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The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

**THE SPECTRE OF TERRORISM AND NIGERIA'S
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT:
A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER IMPERATIVE**

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Abstract

Since 2009, Nigeria has gradually slipped into a terrorist enclave where terror acts have become the regular signature of the country's social memoirs. Aside the complex permutations of socio-economic and political upheavals already facing the polity, the sudden emergence of a supercilious army of terror extremists has not only exposed the polity's unpreparedness for such an intimidating challenge, but has also brought a spectral bite to industrial development. Efforts to achieve development in industry in the country, a strong criterion for economic development and the improvement of the country's Human Development Indices may continue to suffer setbacks in the face of a blistering climate of terror and bombings. The effect of terrorist activities such as suicide bombings, kidnappings, destruction of lives, public infrastructure, private and entrepreneurial investments, the climate of fear, panic and confusion and a heated and ungovernable polity has continued to make Nigeria an unsuitable bride for foreign investments. This not only poses a threat to the budding democracy in place, it also may endanger efforts to achieve industrial development in the country. To face this challenge headlong, a multi-stakeholder imperative has become inevitable. This research work investigated the role of government, private sector, civil society, faith and the international community in fighting the terror monster and providing the leeway for industrial development in the country, without which the standard of living, employment opportunities and other human development indices may maintain their downward trend outright.

Key words: Terrorism, industrial development, multi-stakeholder, government, faith.

Introduction

When the Nigerian government and people were about heaving a sigh of relief from their experiences with the Niger Delta militants, many of whom had been persuaded to embrace the Amnesty programme of government and promised that

the socio-economic pathologies that traumatized the region and necessitated the bloody confrontations with government would be addressed, Nigeria and Nigerians woke up to the onset of the vociferous calls from a supercilious army of terror extremists bent on pursuing their grievances with government in a new violent fashion. The Boko Haram sect had appeared as an innocent-looking and harmless band of Muslim devotees strutting around the northern region with their fiery messages that ordered a return to Islamic law and purity. However, in July 2009, the outbreak of the Boko Haram uprising in the country marked the distasteful beginning of a determined group of terror merchants who initiated a recurring pattern of violent and bloody riots, attacks and bombings. What started as an insurgency against the state and its institutions, gradually assumed political, religious and socio-economic permutations as not only police stations, army barracks, government establishments were targeted but also banks, businesses, churches, Christians, Christian leaders and later mosques and some Muslim clerics fell to the raging inferno of Boko Haram violence. The alarming dimensions of the Boko Haram's terror acts were particularly their forceful attempt to impose a religious ideology on a constitutionally recognized secular state and their introduction of suicide terrorism on Nigerian soil, a tradition alien to Nigeria and Nigerians.

Thus, terrorism, which had been viewed by some publics in the country as a predominantly Western narrative, and supposedly a Western conundrum, had become a Nigerian issue fomented by some Nigerians to express their grievances. So clinical was the prosecution of their terror agenda that fighting terrorism went straight to the top of the political agenda in the country far ahead poverty, crime, underdevelopment, poor health provisions, asymmetrical power relations and resource distributions, corruption and ethnicity even though these factors have been fingered as partly responsible for the emergence of this monster (Adesoji, 2010; Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, 2008; Ipe, Cockayne & Miller, 2010; Okafor, 2011). The Nigerian state, through the perversion of its leadership style, continued neglect of its responsibilities to the people, byzantine corruption, poor governance, weak and compromised institutions realized it had created its own lethal Frankenstein. The Boko Haram sect has again brought to bold relief, like its forebears had repeatedly done, that there is an inexorable linkage between security and development. It has also shown that the realization of the country's industrial development will be far more difficult so long as it remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks, recruitment, radicalization, and penetration, which threaten not only its political stability and therefore the investment and growth climate in the country, but also casts a spectral pall on government's efforts to respond to the calls for rapid industrialization.

This study is focused on examining the spin-off of terrorism in Nigeria as it reins in industrial development and canvasses a multi-stakeholder imperative to address this distended challenge. In particular, the study looks at the role of government, private sector, civil society, faith and international community in resisting the terror ogre, so that industrial development can be realised to meet the

The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

yearnings of a disenchanted and bored population seeking answers to existing poor standard of living, rising unemployment and embarrassing human development indices which presently characterize the country's state of affairs.

Defining Terrorism and Industrial Development

Terrorism has been defined as "The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (Trosper, 2009). The United States Department of Defense defines it as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological." Quoted in Omotola (2010), The African Union (AU) sees terrorism as "any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any member or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage". Terrorism has been described as the "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes that are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them" (UN, 1994). Bockstette (2008) sees terrorism as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols), involving acts meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organization. He argues further that the purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) and reach short- and mid-term political goals and/or desired long-term purposes.

In sum, terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the clandestine nature and small size of terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear organization to defend against or to deter. Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim and the strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. Terrorists plan their attacks to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose.

