as an African American candidate) (McClain et al. 2006). Due to these possibly mixed views of African Americans and Caucasians, Latinos should be more likely to distinguish trust between the two candidates, especially as far as the representation of Latinos' group interests. Because of the dual oppressions of race and gender for African American women and evidence suggesting that racial identities sometimes predominant their gender identities (Mansbridge and Tate 1992; Simien 2006), trust should be based more on congruent racial backgrounds than with congruent genders for the representation of their racial and intersectional group interests.

Hypothesis 3: Intersectionality Enhances Trust

When a candidate and a respondent share both race and gender characteristics,

political trust should increase. For African American men and Caucasian women, both candidates' racial *and* gender characteristics are congruent. Evidence also suggests that among African Americans, gender identification reinforces racial identification, especially among African American men, who are stronger race identifiers than African American women (Simien 2005). Thus, African American men and Caucasian women should be more trusting of Obama and Clinton, respectively, compared to other groups.

Data and Methods

Public opinion data for this study are analyzed from an original survey developed by the author. The national, web-based survey was administered by Luth Research Group via SurveySavvy. SurveySavvy has a panel of over 1 million potential respondents of which respondents were contacted to participate in the survey based on a stratified-sampling technique that over-sampled African Americans (because the data set focuses on black public opinion measures) and specified U.S. Census matching on gender and age characteristics per African American, Caucasian, and Latino racial group (of which Caucasians and Latinos serve as comparison groups in the analysis). Respondents sampled for the survey administration then opted-in to participating in the survey. The survey was in the field from December 26, 2007 through January 2, 2008, prior to the commencement of the 2008 presidential primary season, which started on January 3, 2008. It comprises N = 1021 respondents, of which n = 517 blacks, n = 252 whites, and n = 252 Latinos. Questions on the survey ask respondents about their racial and political socialization experiences, social, political, and racial attitudes, and attitudes about current events.

Dependent Variables

Several ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression models were tested to discern how respondents trusted Clinton and Obama to represent their interests based on race, gender, and the intersection of these two characteristics: *Trust in Clinton/Obama to Represent White Interests*; *Trust in Clinton/Obama to Represent Black Interests*; *Trust in Clinton/Obama to Represent Latino Interests*; *Trust in Clinton/Obama to Represent Women's Interests*; *Trust in Clinton/Obama to Represent Black Women's Interests*; *Trust in Clinton/Obama to Represent Latina Women's Interests*; and *Trust in Clinton/Obama to Represent White Women's Interests*. All respondents were asked to assess how much they trusted the candidates to represent the interests of each of the aforementioned groups. All the dependent variables were scaled (1 = not very much; 5 = very much). Comparisons of means (through paired t-test analysis) were analyzed for Democrats by race and by race-sex groups among women. OLS multiple regression analyses are analyzed for Democrats-only, with comparisons of different race-sex groups to determine the effects of race and gender on perceptions of candidates' trust.

Independent Variables

Demographic variables. In the models of trust in the representation of blacks/black women and whites/white women, I use dummy variables for *blacks* (black = 1, else = 0) and *Latinos* (Latino = 1, else = 0) in order to test differences in these groups' attitudes compared to whites' attitudes. In the models for trust in the representation of *Latinos'* interests, I include a dummy variable for whites (white = 1, else = 0) and blacks' opinions (black = 1, else = 0) in order to compare differences in these groups' attitudes in comparison to Latinos' attitudes. *Gender* is coded female = 1, male = 0. *Age* is scaled from youngest to oldest (age

18 and over). *Income* is scaled as household income, from \$14,999 or less through \$250,000 or over. *Education* is scaled from 9th grade through doctoral degree.

I include two dummy variables for region: *South* (South = 1, else = 0) and *West* (West = 1, else = 0). I control for the South in models of trust in representation for African-Americans, Caucasians, Latinos, and women of these various racial groups. I control for the West only in models of trust in representation for Latinos/Latinas because this region has the highest concentration of Latinos in the country, although, increasingly, more Latino immigrants are concentrating in the South, as well (McClain and Stewart 2006).

Ideology. Respondents were asked, “If you were to describe yourself in terms of how you think politically and socially, would you say that you are....?” (1 = very conservative, 5 = very liberal). There appears to be some discrepancy in the literature over the effect that ideology has on the perceptions of African American and women candidates. Sigelman et al. (1995) find no support for the ideological preferences of Caucasian voters influencing their perceptions of African American candidates. However, their research finds that African American candidates tend to be perceived more moderately than their actual conservative brands. McDermott (1998), on the other hand, finds evidence to suggest that women and black candidates are viewed more favorably by voters who identify as liberals, and liberals also are more likely to vote for women and African American candidates in hypothetical election scenarios. Furthermore, as Griffin and Keane (2006) find, political participation among African American liberals increases with descriptive representation. Liberals should be more trusting of both candidates than conservatives are.

Trust in National Government. Respondents were asked, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal, or national, government to do what is right?” (1 = just about always, 5 = hardly ever). The variable is scaled in the positive direction to indicate distrust in the national government. People who are less trusting of the national government also should be less trusting of Clinton and Obama as presidential candidates representing various interests. This is expected, in part, because anyone who is associated with representing in a national office (such as the presidency) should be judged similarly as being less trustworthy.

Partisanship. Respondents were asked, “How strong would you say your party identification is? The variable is scaled 1 = strong Republican to 5 = strong Democrat. The analysis is limited to Democrats only, those who identified as “weak” and “strong” Democrats. Of respondents who identified their partisanship, 29 percent of whites are Democrats (n = 223, or 65), compared to 72 percent of blacks (n = 471, or 339) and 55 percent of Latinos (n = 214, or 117).