Industrial development, on the other hand, has become an important mode of production in modern society and the key in classifying countries as developed, underdeveloped, developing or emerging economies based on their level of industrialization. As Onyeonoru (2005) asserted, industry provides livelihoods for

millions of people all over the world because it creates a massive pool of employment opportunities for white- and blue-collar workers. Through the deployment of modern technologies, division of labor, specialized skills and large-scale production, organized economic activity is consummated resulting in the production, manufacture, or construction of a particular product or range of products. Onyeonoru (2005) lists the elements of industrial production to include the following:

- The possibility of utilising technologies with complex machinery associated with large scale production;
- The utilization of a wide range of raw materials often already processed through the use of complex technologies;
- A relatively complex technical division of labour within units of production;
- Complex cooperation and coordination of specialized tasks inside the unit of production;
- And a diverse range of skills within the workforce.

Imhonopi (2004) argues that industrialization in Nigeria over the years is low because of factors such as poor infrastructural development, low level of technology, inadequate capital, poor state of the agricultural sector, low manpower development, poor planning and implementation, high degree of dependence on foreign raw materials, political instability, unfavourable government policies, entrenched official corruption, tribalism and nepotism. While these factors are true, another challenge that may further set the country back in achieving rapid industrialization is the deepening terrorist activities in Nigeria especially as triggered by the Boko Haram terror machine.

The Debouchment of Terrorism in Nigeria

The foundation for armed insurrection (and later terrorism) against the Nigerian state was laid when Isaac Adaka Boro, an Ijaw nationalist led an armed campaign for greater Niger Delta autonomy, resource control and self-determination for the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. As the founder and leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed militia consisting members from his fellow Ijaw ethnic groups, Isaac Boro rose to address what he saw as the marginalization and subjugation of his people and their economic interests by the Nigerian state (Okafor, 2011). With a force of 150 recruits, who were given training in the use of firearms and explosives in the creeks and bushes, he and his men attacked a police station on February 23, 1966, raided the armory and kidnapped some officers, including the officer in charge of the police station. They also blew up oil pipelines, engaged the police in a gunfight, and declared the Niger Delta an independent republic. The revolt was however suppressed and Boro and his compatriots were put on trial on a 9-count charge of treason at Port Harcourt Assizes before Judge Phil Ebosie (Okafor, 2011). Boro was found guilty and was jailed for treason.

The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

However, the federal government led by General Yakubu Gowon granted him amnesty on the eve of the Nigerian civil war in May 1967. He enlisted and was commissioned a major in the Nigerian army and fought on the side of the federal government, but was killed in active service in 1968 at Ogu in River State.

Many years later, Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots formed the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which advocated the rights of the Ogoni people; demanding increased autonomy, a fair share of the proceeds of oil extraction, and remediation of environmental damage to their lands. He was successful in drawing global attention to their cause through his peaceful non-violent measures but paid the ultimate price when in 1995 he was sentenced to death by the Abacha military junta for a crime he was purportedly accused of committing. In the words of the Human Right Watch, "the hanging of Saro-Wiwa in November 1995 could be said to be the turning point in the politics of the Niger Delta" (Ogundiya, 2009).

After the avoidable death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, ethnic militias began to arise and mushroom, confronting what they saw as the high-handed and despotic leadership style of the Abacha between the years 1993 - 1998. Within that period, too, Nigerians experienced the most severe political repression and economic hardship in the country's history (Douglas, Kemedi, Okonta & Watts, 2004). According to Douglas et al (2004), the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) was established in the Yoruba-speaking southwest in 1994 largely to protest the annulment of the 1993 elections in which Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim, had seemingly won the presidency. Led by mostly disenchanted Yoruba youth and supported by some of the Yoruba elite, the organization claimed that a "northern cabal" in the Army had denied Abiola victory and aggressively pressed for Yoruba political autonomy. Two vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), emerged in the Igbo-speaking southeast two years later. MASSOB claimed that the Nigerian state and its functionaries had systematically oppressed the Igbo since the end of the civil war and sought to secure self-determination by resuscitating the Republic of Biafra, whose bid to secede from the Federation was crushed by Nigerian troops in 1970. The Arewa People's Congress (APC) emerged in the north in 1999 as a reaction to the killing of northern elements in Lagos and other Yoruba cities and towns by OPC cadres, and as a foil to the new Obasanjo government which many northerners viewed as a "Yoruba regime". The APC claimed that the harassment of northerners in the southwest was part of a Yoruba plan to secede and establish an "Oodua Republic" and that President Obasanjo was sympathetic to it. The group threatened to go to war if necessary to prevent national dismemberment. These and other ethnic militias heated up the polity by seeking to protect the interests of their ethnic constituencies, employed jungle justice to fight their real and perceived enemies and played sectional roles in the political life of the nation as party thugs, enforcers, and champions of local interests.

While these ethnic militias were contained by the democratic government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the next phase of engagement with government by

disenchanted Niger Delta youths was spearheaded by Niger Delta militants who unleashed violent attacks and bombings of oil installations, kidnapping, hostage taking and assault to press home their demands. The “judicial murder” of Ken Saro Wiwa, their worthy ambassador and mediator had created a leadership vacuum which over 150 militant ethnic groups scrambled to fill. While these militants have earned titles such as terrorists, criminals, ethnic militias, rebels, freedom fighters, insurgents, revolutionaries and political agitators (Adejumobi & Aderemi, 2002; Ikporukpo, 2007; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2006; Osaghae, 1995; Suberu, 1996, 2001), some scholars have argued that the Niger Delta militants employed terrorist strategies in the pursuit of their grievances which constituted a serious threat to the economy, human and national security and pitched the country in the league of terrorist trouble spots around the world (Ogundiya, 2009; Okafor, 2011).

However, the rise of the Boko Haram terrorists in Northern Nigeria had been predated by similar uprisings in the past. It was just that the Boko Haram-styled terror acts assumed a more virulent, sophisticated and religious dimension. Adesoji (2010) in his erudite treatise traced the evolution of the crisis to the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi. These were the first attempts to impose a religious ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria, and marked the beginning of ferocious post-independence conflict and crises in that region (Ibrahim, 1997; Isichei, 1987). Following the Maitatsine crises, or interspersing them, were several other crises. These include the Kano metropolitan riot of October 1982, the Ilorin riot of March 1986, the University of Ibadan crisis of May 1986, the nationwide crisis over Nigeria’s membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference in January/February 1986, the Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/Funtua religious riots of March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of March 1988, the acrimonious nationwide debate on Sharia (Islamic law) at the Constituent Assembly in October/November 1988, the Bayero University crisis of 1989, the Bauchi/Katsina riots of March/April 1991, the Kano riot of October 1991, the Zangon-Kataf riot of May 1992, the Kano civil disturbance of December 1991 and the Jos crisis of April 1994 (Imo 1995; Ibrahim 1997; Enwerem 1999).

Similarly, between 1999 and 2008, 28 other conflicts were reported, the most prominent being the Shagamu conflict of July 1999 and the recurrent Jos crises between 2001-2008 (Akaeze 2009; Omipidan 2009). The crisis recurred in January 2010 and has become recurrent till date. Virtually all these crises, many of which took a violent turn, have been explained or justified by one reason or the other. Where the crisis was not borne out of the need to curb the excesses of some groups, prevent them from being a security threat, or contain their spread, as was the case with the Maitatsine riots (Albert 1999; Ladan 1999), it arose out of the proselytization drive by one religious group and the resistance by another religious group of its perceived stronghold. This was the case with the Kano riot of 1991 during which Muslims complained of preferential treatment in the approval of conduct of a religious crusade by Christians and the use of Kano Race Course earlier not approved for Muslims to hold a similar program (Albert 1999; Williams

The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

1997). In some other cases, it was the seemingly unresolved indigene-settler problem that was at its root. The Zangon-Kataf riots and the recurrent Jos crises fall into this category (Nwosu 1996; Williams 1999; Ibrahim 1998; Uchendu 2004; Human Rights Watch 2005). Although almost all the crises have been subsumed under religion and explained by even some authors as religious factors, it is apparent that other extraneous and underlying factors like economic disequilibrium/inequality, envy, poverty among youths (who easily become willing tools in the hand of barons), and the unhealthy contest for political offices have all played parts (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Ibrahim 1997; Sulaiman 2008). Ibrahim's assertion corroborated by Ladan that all ethno-religious crises have behind them a perceived domination by supposedly external or illegitimate groups is quite accurate in this case (Ibrahim 1998; Ladan 1999). Specifically, the Maitatsine uprisings, which are comparable to those of Boko Haram in terms of philosophy and objectives, organizational planning, armed resistance and modus operandi, have generally been explained by a combination of factors like economic dislocation, deprivation, and income inequalities, as well as poverty aided by local disasters like drought and a rinderpest (cattle plague) pandemic, all with links to Islam. Significantly, many of the explanations offered for the outbreak of the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s are relevant to the Boko Haram uprising.

The Boko Haram sect is a radical Islamic fundamentalist organization that has been described as the Nigerian *Taliban*. Boko Haram translates to "western education is a sin" and its members follow a strict interpretation of the Koran. Boko Haram is built on an Islamic faith that its members consider as the panacea for the country's endemic moral, social, political, and economic problems; hence, their determination to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state to be ruled on the basis of the "Sharia." This doctrinal foundation makes the Boko Haram similar to other terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), Al Shabaab, Ansauru, Hezbollah, the Islamic State, and others, whose cause is entwined in and driven by Islamic fundamentalism. Followers of such groups are a menace to society, especially in situations where their target is a secular state that supports, without let or hindrance, the co-existence of multiple religious sects. Their attempt to impose their will on adherents of other religions certainly leads to disaster. Even in Northern Nigeria where Sharia law has already taken root, Boko Haram terror messengers believe they can only achieve their version of extremist Islamic rule by overthrowing the Federal Government of Nigeria. According to Australia's Counterterrorism White Paper (Australian Government, 2010), many terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaeda, Boko Haram and their ilk share a common distorted narrative, in spite of differing and often local objectives, which narrowly and simplistically interprets history and current affairs through the lens of the alleged oppression of Muslims, principally by the West. These groups want people to believe that:

- the West, led by the United States of America, is engaged in the systematic exploitation and repression of Muslims;
- governments in Muslim majority countries are illegitimate, corrupt and un-Islamic;

- the solution is the removal of Western interference in Muslim majority countries and the establishment of “truly Islamic” systems of governance; and
- it is the religious duty of all Muslims individually to use violence to attack the political, military, religious and cultural enemies of Islam anywhere around the world.

These groups advocate Islamic justice for the poor and want to ultimately abolish “western influence”.

As Adesoji (2010) noted, the Boko Haram uprising was not the first forcible attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society, but like the first major attempt and subsequent small-scale attempts, it has widened the scope of Islamic revivalism, and escalated the use of terror and violence including suicide terrorism in expressing their grievances. Adesoji adds that despite the brutal suppression of previous attempts, the gallantry of the Boko Haram soldiers to recuperate, the spread and swiftness of its military organization, and the belief of its leadership, and perhaps its membership, that it could successfully engage a modern state in a military duel all show an extraordinary commitment to their cause. Boko Haram terrorist organization has adopted al-Qaeda-styled terrorist strategy which is decentralized, elusive and difficult to neutralize. They also pledged their “Bay’at” or allegiance to the Islamic State, the world’s most lethal Islamic Jihadist group up until now with bizarre signatures of religious intolerance, a global Islamic expansionary agenda, and a caliphate-building strategy. Boko Haram’s terror performances have repeatedly pointed to the shortcomings of the Nigerian security forces, highlighted the need to step up security in the country, the effective patrol of the country’s porous borders and the need to address the salient etiologies that necessitated the rise of ethnic militias, Niger Delta militants and generally domestic terrorism in Nigeria. Authors contend that this status quo points to the need by the political leadership to create forums for national conversation in order to renegotiate the terms of engagement of the various ethnic nationalities that make up the federation.

Reflecting on the Etiologies of Terrorism in Nigeria

The causes of terrorism are abundant in the terrorism literature. However, Khan (2003) has identified the following etiologies as central to the manifestation of terrorism within society. These factors could be applied to the Nigerian situation. They include:

First, **ethnicity, nationalism/separatism**. In this sense, an aggrieved group could resort to terrorist toga and strategies to achieve nationalist or separatist goals. However, ethnic conflict could arise from a complex combination of class, inequality, political opportunity, mobilization resources and “ethnic strength”. Second, **poverty and economic disadvantage, globalization**. The

The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

asymmetry in the distribution of scarce resources and benefits within the state can push vulnerable groups to take up arms and unleash terror on an apathetic and complacent population and the establishment. Many terrorist groups also have arisen out of the links they share with international terrorist organizations. Third, **absence of democracy**. Democracy, in its truest sense, is supposed to be representative of the people, their wishes and interests. However, because this is not always the case in reality, terrorism can arise in a democracy in two occasions: (1), when there is a case of a minority whose basic rights and liberties are denied or taken away by arbitrary action of the government or its agencies; and (2), when one minority is attacked by another minority and does not receive adequate protection from the state and its forces of law and order. In other words, those who are the subjects of a liberal state, but who are not admitted to its rights of citizenship cannot be morally bound to show allegiance or obedience to the state. They are not bound by political obligation either because they have not been accorded any rights by the state (Wilkinson, 1977). Fourth, **disaffected intelligentsia**. Rubenstein (1987) believes that terrorism could be triggered by disgruntled and disaffected, intelligentsia who are in a social and moral crisis unable to mobilize the masses. When rigid social stratification shatters hopes for social transformation, then the ingredients are present for a start or rise in terrorist activities in an attempt to reconnect with the masses who they claim to represent and aspire to lead. Fifth, **dehumanization**. This is the opposite of the concept of disaffected intelligentsia as it represents simple-minded people who are easy to be indoctrinated and swayed into believing that they need to fight to be heard, recognized and treated as equal human beings in the society. Lastly, **religion**. Religion has become a vital opium that some groups feed on to misinterpret the requirements of their religion and to carry out their fundamentalist beliefs which are generally aimed at conquering, expanding and consolidating on their religious gains and territories.

In support of some of the points raised above, speaking before the UN Sixth Committee in October 2009, the Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations stressed that in adopting a global and comprehensive response to terrorism, a coherent international response must give priority attention to addressing underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, such as poverty, prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance. This he said should be supported by respect for human rights and the promotion of the rule of law as a *sine qua non* to the successful combating of terrorism and the implementation of the strategy (Onemola, 2009).