Interaction Terms. To control for the effect that race and gender can have on trust in the candidates’ representation of groups’ interests, there is a multiplicative interaction term that is included in the models of all respondents and Democratic respondents’ attitudes in order to control for both race and gender—*black*female*; *Latina*female*; *white*female*; *black*male*; *Latino*male*; *white*male*. In models that include interactions between race and female (black*female and Latina*female), the reference category is white men, with the exception of models for Latino/a interests, wherein the reference category is Latino men.

African American Linked Fate. African American, specifically, are asked whether they perceive a linkage to other blacks: “Do you feel that what happens to other black people will have something to do with your life?” The variable scale is as follows: (1) Not a very great deal to do (2) Not a good deal to do (3) Somewhat to do (4) A good deal to do (5) A very great deal to do. I include this variable in the model of African American public

opinion as a standard African American identification measure.

Results

Embedded Survey Experiments. In Table 1, the comparison of means of Democrats' trust in Obama and Clinton to represent either racial, gender, or intersectional groups' interests demonstrates that all the racial groups trust Obama more than Clinton to represent African Americans' and African American women's interests, and African Americans interests in general. All groups also trust Clinton more than Obama to represent Caucasians', women's, and various race-sex groups' interests more than Obama, with the exception of African American women's interests.¹⁵ Only Caucasians and Latinos trust Clinton and Obama similarly to represent Latinos' interests, whereas African American respondents trust Obama more than Clinton to represent Latinos' and Latina women's interests.

Table 1: Differences of Means of Democrats to Trust in Clinton and Obama to Represent Group Interests

Trust to Represent...	Black Respondents		N = Diff. =	Latino Respondents		N = Diff. =	White Respondents		N = Diff. =
	Clinton	Obama		Clinton	Obama		Clinton	Obama	
Blacks	3.7	<u>4.2</u>	N = 323 Diff = .50****	3.6	<u>4.2</u>	N = 112 Diff = .60****	3.7	<u>4.2</u>	N = 76 Diff = .50****
Black Women	3.8	<u>4.2</u>	N = 320 Diff = .40****	3.8	<u>4.1</u>	N = 113 Diff = .30**	3.9	<u>4.1</u>	N = 76 Diff = .20**
Latinos	3.6	<u>4.0</u>	N = 300 Diff = .40****	3.5	3.4	N = 112 Diff = .10	3.7	3.5	N = 71 Diff = .20
Latina Women	3.7	<u>3.9</u>	N = 303 Diff = .20****	<u>3.7</u>	3.3	N = 110 Diff = .40****	<u>3.8</u>	3.4	N = 70 Diff = .40**
Whites	<u>4.2</u>	4.0	N = 322 Diff = .20****	<u>4.3</u>	3.5	N = 114 Diff = .80****	<u>4.0</u>	3.5	N = 77 Diff = .50**
White Women	<u>4.3</u>	4.0	N = 319 Diff = .30****	<u>4.4</u>	3.3	N = 113 Diff = 1.1****	<u>4.2</u>	3.6	N = 77 Diff = .40****
Women	<u>4.4</u>	4.1	N = 317 Diff = .30****	<u>4.3</u>	3.6	N = 110 Diff = .70****	<u>4.3</u>	3.6	N = 77 Diff = .70****

Note: * $p \leq .10$; ** $p \leq .05$; *** $p \leq .01$; **** $p \leq .001$; Items that are underscored indicate the candidate who is perceived as being trusted the most to represent the interests of the group.

Source: 2007 National Politics and Socialization Survey

Table 2 shows a comparison of mean differences among African American, Latina, and Caucasian women Democrats, with respect to their trust in Obama and Clinton to represent the interests of various racial, gender, and race-sex groups. From this analysis, it becomes clear that, for African American women, their racial identities resonate more than their gender with respect to their group interests. When comparing Clinton and Obama as candidates, African American women trust Obama more than Clinton to represent African Americans' interests. For the representation of African American women's interests, as an intersectional group, African American women also are more inclined to trust Obama over Clinton to represent their interests. Thus, in seeking congruency in their descriptive representation of a politician, race trumps gender. African American women perceive

gender as the descriptive characteristic that Clinton best represents for Caucasian women and women, in general. With respect to Latinas, yet again, African American women perceive Obama as being best entrusted to represent this group, suggesting that they possibly perceive Obama's shared minority status with Latinas as being an important indicator (even over his gender as a man) for him to best represent Latinas. Thus, in a zero-sum way, African American women perceive that Clinton's race will perhaps interfere with the best representation that she can offer non-Caucasian women, and it also appears that they perceive that Clinton's race as a Caucasian woman best enhances her ability to represent the interests of Caucasians, in general.

Despite African American women's perceived connection between Obama and Latinas, Latinas do not perceive a prevailing racial/ethnic minority status with Obama. Instead, they perceive Obama as best representing the interests of both African-Americans in general and African American women. With respect to the representation of interests of Latinas in general, absent of any shared racial/ethnic background with Clinton, Latina women trust Clinton more than Obama. Gender also appears to resonate more for them, as they also entrust Clinton to represent not only the interests of Latinas but also Caucasians, Caucasian women, and women in general. In this sense, the shared gender with Clinton appeals more to Latina women, as they trust Clinton more universally to represent their, Caucasians, and women's interests. Thus, Obama becomes a representative trustable to represent African-Americans' interests only.