It has been observed that terrorism seems to thrive in West Africa, Nigeria inclusive, because of the linkage of development challenges and security (Ipe *et al*, 2010). In other words, the sub-region suffers from recurring deficiencies in governance, a lack of state capacity to address a range of interlinked security and development challenges, a history of intra- and interstate conflict, and segments

of the population that are arguably increasingly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by extremist movements and criminal organizations.

This view was shared by Look (2011) who posited that the roots of the problem are not only religion-oriented, but also are connected to the country's economic hardships and unemployment, as well as to alienation from the central government. This includes the incapability and lack of political will of the government to handle these groups, which has allowed the spread and resurgence of Boko Haram, as they question the state's capabilities. Due to the combination of religious revivalism and weak governance structures and process, there has been an uprising and growth of religious sects.

According to Ibegbu (2009), poor governance, corruption, lack of social and basic amenities, and lack of security could lead to the rise of terrorist organizations as it is being witnessed in Nigeria. This view was shared by Trosper (2009) who averred that poor governance is the primary cause for terrorism in West Africa. Some reports also underpin this argument as they assert that weaknesses in democratic governance and factors contributing to fragility inhibit social development and economic growth, and this situation could cause civil unrest and provide fertile ground for the rise of extremist ideologies (Brown, 2006; UN, 2009; USAID, 2008). Therefore, as weak governments increase in West Africa, the potential for terrorist safe havens to flourish within various regions might also increase. When this poor governance is allowed to exist, it becomes a sign for terrorist groups to organize and capitalize on the weaknesses of a country's political and economic turmoil. Cilliers (2006) added climate change, competition over resources, and marginalization of the world's poor majority as other factors that trigger terrorism within societies.

In contextualizing the causes of terrorism in Nigeria, it is pertinent to point out that many years of poor governance, militarism and abandonment of the Niger Delta and Northern regions by the government and the conspiracy between the managers of the state and the local elite who connive with international bourgeoisie to expropriate the resources of these regions have led to the rise of a Frankenstein bent on taking its pound of flesh. For instance, the history of military dictatorships or autocratic rule, which fostered a legacy of peremptory political leadership that can be classified as one which practiced patrimonial rule and clientelism, created poorly run governments that legitimized injustice, inequality and inequity among Nigeria's population.

However, Trosper (2009) argues that Nigeria, like its West African neighbors, is deluged by torrents of Islamic fundamentalist ideology due to the high concentration of African Muslims in the sub-region leading to the growing population of hardline Muslims who are clearly anti-American or Western and may provide a sanctuary for terrorists as a form of religious persuasion or devotion. Therefore, the issue that currently faces the US, Western and Christian elements is the radical ideology of Islam which is currently spreading in many West African

The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

countries, posing a threat to anything not Islamic (Charisma Magazine, 2011; Elombah, 2011).

Theoretical Paradigm

The theory of religion has been adopted to analyze the emergence and activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. According to notable criminologists (Kraemer, 2004; Stitt, 2003), the disciplines of theology, religion, and philosophy have had important things to say about terrorism. To Hoffman (1993), about a quarter of all terrorist groups and about half of the most dangerous ones on earth are primarily motivated by religious concerns. They believe that God not only approves of their action, but that God also demands their action. Their cause is sacred, and consists of a combined sense of hope for the future and vengeance for the past. Of these two components, the backward-looking desire for vengeance may be the more important trigger for terrorism because the forward-looking component (apocalypse or eschatology) produces gullible and radicalized fanatics who are more a danger to themselves and their own people. The trick to successful use of terrorism in the name of religion rests upon convincing believers or converts that a "neglected duty" exists in the fundamental, mainstream part of the religion. Religious terrorism is, therefore, not about extremism, fanaticism, sects, or cults, but is instead all about a fundamentalist or militant interpretation of the basic tenets of a religion (Imhonopi & Urim, 2011). Some religious traditions are filled with plenty of violent images at their core, and destruction or self-destruction is a central part of the logic behind religion-based terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2001). Evil, which can assume any real or perceived entity, is often magnified and religion easily serves as moral cover for self-centered terrorists and psychopaths (Stitt, 2003).

To be sure, the usual pattern in religious-based terrorism is for a psychopathic, spiritual leader to arise that is regarded as somewhat eccentric at first (a tendency toward messianism). But then, as this leader develops his charisma, he tends to appear more and more mainstream and scholarly. He begins to mingle political and religious issues (a tendency toward theocracy), and little-known religious symbols or pieces of sacred text take on new significance. Quite often, these symbols are claimed to be an important part of that religion's history that has somehow been neglected. The stage is then set for blaming somebody for the betrayal of this sacred heritage. First, the politicians in one's own country are blamed, but soon a foreign influence, like secularization or modernization is blamed. Religious terrorists quickly move to blame a foreign influence for at least three reasons: (1) it does not serve the religion's survival interests to blame a homeland; (2) it makes use of a long history of competition, animosity, and war between the world's different religions; and (3) any blaming to be done must occur on the symbolic or cosmic level, which is to say that the enemy cannot have a face, but must be some impersonal, evil-like force or influence. Hence, the most specific enemy religious terrorists can have is some global trend like secularization, modernization, or Westernization. The strength of fundamentalism is its ability to

guarantee that a radical change is coming without specifying exactly what it will look like. However, once a semi-vague enemy has been identified, the religious movement borrows the idea of "sovereignty" from the political realm and begins to see itself as the legitimate defender of the faith and legitimate restorer of dignity to the homeland. Most importantly, such "defenders" justify terrorist actions in their accountability only to God, for it is God who has chosen them for this sacred mission in history.

A theological linchpin of terrorism would be the notion that communal violence, even though violence is despised, is still a form of worship that may help discover the true nature of God and open up two-way communication with God. Religious terrorism can be quite extreme in its tactics. Not only does it strive to avenge a long history of persecution and injustice, but it frequently carries out preemptive attacks. This is because a high level of paranoia is usually maintained about the actual degree of threat that the enemy poses. Rarely are religious terrorists swayed by secular sources of information about the degree of actual threat, but instead are driven by doctrinal differences of opinion over interpretation of holy scriptures. This results in two things: (1) a rather non-selective targeting pattern, lashing out blindly, often harming innocents; and (2) the creation of numerous offshoot, spin-off, or fringe groups who believe they are commanded to follow a different mission imperative. Add to this the fact that most adherents have already long felt like alienated and marginal members of society, and you have a recipe for perhaps the most dangerous or prolific kind of terrorism in the world today.

Recruitment generally is followed by a reeducation program that changes the way a person thinks about good and evil. Anything foreign, secular, or modern without question becomes evil; and anything supporting an all-out, uncompromising struggle with the enemy, including the killing of innocents, becomes good. The only exceptions are when the group has freed up some nonviolent avenues of experimentation. It is important to understand the practice of martyrdom in the terrorist context. Not only does a martyr serve recruitment and other purposes after their death, but a whole mythology develops around them, which might be called a process of martyrology (Ranstorp 1996). *Targets are chosen not for strategic purposes, but for symbolic purposes, and the repercussions of an attack are managed as well.* The ideal target is one in which the martyr can inflict more damage than is expected for their size. The idea is to produce an impression that the group is larger and more powerful than it actually is.

Religious terrorists demonstrate marvelous ingenuity in means, methods, and timing, but their targeting is flawed, and one can only wonder how strategically effective is their "symbolic" success from "striking at the heart of the infidels." Perhaps the whole reason for it is to bolster their reputation among other religious communities. This would be supported by the fact that some terrorist acts are scheduled on dates specifically designed to desecrate a competitor's religious holidays and sacred moments. In all fairness, it should be said that most militant religious groups only adopt terrorism as a tactic of last resort.

The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

Examining the Spectral Bite of Terrorism on Nigeria's Industrial Development

Generally, industrial development only thrives in an atmosphere of security, socio-economic and political stability and peace. With the creation of an environment of violence, destruction of infrastructure, unleashing of bloodletting, fear, terror, incessant and unpredictable killings, kidnappings, hostage-taking, carjacking, harassment, threats and bombings, including suicide bombings, emissaries of violence have inadvertently or wittingly put a cog in the wheel of industrial development and progress with adverse effects on the immediate affected states in Nigeria and on the country as a whole. Terrorism has given a spectral bite to industrial development in Nigeria and will limit the quest of the country to achieve its industrialization agenda if not checked. Although the impact of terror on industry in the country is miscellaneous, the following points are worth noting.

First, many Nigerians are no longer able to meet their social obligations in flashpoints where terrorist activities are rife because of the palpable fear of being killed or injured which could bring about permanent disability. On the periphery, this might look harmless and extraneous to industrial development, but probing further, this situation portends a lot of damage on the growth of business as citizens who may have to meet outdoors over breakfast, lunch or dinner to discuss business issues may not be willing to take the risk. It is common knowledge that so many deals are closed in informal settings such as on golf courses, on lawn tennis courts, during social get-togethers and in eating establishments. People are forced to limit their social engagements which have the potential of facilitating commercial activities and they become excessively cagey of outdoor activities which could expose them to terror attacks. Industry, therefore, is left in the lurch. Second, there is mass exodus of large corporations and small medium enterprises (SMEs) to commercial centers outside terror hot spots to preserve their investments and business.