From the view of Caucasian women, race and gender operate differently. While Caucasian women perceive Obama to be entrusted most to represent the interests of African Americans in general, their perceptions are indistinguishable between the two candidates with respect to the representation of African American women and Latinas. However, clearly, shared gender with Clinton promotes their trust in her more than Obama to represent the interests of Latinas, Caucasian women, and women in general (excluding African American women). Thus, for Caucasian women, shared race and gender with Clinton enhances their trust perception that she can best represent more universally for certain groups and not others. Shared race and gender between Caucasian women and Clinton appears to support for intersectionality enhancing trust. This trust perception, however, has its limits with respect to the shared gender Clinton has with African American women and perhaps the lack of ethnic congruency she has with Latinas based on race/ethnicity and gender (especially, with respect to Latino men). However, Caucasian women perceive a gender connection between Latinas and Clinton that they feel she can offer sufficient descriptive representation.

In the OLS multivariate regression analysis that compares various racial and gender groups' attitudes to Caucasian women's (results not shown), African American women are more likely than Caucasian women to trust Obama to represent women's interests, although this relationship is modestly statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

Table 2: Differences of Means of Women Democrats to Trust in Clinton and Obama to Represent Group Interests

Trust to Represent...	Black Women Respondents		N = Diff. =	Latina Women Respondents		N = Diff. =	White Women Respondents		N = Diff. =
	Clinton	Obama		Clinton	Obama		Clinton	Obama	
Blacks	3.8	<u>4.2</u>	N = 201 Diff. = .40****	3.7	<u>4.2</u>	N = 73 Diff. = .50****	3.9	<u>4.2</u>	N = 41 Diff. = .30****
Black Women	3.9	<u>4.1</u>	N = 198 Diff. = .20****	3.8	<u>4.1</u>	N = 74 Diff. = .30*	4.0	4.1	N = 41 Diff. = .10
Latinos	3.7	<u>4.0</u>	N = 183 Diff. = .30****	<u>3.5</u>	3.4	N = 73 Diff. = .10	3.8	3.5	N = 38 Diff. = .30
Latina Women	3.8	<u>3.9</u>	N = 185 Diff. = .10**	<u>3.7</u>	3.3	N = 72 Diff. = .40****	<u>3.9</u>	3.5	N = 210 Diff. = .40**
Whites	<u>4.2</u>	4.0	N = 200 Diff. = .20****	<u>4.3</u>	3.6	N = 74 Diff. = .70****	<u>4.2</u>	3.5	N = 42 Diff. = .70**
White Women	<u>4.3</u>	3.9	N = 198 Diff. = .40****	<u>4.4</u>	3.3	N = 74 Diff. = 1.1****	<u>4.3</u>	3.5	N = 42 Diff. = .80****
Women	<u>4.4</u>	4.0	N = 198 Diff. = .40****	<u>4.3</u>	3.5	N = 72 Diff. = .80****	<u>4.3</u>	3.6	N = 42 Diff. = .70****

Note: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; ****p ≤ .001; Items that are underscored indicate the candidate who is perceived as being trusted the most to represent the interests of the group.

Source: 2007 National Politics and Socialization Survey

There are no other statistically significant differences between other groups and Caucasian women’s trust in Obama to represent women’s interests. Similarly, African American women are more likely than Caucasian women to trust Obama to represent Caucasian women’s interests, and there are no other trust differences between other groups’ trust and Caucasian women’s. African American women are also more likely than Caucasian women to trust Obama to represent Caucasians’ interests, in general. As far as trust in Clinton, there are no statistically significant differences in trust between the intersectional groups’ trust and Caucasian women’s. Thus, despite a preferred trust in Clinton’s representation, Caucasian women are no more likely than Caucasian men (or other racial groups) to trust Clinton to represent various groups’ interests, and this eliminates support for congruent intersectionality in race and gender enhancing trust for Caucasian women, beyond levels of trust, evident among others.

Table 3 shows multivariate regression analyses comparing intersectional perceptions based on the race *and* gender of female and male Democratic respondents, as compared to Caucasian men. The results indicate that African American and Latino male Democrats are more trusting of Clinton to represent Caucasian group interests than Caucasian males are. Only African American male Democrats trust Clinton more than Caucasian male Democrats to represent Caucasian women’s interests. African American men also are more likely than Caucasian men to trust Obama to represent Caucasians’ interests, Caucasian women’s interests, and women’s interests. None of the women’s attitudes, especially Caucasian women, differ statistically from Caucasian men. Neither does any of the intersectional, race-sex groups’ views statistically differ from Caucasian men’s with respect to trust in either Clinton or Obama to represent African-Americans’ and African American women’s interests. Thus, being Caucasian does not enhance trust in Clinton’s representation among Caucasian men. In fact, the opposite may be the case, such

that Clinton’s gender is actually suppressing the extent of trust in her representation among Caucasian men to represent Caucasians regardless of their gender and to represent people universally. It appears that there is distancing between Caucasian men and Clinton, wherein gender trumps race in trusting Clinton, but in no clear way does it enhance trust in Obama as a male candidate.