Incessant bombings and bloodcurdling chaos in the North and the erstwhile Niger Delta militant strongholds have forced many large and small businesses to move out of the regions. This is because the owners of such businesses are not willing to risk their investments and capital. For instance, in the North where Boko Haram operatives have continued to target small business operators they consider selling goods forbidden to Muslims, some of these small business owners who survive such attacks move their businesses to other states within and outside the North where their businesses can be safeguarded from wanton destruction. Thus, not only are they moving their businesses, the taxes they pay to state and local governments are withdrawn, employment of indigenes in such businesses plummet and the supply chain, which could involve large or small manufacturers of such products or both is severed especially if such owners are killed or are unable to continue such businesses. In other words, terrorism leads to the disruption of SMEs within the value chain with a deleterious ricocheting impact on industrial development. Third, there is mass exodus of skilled workers of Southern and

Northern origins to other parts of the country or to their states of origin for safety. Many of these workers are tired of the threat to their lives and property and have decided to move out of the trouble areas. The emigration of these skilled workers to other parts of Nigeria will definitely starve the industries that remain in the terror zones of the needed manpower to run their business processes. This ultimately could lead to more costs in terms of hiring and insurance and sometimes when some skilled workers are hard to get could spell the death or discontinuation of the business or an entire industry.

Fourth, the state of insecurity has lowered the trade velocity within and between states in the North where Boko Haram terror activities have lingered. Without trade activities, employment cannot be generated, personal economies will bite the dust, goods and services cannot be bought or sold creating scarcity due to lack of supplies, inflation in the local economy will arise, traders may no longer be able to sell as the population of consumers to buy the products dips and commercial activities could grind to a halt making it impossible for financial intermediaries like commercial banks, microfinance institutions and finance houses to close shop or move their businesses elsewhere. Fifth, the economy of the North-West and North-East is in tatters as most suppliers of goods and services to the North have withdrawn their services for fear of becoming targets for terrorist attacks. There is the destruction of markets and market linkages. This has further slowed industrial development and led to the shutting down of industrial processes.

Sixth, the transport system to the North that facilitates the conveyance of goods and human beings is also adversely affected. A story was making its rounds in the media where innocent travelers were stopped in some parts of the North and where summarily executed if they were not of Northern origin. While the intent of this article is not to fan the embers of hate, it is really to draw attention to the impact this state of affairs could have on the domestic economy in the North. Some organizations in the Southern part of Nigeria dependent on agricultural supplies from the North have also lost countless businesses and customers as a result of the inability of suppliers from that region to meet their targets. Local production is grossly affected and limited and many of these manufacturers are looking to states in the South to make up for the shortfall or replace their northern business allies.

Seventh, the mass departure of foreign expatriates in the Niger Delta and some parts of the North with their investments sends a very strong message to the international business community that Nigeria is not ready to accommodate foreign direct investments and to do business with the world. Eighth, huge financial cost of infrastructure repairs, insurance, security and others puts more burden on government and diverts scarce resources that could have been channeled into other critical investment areas. This further slows industrial development and takes the country some inches backwards in development terms. Ninth, terrorism in some parts of Nigeria has led to the disruption of academic calendar of secondary and tertiary institutions. Affected schools are shut down and

The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

affected students stay back at home for fear of being killed, kidnapped or injured by the terror envoys.

This situation throws these students into the streets and even makes the situation worse as some of them could become targets or recruits for the terror gangs. Also, industry suffers because the products of these institutions who upon graduation could help to provide the critical human capital needed to run the industrial processes in place are forced to remain at home or leave the trouble spots momentarily or for good. Lastly, terrorism in different parts of Nigeria has limited the tourism and hospitality potentials of the country or affected states. For example, Bauchi State with its Yankari Game Reserve, Sokoto with its Argungu Festival and Jos in Plateau State touted as the Tin City with its temperate climate have experienced low or non-existing patronage as many citizens and foreign tourists no longer go to such places for fear of becoming targets to the terror bloodhounds. Hostage-taking and kidnappings of expatriates have also reduced the number of these visitors to such unique tourist places and denied the respective governments concerned the income, goodwill and business opportunities that could have been generated from such rendezvous.

A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Fighting Terrorism in Nigeria

Tackling Boko Haram-styled terrorism and any form of terrorism in Nigeria goes beyond the resources and capabilities of government and its agencies. The hydra-headed terror monster, with its international allies and financing, requires more commitment, resources and support from many more stakeholders including government and its security agencies but extending to regional bodies, the international community, civil society, business community and faith organizations.

For space constraints, this study has summarized the roles sub-regional, regional and international bodies can play in fighting terrorism in Africa.

The African Union's 2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa must not remain a mere legal instrument. Its provisions must be enforceable such that the operations of terror gangs and their sponsors are checkmated in any part of Africa. Through its African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT, the technical arm of AU on terrorism), AU member-states, the regional economic commissions and the United Nations should engage in greater information sharing, cooperation and coordination, with a view to raising awareness of terrorist threats across Africa and helping African states gain access to needed capacity-building assistance. The United Nations should continue to help African states through the AU to provide the needed logistics, capacity building, technical and monetary resources for increased surveillance of their many porous borders, information sharing among these states and the equipment of national security agencies with modern gadgets and training to combat terrorists in the region. There is also the need to continue to build the

capacity of law enforcement and other criminal justice officials from West African countries to fight the rising menace of terror merchants within the sub-region. Promoting community policing as part of the options for patrolling borders is critical to winning the war against terrorism. Member states of ECOWAS must work in conjunction with the ECOWAS Commission to finalize and adopt a sub-regional strategy and plan of action for addressing threats from terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa that is driven by local and sub-regional needs and priorities.

The United States and European Union have numerous investments and interests in Nigeria and West Africa because of the latter's rich oil and mineral deposits. To support the war against terrorism in Nigeria and against its West African neighbours, the United States and the EU must be involved in counterterrorism capacity-building assistance of countries in the sub-region. This support should be extended to the rigorous implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on illicit drug trafficking and organized crime by "increasing operational capacities of ECOWAS, its Commission as well as ECOWAS Member States, and their deeper involvement in addressing" these illicit activities (Ipe *et al.*, 2010). The US and EU should facilitate horizontal security cooperation among the states in the sub-region, strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities; enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the region's security forces; promote democratic governance; discredit terrorist ideology; and reinforce bilateral military ties with these world powers as a measure of strengthening the weak states in the sub-region. The US and EU should support efforts to improve education and health; and provide counterterrorism training in marksmanship and border patrol to the militaries of partner countries.

Donors should employ a two-level approach to assessing and funding Strategy-related activities in West Africa: one at the national level that identifies local priorities and gaps that need immediate attention; the other at the sub-regional level, by focusing on multilateral activities that strengthen and sustain cooperation among ECOWAS member states.

Non-traditional actors such as civil society groups, NGOs, foundations, public-private partnerships, and private businesses are some of the most capable and credible partners in local communities. A strategy that provides a common framework for Nigeria, its West African neighbors, ECOWAS, and civil society to engage in counterterrorism issues and built on the rich contributions of civil society to further human security in West Africa must be put in place. Given the importance of ensuring national and sub-regional ownership over the counterterrorism agenda in Nigeria and West Africa, more attention should be given to reaching out to and involving civil society in this area. Outreach by states and multilateral bodies to Nigerian and West African civil society groups on strategy-related issues should involve engagement with grassroots organizations, including youth and women's groups, and academic researchers and think-tanks to develop locally based, credible assessments of terrorism-related threats and

The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigerian Development by Imhonopi & Urim

vulnerabilities in the sub-region. Efforts by civil society groups should aim at promoting the rule of law, good governance, and peace and security, as well as the broader economic, social, and political development of Nigeria and the sub-region.

Religious leaders must begin to look critically at ways to engage their followers and memberships and guide them by correctly interpreting their scriptural beliefs, avoiding the temptation of invoking hate, bigotry and extremism in all interactions. There must be respect for other faiths and the differences involved in worship. There must also be respect for human lives. Seminars, conferences and workshops must be held by faith organizations to retrain religious leaders to abide by the true doctrines of their faith without violating the rights of others to freedom of worship. To fight the Boko Haram menace, Nigeria can adopt the example shown by the Saudi government to checkmate terrorism within the kingdom. According to (*Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, 2008*), the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs launched an extensive media campaign to educate young Saudis on the –correct teachings of Islam in order to prevent them from becoming drawn to extremist doctrines. The campaign included messages incorporated into Friday sermons at mosques, distribution of literature and tapes, and publication of articles on the Internet. As part of the campaign, the government published a book in October entitled, "Guarding Against Terrorism." The government also recently began to issue identification cards to imams and religious leaders to curb instances of unauthorized persons delivering Friday sermons.

Meanwhile, these initiatives will only work when Nigeria and its West African neighbors lead the development of these strategies.

Conclusion

Terrorism raises the vote allocated to security. In an industrially and infrastructurally deficient economy, such monies could have been well utilized for development purposes. Ironically, since development cannot take place within a context of insecurity, these votes become a desideratum to raise the level of security formation so that economic and other activities can be sustained. The etiology of terrorism in Nigeria is traceable to a history of asymmetry in resource allocation and warped resource allocation formulae, marginalization of some groups within the Nigerian society, official and elite corruption, subjugation of minority groups and their rights, environmental pollution of the Niger Delta, the supply of arms and ammunition to political thugs who later metamorphose into terrorist armies, ethnic and religious rivalries and bigotry and the quest for self-determination by ethnic groups. While government must address the issues of corruption, youth unemployment, illiteracy of many citizens, poverty of the vulnerable sectors, poor healthcare, environmental pollution, poor governance processes and the different weaknesses of the state, already identified as the problems that initiated and have sustained the incidence of terrorism in Nigeria, it is important that government accedes to the request by interest groups within the polity to convene a truly national conversation to determine the terms of engagement of the nationalities that make up the Nigerian commonwealth.

Meanwhile, to quell the raging inferno of terror acts in the country, the job falls on the table of not only the government, but also other stakeholders whose interests in the continuity of the Nigerian project could be damaged if the polity is overrun by terror gangs whatever their names or *raisons d'être*. The international community, faith organizations, civil society, business community and others have to conflate their roles in order to obliterate or checkmate terrorism in Nigeria and create the needed breather for industrial development to happen.

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