**Table 3: American Democrats’ Trust in Clinton and Obama’s Representation
(With White Men as a Reference Group)**

	Blacks’ Interests		Black Women’s Interests		Whites’ Interests		White Women’s Interests		Women’s Interests	
	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama
Black (Men)	-0.084 (.2190)	.0408 (.2000)	-.1294 (.2242)	.0590 (.2039)	.4742*** (.1711)	.6546*** (.2006)	-.3139* (.1786)	.4571** (.2091)	-.0484 (.1851)	.5367*** (.2009)
Latino (Men)	.0249 (.2602)	-.0342 (.2375)	.0271 (.2663)	-.1401 (.2422)	.5218** (.2032)	.0974 (.2384)	.2772 (.2122)	-.2779 (.2483)	.0846 (.2196)	-.1259 (.2384)
Female (Whites)	.2371 (.2746)	.0876 (.2485)	.0459 (.2786)	-.0178 (.2562)	.2688 (.2125)	.1282 (.2521)	.1209 (.2219)	-.0720 (.2596)	-.1923 (.2297)	.1069 (.2494)
Age	.1296*** (.0307)	-.0339 (.0281)	.0813*** (.0313)	.0146 (.0289)	.0760*** (.0239)	.0781*** (.0285)	.0261 (.0249)	.1059*** (.0299)	.0184 (.0257)	.1151*** (.0285)
Income	.0278 (.0305)	-.0246 (.0277)	.0301 (.0313)	-.0185 (.0283)	.0239 (.0237)	-.0170 (.0279)	.0271 (.0248)	.0011 (.0291)	.0201 (.0257)	-.0166 (.0281)
Education	-.0176 (.0271)	.0222 (.0247)	-.0457 (.0278)	.0058 (.0253)	-.0193 (.0211)	.0593** (.0249)	-.0185 (.0220)	.0215 (.0260)	-.0048 (.0229)	-.0282 (.0250)
South	.1133 (.1104)	.1824* (.1014)	.1876* (.1128)	.2510** (.1041)	-.0075 (.0859)	.1705* (.1024)	.0637 (.0897)	.2019* (.1070)	.1453 (.0930)	.1716* (.1026)
Ideology	.0404 (.0309)	-.0310 (.0462)	.0557 (.0519)	-.0638 (.0472)	.0594 (.0396)	.0598 (.0464)	.0036 (.0413)	.0245 (.0487)	.0114 (.0429)	-.0016 (.0470)
Distrust in National Government	-.3920*** (.0804)	-.1876** (.0731)	-.2942*** (.0826)	-.1948*** (.0748)	-.1860*** (.0626)	-.1800** (.0735)	-.1736*** (.0654)	-.1647** (.0772)	-.2243*** (.0679)	-.1891*** (.0740)
Black * Women	.1298 (.3056)	-.1338 (.2770)	.2290 (.3106)	-.1197 (.2854)	-.3881* (.2369)	-.2614 (.2809)	-.2598 (.2473)	-.0977 (.2899)	.2969 (.2563)	-.1887 (.2784)
Latino* Women	-.0050 (.3531)	-.0422 (.3215)	.0906 (.3591)	.1975 (.3300)	-.2795 (.2740)	-.0576 (.3247)	-.1644 (.3358)	.1097 (.3358)	.1173 (.2961)	-.1533 (.3236)
Constant	3.899*** (.4734)	4.927*** (.4298)	4.310*** (.4824)	4.890*** (.4395)	3.903*** (.3677)	2.806*** (.4336)	4.362*** (.3840)	3.184*** (.4518)	4.811*** (.3975)	3.318*** (.4332)
N =	394	396	396	392	399	392	399	390	397	389
R-Squared	0.127	0.036	0.079	0.036	0.072	0.112	0.038	0.142	0.047	0.125

Note: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; ****p ≤ .001; † Indicates the covariate just missed significance at .10 p-value.
Source: 2007 National Politics and Socialization Survey

Table 3 also reveals that older Democrats are more trusting than younger Democrats in Clinton representing the interests of African Americans, African American women, and Caucasian. They also are more trusting than younger Americans in Obama representing the interests of Caucasians, Caucasian women, and women, in general. Political trust among older Americans tends to be higher, nevertheless (Putnam 2000). Democratic Southerners are modestly more trusting than other regions are of Obama to represent the interests of African Americans, African American women, Caucasian, Caucasian women, and women, in general.¹⁶ For trust in Clinton, the southern region variable is statistically significant only with respect to Democrats’ trust in her to represent African American women’s interests, with Southerners trusting Clinton more than other regions. Across all the models, distrust in national government reduces Democrats’ trust in both candidates to represent the interests of all groups.

Table 4 shows the OLS multivariate analyses of the trust perceptions of African American Democrats. Unlike Caucasian men and women, there is a statistically significant difference in African American men’s and African American women’s perceptions of

Clinton only, with respect to trust in her to represent African Americans' interests and African American women's interests. African American women are more trusting of Clinton than African American men are. Thus, among African American women, gender appears to mitigate their attitudes about Clinton; in particular, despite the fact they trust Obama more than Clinton to represent their interests as African American women. Interestingly, for African American men, sharing both race and gender with Obama does not statistically enhance their trust in Obama to represent African Americans', African American women's, or any other groups' interests over African American women respondents. The model for African Americans also shows us that older African Americans trust Clinton more than younger African Americans to represent the interests of African Americans, African American women, and Caucasians, in general.

Southern African Americans blacks are more trusting of Obama than non-Southern African Americans to represent all African American and Caucasian, race, women's, and intersectional interests. Additionally, having an enhanced feeling of connectedness with other African Americans increases African Americans' trust in Obama to represent the interests of these same groups. At the same time, black linked fate also appears to increase the perception that Clinton best represents the interests of Caucasians, Caucasian women, and women, in general. Thus, black linked fate also may be functioning to enhance African Americans' perceptions of zero-sum politics in view of Clinton's representation. With the exception of the model for trust in Obama to represent the interests of Caucasian women, we also see evidence to suggest that distrust in national government decreases African Americans' trust in both candidates to represent the various races, women's, and intersectional groups' interests.

The West regional variable reduces trust only in the models for trust in Obama to represent Latinos' and Latinas' interests. Across all the models, distrust in the national government diminishes Democrats' trust in both the candidates representing Latinos' and Latinas' group interests. In the separate model comparing attitudes to Latinas (results not shown), African American women are more likely than Latinas to trust Obama to represent Latinas' political interests. There are no other statistically different attitudes.

Table 4: Black Democrats' Trust in Clinton's and Obama's Representation of Blacks', Whites', and Women's Interests

Covariates	Blacks' Interests		Black Women's Interests		Whites' Interests		White Women's Interests		Women's Interests	
	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama
Female	.381***	-0.036	.287**	-0.119	-0.128	-0.103	-0.142	-0.138	0.108	-0.045
Age	.139****	-0.017	.112***	0.042	.075**	0.043	0.010	.102***	0.022	.123****
Income	0.010	-0.042	0.019	-0.042	0.025	-0.056	0.014	-0.043	0.015	-0.045
Education	-0.018	0.012	-0.057	0.003	-0.013	0.038	0.005	0.011	0.023	0.018
South	0.117	.247*	0.278	.311**	0.063	.260**	0.106	.290**	0.179	.237**
Frequency of Discrimination Experiences	0.058	-0.061	0.015	-0.031	0.011	0.117*	0.038	0.087	0.009	0.058
Ideology	-0.031	-0.026	-0.007	-0.059	0.032	0.044	-0.038	0.010	-0.040	-.008
Trust in National Government	-3.14***	-2.29**	-2.20**	-2.28**	-2.25***	-2.32***	-2.15***	-0.152	-2.26**	-1.70**
Black Linked Fate	-0.004	.138**	0.063	.168***	.142***	.138**	.131**	.142**	.130**	.196****
Constant	3.744	4.802****	3.86****	4.471****	3.961****	3.506****	4.5****	3.278****	4.141****	3.171****
N=	250	249	249	247	251	247	251	244	249	245
R-squared =	0.127	0.065	0.098	0.099	0.100	0.129	0.078	0.130	0.072	0.172

Source: 2007 National Politics and Socialization Survey

Note: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; ****p ≤ .001

**Table 5: American Democrats' Trust in Clinton and Obama's Representation
(With Latino Men as the Reference Group)**

	Latinos' Interests		Latina Women's Interests	
	Clinton	Obama	Clinton	Obama
Black (Men)	-.1948 (.1984)	.4866** (.2165)	-.2158 (.2102)	.4908** (.2241)
White (Men)	-.1750 (.2512)	.1650 (.2778)	.0336 (.2730)	-.0948 (.2907)
Female (Latinas)	.1086 (.2106)	-.0731 (.2308)	.0832 (.2231)	-.1495 (.2398)
Age	.1325**** (.0300)	.0238 (.0332)	.1050**** (.0318)	.0731** (.0345)
Income	.0306 (.0296)	-.0205 (.0321)	.0159 (.0313)	-.0235 (.0333)
Education	-.0223 (.0264)	.0335 (.0288)	-.0391 (.0280)	.0179 (.0299)
South	.0158 (.1163)	-.0236 (.1271)	.0480 (.1231)	.0493 (.1321)
West	.0849 (.1274)	-.2667* (.1382)	.0043 (.1340)	-.2493* (.1431)
Ideology	.0092 (.0488)	.0227 (.0535)	.0037 (.0517)	.0644 (.0555)
Distrust in National Government	-.4488**** (.0783)	-.1784** (.0849)	-.4288**** (.0832)	-.1901** (.0878)
Black * Women	.1600 (.2458)	.0069 (.2688)	.0968 (.2601)	.0622 (.2790)
White * Women	.1306 (.3372)	.1928 (.3737)	-.1598 (.3622)	.2524 (.3898)
Constant	4.269**** (.4066)	3.727**** (.4474)	4.833**** (.4332)	3.431**** (.4631)
N =	383	381	385	379
R-Squared	0.146	0.080	0.114	0.094

Note: * $p \leq .10$; ** $p \leq .05$; *** $p \leq .01$; **** $p \leq .001$
Source: 2007 National Politics and Socialization Survey

Conclusion

This analysis examined the extent to which African Americans, Latinos, and Caucasians trusted Obama's and Clinton's representation of group interests. Three competing theories of trust were tested to ascertain whether race, gender, or intersectional race-sex groups weighed more in these political trust assessments and the implications of these assessments for zero-sum politics. While the national survey herein offers limited generalizability to the broader population because the web-based survey does not offer a representative sample and perhaps suffers from other issues associated with such web-based surveys (Couper 2000), the results offer some insight as far as race, gender, intersectionality, zero-sum trust, and representation, especially considering the internal validity of embedded survey experiments.

The results elucidate that intersectionality mitigates trust among African Americans, when African American women are more likely than African American men to trust Clinton to represent the interests of African Americans and African American women. Both African American men and women, however, trust Obama more than Clinton to represent African Americans' and African American women's interests, despite evidence of gender sensitivity among African American women as far as their few instances of trusting in Clinton more than African American men. Nonetheless, generally, gender does not trump race for African American women because they do not trust Clinton more than Obama to represent their respective group interests or the interests of other groups. Rather, for African American women, as studies have shown before, race trumps gender for African American women (Mansbridge and Tate 1992; Simien 2005), as far as choice among candidates to best represent their interests. Moreover, as African American black women embrace Clinton more than African American men, there is evidence of the sub-textual complexities of race, especially with respect to gender (Brown, forthcoming; Higginbotham 1992).

For African Americans, zero-sum politics resonates in a way that suggests they exclusively associate trust in Clinton to represent Caucasians', Caucasian women's, and women's (regardless of race) interests. Simply put, Obama has more universal appeal among African Americans, regardless of their gender. In this way, racial descriptive representation curries favor among African Americans (male and female) such that they see Obama more than Clinton as being able to represent best most groups' interests. Thus, Obama's gender also does not become an impediment in African Americans' perceptions about his ability to represent African American black and Latina women. However, Clinton's race influences how African Americans perceive her as trustable to represent Caucasians, especially. There appears to be a racial divide in how Caucasians and Latinos perceive Obama and Clinton compared to African Americans, as Caucasians and Latinos trust Clinton more to represent best Caucasians', Caucasian women's, and Latinas' interests.

In general, neither Caucasians nor Latinos see Clinton or Obama as being trusted best to represent the interests of Latinos as an ethnic group. However, Clinton's gender enhances her trust among Caucasians and Latinos to represent women's interests, in general, along with Caucasians and Latinas' (Latinas only) interests. Caucasians and Latinos "drew the line" with respect to trusting Clinton to represent best the interests of African American women, perceiving instead that Obama represented their interests best. Thus, interestingly, Caucasians and Latinos perceive that race trumps gender in the connection between African American women and the potential quality of representation offered by Clinton and/or Obama. While Clinton's gender, in many instances, does not limit her being entrusted to represent other groups, it seems that Caucasians and Latinos perceive her race as a limitation in her being able to represent the interests of African Americans and African American women.

With respect to Clinton being able to represent the racial interests of Caucasians, however, race does not trump gender, as her shared race with Caucasian men does not enhance her trust among this group in comparison to other non-Caucasian men and non-Caucasian women to represent Caucasians' interests, in particular, or for that matter, any other groups. Nor, is it apparent that compared to Caucasian women and other race-sex groups of women that Caucasian men are more trusting of Obama to represent various groups' interests. This suggests, symbolically, that perhaps Clinton's gender suppressed her trust among Caucasian men. Moreover, despite congruency in race and gender between Caucasian women and Clinton, there is no supporting evidence of intersectionality

enhancing trust among Caucasian women such that their trust in Clinton is more than any other race-sex groups. However, there is evidence that Caucasian women are more trusting in Clinton than Obama (as a man) to represent the interests of various groups, with the exception of African Americans, African American women, and Latinos. As noted previously, sharing both race and gender with Clinton, nevertheless, does not distinguish Caucasian women's trust compared to Caucasian men.

Although Caucasians trust Clinton more than Obama to represent various groups' interests, zero-sum politics for Clinton appears to occur with respect to her gender and the limited trust that Caucasian men have compared to non-Caucasians in her representing the interests of all Caucasians. Through a zero-sum lens, Caucasians and Latinos share in the perception that Obama is trusted most to represent best the interests of both African Americans' and African American women's interests, but again, not other groups' interests. But, for the case of African American women, all people (including African American women, themselves) perceive racial representation mattering more than gender for this group.

Despite surrogate ethnic representation that both Obama and Clinton can offer Latinos, herein, Clinton wins trust among Latinos to represent only the intersectional interests of Latinas. As expected, Latinos, in general, show no distinctions in trusting Obama or Clinton most to represent best their ethnic group interests. However, Clinton's gender appears to cue Latinas' trust in her to represent both all Latinos' and Latinas' interests more than Obama.

In the minds of African American, Caucasian, and Latino respondents in this study, overall, the racial and ethnic characteristics of both candidates, more than gender, appear to drive perceptions of trust to represent most groups. Clearly, however, Clinton's gender as a woman enhances the perceptions that she best represents the interests of women of various races/ethnicities, with the exception of African American women. Perceptions of Obama, nonetheless, seem to suggest that his race impedes his trustability across non-African American, race-sex groups, thus, limiting his predominate trustability to his representing best only African American groups' interests, despite even his gender incongruence with African American women and his gender congruence with men of various races.

With respect to zero-sum politics, Caucasians and Latinos not only see Obama as not being as trustworthy as Clinton to represent their interests but also they see Clinton's race and gender as a Caucasian woman mostly enhancing her universality to represent the intersectional interests of Caucasian women and Latinas. For both candidates, however, race is the prevailing characteristic for which respondents perceive trust is most important in congruent, descriptive representation between them and constituent race-sex groups.

Despite Obama's eventual presidential win, with 53 percent of the popular vote in the 2008 presidential election, results herein suggest ways that trust perhaps limited his early support among Democrats prior to the primaries. While various aspects of zero-sum politics are not tested directly here, the results suggest both candidates face zero-sum trust dilemmas. But, the greatest trust dilemma faced by either candidate was the one that Obama faced among Caucasians and Latinos based on overcoming perceptions that his race limits his trustability to represent non-African Americans' and women's interests, especially as Caucasians and Latinos view Obama less universally compared to African Americans, who trust Obama to represent even Latinos' interests. Moreover, Latinos appear to stand within the intersections of the respondents' views of them being best represented by a Caucasian candidate versus a non-Caucasian candidate, and this may reflect similar controversies

surrounding where Latinos “fit” in the “black-white” dichotomy and even perceptions of this dichotomy, as it is represented by a Caucasian and African American candidate. Although one aspect of zero-sum politics suggests group competition feeds zero-sum perceptions, in this study, another aspect seems most applicable—trustability of candidates to represent exclusively some groups and not others.

Future studies of race, gender, and zero-sum trust should include experiments that examine race and perceptions of zero-sum politics between two candidates that share a non-Caucasian racial group but that differ in their partisanship. For example, perhaps African American Republicans by way of their partisan labels become more attractive as candidates to trust because they become attached to a political party label that casts a conservative brand in contrast to the one often associated with African American candidates, especially Democratic candidates. Perhaps zero-sum trust research should ask directly whether politicians will sacrifice other racial and gender groups’ interests for the benefit of their own social groups. Qualitative research also can help us glean how respondents process the representation styles of politicians from different racial and gender backgrounds. Work also remains to be done on how much people trust a African American Republican candidate to represent the interests of various racial groups. Other survey experimental research indicates distinctions in trust that African Americans, in particular, make with respect to trust in Democrats and Republicans of various races, and while Democrats of all races are trusted more than their counterparts of the same race as members of the Republican Party, African Americans still trust African American Republicans at a level more than Caucasian Democrats (Nunnally 2012). Moreover, expanding such an analysis to include trust in a Latino candidate can prove fruitful in assessing trust in a candidate whose race/ethnicity lies outside the “black-white” dichotomy.

To this extent, racial attitudes may be cued in ways that otherwise may not be tapped by mere mention of the candidate’s race and partisanship. Furthermore, layering gender with race and partisanship also can complicate the ways that prospective voters view trust in candidates in ways for which zero-sum politics may have great import for the successful ability of candidates to mobilize effective cross-communal connections across various race-sex groups. As evidenced by this study, the (in)congruency between candidates and groups can affect perceptions of trust and representation. Generally, we predict voters’ decisions based on their own, self-/group-interests. However, more research should consider how perceptions of candidates’ relationships with their own, congruent groups relate if any to perceptions of the candidates’ relationships with incongruent constituents. The results, herein, at the least, point to the significance that race and gender can have in cross-racial appeal to voters, even among voters within their political party. Most importantly, the results elucidate how much race still matters greatly in the way people perceive candidates, and as political interests are perceivably connected to racial and sex groups, zero-sum politics can manifest differently as far as how much people feel politicians can best represent public interests.

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Notes

¹ I sincerely wish to thank Nadia Brown, Julia Jordan-Zachery, Evelyn Simien, and Alvin Tillery for their comments on this paper.

² "Latino" will be used to denote the grouping of both women *and* men of Latin American descent. "Latina" solely indicates Latin American-descended women.

³ Barack Obama, unlike other black presidential candidates before him, was constructed into a black candidate that did not have the "typical" background of his predecessors. He was not raised in the context of a Jim Crow American nation. He spent his formative years studying abroad in areas that were more diverse, and arguably, more racially progressive than the historical context of American race relations (Obama, 2004). He had an Ivy League undergraduate and professional education at Columbia and Harvard Law School, respectively. He also was bi-racial: the progeny of a black, Kenyan father and a white mother from Kansas.

Pre-primary discourse about Obama's biracial heritage also referred to him as "post-racial," suggesting that, by transcending race as a "black candidate," he also could transcend the historical, anti-black sentiments of white voters (Reeves, 1997). Put simply, Obama's bi-raciality could make him more equally appealing to both black and white voters. These attributes contributed to a nuanced construction of Obama as a "black candidate" with attributes (e.g. bi-raciality, a multi-cultural background, an Ivy-League education, and minimal ties to black civil rights activism) that might be considered differently and possibly more appealing to white voters than previous black presidential candidates, such as Shirley Chisholm, Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton, and Carol Moseley Braun, who are not bi-racial

and/or who do not have linkages to the civil rights political tradition. (See Gillespie (2012) for a discussion on the candidacies of “new black politicians,” whose backgrounds generally lack connections to the civil rights movement as many older, black politicians once did and often celebrate post-civil rights advancements.) Furthermore, as a man running against a woman candidate, Obama’s gender stood to enhance the affinities that men had for him to be trusted to represent them.

⁴ Dawson (2001) defines *black nationalism* as a kind of African American ideology that has various facets that center on building a black “nation,” whether through social, cultural, economic means. Often this ideology focuses on building the “nation” as a separate entity from other racial groups, especially whites. (See Dawson 2001 for a more explicit description of these differences).

⁵ As Davis (1991) describes, the socio-historical development of race in America defined black racial group status based on a standard of identifying people who had “one-drop of black blood” or African ancestry (referred to as “hypo-descent”), effectively quantifying their race based on pseudo-biological practices that also carried social consequences for blacks who were historically discriminated against because of their racial status. Whiteness, historically, was reserved for whites with “pure white blood” only. Contemporarily, this understanding of whom is black remains, despite social standards that rely on self-identification for racial group identification and status.

⁶ According to a May 1-5, 2008 Gallup Poll, 37 percent of whites, 91 percent of blacks, and 51 percent of Latinos voted for Obama (Newport 2008). Evidence from a Washington Post/ABC News Poll finds that 3 in 10 Americans admitted to race prejudice influencing their (non)support of Obama versus Senator John McCain (Cohen and Agiesta 2008), suggesting that Obama’s race possibly inhibited some of his cross-racial appeal to voters. But, by early October, Obama had overtaken McCain in the public opinion polls. Pundits, however, questioned how much negative racial attitudes toward Obama would influence the actual outcomes of the presidential election (Carroll 2008). Republican presidential ticket candidates, John McCain and Sarah Palin, also rallied the support of “Joe the Plumber,” a working class, white man who questioned the effect of Obama’s tax plan on his income. During the general election campaigns, Obama’s religion also became the center of controversy, as people questioned whether he was a “secretly-practicing Muslim,” who implicitly was waiting to win presidential office, eventually reveal his true religion, and evoke presidential power in favor of Muslim extremists.

With respect to trust, this stereotype implicitly suggested that Obama could not be trusted to assume presidential power because he was potentially biased towards Muslim extremists in foreign policy in a way that would lead to the downfall of the nation. In a post-9-11 United States, this religious stereotype harkened fears about the security of the United States vis-à-vis Muslim extremists. In July 2008, *New Yorker* magazine depicted this stereotype on its cartoon-produced cover, as it lampooned candidate Obama wearing Muslim religious garb, with him fist-bumping his wife, Michelle Obama, as she was wearing army fatigue gear with an automatic rifle slung over her shoulder with bullets (evocative of a black nationalist stereotype of blacks during the 1960s, suggesting black nationalists were waiting to overthrow the power of whites for blacks’ benefit) and as the two of them stood in an Oval Office with Osama Bin Laden’s portrait pictured over the fireplace, with a burning American flag in the fireplace. Pundits also questioned whether this magazine cover contributed to dangerous stereotyping of Obama’s candidacy.

As Walsh (2009) notes, questions about Obama's religion and race contributed to his "otherization." It also made him appear less patriotic and marginally "American," similar to the accusations that "birthers" made that Obama was not born in the United States, thus was not an American citizen, and most importantly, was not qualified to run for (or assume) the presidency.

⁷ Obama's black voter appeal was counterbalanced by the positive legacy and popularity among blacks that Hillary Clinton was likely to inherit as a benefit of being the first lady and wife of former president, Bill Clinton. For example, a July 25-29, 2007 survey of black Americans indicates that 47 percent of black Democrats supported Clinton's candidacy, compared to 34 percent who supported Obama's. At the time, 94 percent of black Americans viewed Clinton "very favorably" compared to 88 percent who viewed Obama "very favorably" (Pew Research Center Report, August 30, 2007). Thus, despite being a white woman, Clinton's reputation with black Americans stood to enhance black Americans' trust in her to represent black group interests (CNN.com 2007). Her gender also stood to enhance women's trust in her to represent women's interests (Dewan 2008).

⁸ During the primaries, Clinton also garnered her strongest support among Latino voters and white women voters, and white Democratic men split their vote between the two candidates (Murray and Kornblut 2008). Hillary Clinton won large Latino support in the West in California, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico. In the Nevada primary, demographic cleavages became even more evident, as Clinton won 66 percent support among Latinos and 52 percent support among whites, whereas Obama's support was largest among blacks, with 83 percent support compared to Clinton's 11 percent support (Murray and Kornblut 2008). Clinton also won the presidential primary in Puerto Rico. These primary outcomes attest to the "balance of power" that Latinos had in states where the group was more populous. In response to Clinton's support among Latinos, Obama also tried to increase his appeal among Latino voters (Nagourney and Steinhauer 2008). During the 2008 presidential primary, many voters supported the candidates who shared either their racial or gender characteristics, although Latinos and some groups—white men and black women—split their support based on either their race or their gender.

⁹ Early in the primary season, near the national holiday recognition of Dr. Martin Luther King's Birthday, Clinton became embattled in a controversy over her reference to the significance of President Lyndon B. Johnson in promoting and signing into law the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Some members of the black community questioned whether she effectively belittled the role of Dr. Martin Luther King and civil rights activists in protesting to push the need for the legislation towards national recognition. Additionally, after a series of primary wins by Candidate Obama, former President Bill Clinton (Hillary Clinton's husband) seemingly dismissed the significance of these wins, as he likened them to the wins of Jesse Jackson in the 1988 primary season, which also ultimately led to a failed candidacy by Jackson.

¹⁰ On August 28, 2008, 45 years to the date that Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King delivered his famous "I Have a Dream" speech, Senator Barack Obama delivered his nomination acceptance speech as the first black American in U.S. history to assume the official nomination of a major political party for the office of the presidency.

¹¹ The Michigan and Florida primary results were initially excluded from the delegate count because both states violated Democratic primary rules by setting their primary dates prior to those designated for them by the Democratic National Party. By the decision of the

Democratic National Committee's (DNC) Party's Rules and Bylaws Committee, both states were eventually granted half the delegates they were allotted per state.

¹² When Republican presidential candidate and opponent, Senator John McCain, selected Governor Sarah Palin as his vice-presidential running mate, pundits questioned whether Palin's candidacy would draw the support of moderate white women, especially Clinton supporters, who may have been disillusioned by the Obama presidential nomination and who may have sought descriptive representation in historic proportion to vote for the nation's first woman candidate for the vice-presidential office.

¹³ Racial- and gender- oriented controversies during the campaign season also made the race and gender of Clinton and Obama salient political cues. With a series of political gaffes by both candidates and people associated with them and various mishaps during their campaigns—Bill Clinton's seeming dismissal of the significance of Obama's primary wins; Geraldine Ferraro's allusion to gender hindering Clinton's candidacy more than race hindering Obama's candidacy; Reverend Jeremiah Wright's seemingly angry, anti-patriotic comments about the history of America; Michelle Obama's seemingly anti-patriotic comments when she announced that she was not "proud" of her country until positive developments in her husband's campaign; or random decries from an audience member taunting Hillary Clinton about her gender and telling her to "Iron my shirt!" (McCormick, 2008)—media hype seemed to imply that overcoming the hurdles of race and gender would be major impediments confronting the Obama and Clinton candidacies. Therefore, it is highly plausible that whether voters' race and/or gender are congruent with candidates' race and gender affects voters' political trust.

¹⁴ While black women are the most ardent supporters of black female candidates (Philpot and Walton, 2007), without the choice of a black female candidate in the Obama-Clinton race, they may not necessarily support a white female candidate over a black male candidate, who shares their racial demographic group.

¹⁵ Fifty-nine percent of the respondents identified as Democrats, compared to 14 percent who identified as Republicans and 27 percent who identified as Independents (N= 908). Excluding those who identified as Independents, of the black respondents (n= 364), 93 percent identified as Democrats, compared to 7 percent who identified as Republicans. For white respondents (n =147), again, excluding Independents, 56 percent identified as Democrats, compared to 44 percent who identified as Republicans. As for Latino respondents (n =151), with the exclusion of Independents, 77 percent identified as Democrats, compared to 23 percent who identified as Republicans.

¹⁶ This appears to be an artifact of black Americans, who are mostly concentrated in the South, supporting Obama.

Author Biography

Shayla C. Nunnally is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and the Institute for African American Studies at the University of Connecticut. Her research interests include African American politics, race and politics, public opinion, political behavior, and intergroup attitudes and relations. shayla.nunnally@uconn.edu.