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Letters to the Editor and all other business correspondence should be addressed to Editor-in-Chief Andrew Ewoh, JPMSP, Barbra Jordan-Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs, Texas Southern University, 3100 Cleburne Street, Houston, Texas 77004.

Manuscripts should be forwarded electronically to Managing Editor Charles E. Menifield (Charles.menifield@rutgers.edu) and cc’d to Editor-in-Chief Andrew E. Ewoh (Andrew.Ewoha@tsu.edu). Proposals for symposia should be forwarded electronically to Symposium Editor Brian N. Williams (bnwillia@uga.edu). For more information visit http://www.jpmsp.com.

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Municipal Consolidation, Innovations and the Dynamics of Public Policies

Andrew I.E. Ewoh
Texas Southern University

The Journal of Public Management and Social Policy ends the twenty-fifth volume with scholarly contributions that explore various issues pertaining to municipal organizational realities, innovations, media influence in the public policy process, choice, perceptions, and participation. This volume starts with a discussion on municipal consolidation and closes with a qualitative analysis of political rhetoric in framing public policy and its implication on Latino political participation in Arizona. The five articles in this volume show the variety of topics published in *JPMSP*.

The first article, “Municipal Consolidation and Organizational Realities: A Case from New York City,” by Bakry Elmedni, Sade McIntosh, and Beverly Lyons evaluates the merger of two New York City agencies. Using a survey instrument and follow-up interviews, the analysis reveals that the merger process was deficient and resulted in differing perceptions of employees’ self-image six years after implementation. It further notes that a well-planned and negotiated process could have produced a better working relationships among the employees while accomplishing the goals set for the new emerging agency. The article concludes that employees were unaware of the new agency’s mission and policies due to the deficiency in the merger process and its efforts.

In the second article, “The Good, Bad and Ugly of Innovations in Human Services Administration: Evidence from New York Counties,” Lauren Bock Mullins and Jylldyz Kasymova deploy a theoretical method in selecting the six counties included in their study that reported using innovation techniques in the administration of social services in their jurisdictions. The major innovations in departments of social services pertains to a transition from a case-based administration of welfare application to a tasked-based method, including a web-based application process, to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in program implementation. Comprehensively, the study concludes that counties demonstrated their proclivity to innovate even during periods of budgetary constraints.

The third article—“In the Midst of an Epidemic: How Print Media Shapes Policy Feedback to the Opioid Crisis,” by Peter Stanley Federman—uses a content analysis of local newspaper articles to show that political and administrative officials perceive the...
use of medication to decrease the risk of opioid abuse in noticeably different ways. On the contrary, elected officials portray an “indirect mindset” and usually focus on cost, legal implications, and eclectic effect, ignoring the street-level concerns shared by public administrators and other policy advocates. The analysis concludes with directions for future research not only to enhance citizens’ understanding of the dynamisms influencing Narcan policy, but how the elected officials, public administrators and other stockholders can bargain, dialogue, and form alliances throughout the policy making process.

Jeanne M. Powers, Amelia Marcetti Topper, and Amanda U. Potterton in the fourth article titled “Interdistrict Mobility and Charter Schools in Arizona: Understanding the Dynamics of Public School Choice” investigate the mobility patterns of elementary school students enrolled in traditional public school districts and charter schools in Arizona. Using a regression analysis, the study finds that the relationships between different types of student mobility and school characteristics differ across the two sectors including regional variation in mobility patterns. Moreover, the study concludes that educational markets differ significantly across and within local jurisdictions.

In the fifth article, “Does Political Rhetoric Framing of Public Policies Thwart Political Participation? Latinos Say Yes, and No: Implications of Latino Civic Engagement in a Trump World,” Karina Moreno deploys a purpose sampling technique in selecting participants that provided qualitative data in the form of in-depth interviews pertaining to their understanding of public policy issues that affect their welfare, which in turn affect their civic engagement. The study findings show that a degenerative policy such as Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 has a negative impact on political integration of Latinos and Latino immigrants, because it alienates them from the conventional form of political participation. The analysis concludes that since current policy dynamics convey political unpalatable messages to Latino communities and other similarly situated minorities, public administrators should play a crucial role in transforming these dynamics into positive changes that strengthens the nation’s democracy and upholds social justice and equity in its involvement with the community that they serve.

In sum, thank you to all the JPMSP’s authors and reviewers for their contributions in producing the third issue of Volume 25. On behalf of the Editorial Board, I extend my profound gratitude to Charles E. Menifield for agreeing to serve as the Managing Editor, and to John C. Ronquillo for accepting the role of Case Study Editor. Furthermore, the ideas and thought provoking questions raised in the articles that appeared in this Journal will help our readers to deepen their understanding of issues regarding municipal consolidation, innovations and the dynamics of public policies in the United States.
Municipal Consolidation and Organizational Realities: A Case from New York City

Bakry Elmedni
Sadé McIntosh
Beverly Lyons
Long Island University-Brooklyn

This article examines a merger of two New York City agencies (DJJ and ACS) from employees’ perspectives. Mergers in the public sector have always been conceptualized as a tool for enhancing service provision and promoting fiscal responsibility. The evidence is dubious on both fronts. Using self-administered questionnaire and follow-up interviews, the paper shows that the process used to carry out the merger was insufficient, resulting in divergent sense of identity among employees after six years. Further, it contends that a well-designed and carefully-negotiated merger can lead to harmony while meeting the intended goals of the new organization. We concluded that because of insufficient efforts in the three phases of merger (pre-merger, merging, and post-merger), employees were oblivious to the agency’s new mission and often confused by contradictory policies.

There are generally three arguments used to justify inter-agency merger. First, the functional expedience argument, which seeks effective ways to provide public services to enhance interaction with the public. Second, the cost reduction argument, which aims to eliminate administrative and procedural redundancies. Third, the consolidation argument, which is usually deployed as a response to geographical or demographic shifts. In reality, however, each of these arguments can be trumped by the prevailing organizational realities that influence the three stages of merger: pre-merger, merging, and post-merger.

While the topic of inter-agency consolidation can be examined from a public finance point of view, e.g., a cost reduction argument, this paper focuses on service quality (functional expedience) from employees’ perspective, an aspect that has been found to be lacking in previous studies (Maher 2015). This is particularly true about public inter-agency consolidation. The topic of quality service has been studied extensively from the customers’ perspectives (Abernathy 2012; Bushnell and Halus 1992; Wisniewski 1996). To contribute to bridging this gap in the literature, this study explores inter-agency consolidation from employees’ perspectives. As such, the purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to explain the
forces that continue to shape employees’ perceptions in the post-merger stage at NYC’s Administration of Children Services (ACS) and (2) to examine the influence of employees’ perceptions on their understanding of the agency’s mission and mandates.

The story began in 2010, when NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed legislation officially merging the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) into the Administration for Children's Services (ASC). The result of the merger was that ACS created the Division of Youth and Family Justice (DYFJ) to provide juvenile justice services, which used to be the domain of DJJ. However, after six years and a new mayoral administration, employees still identify with their old divisions while dealing with contradictory policies and procedures at times. Looking at the mandates of both agencies, there were apparent overlaps. The two agencies had liaised with each other to ensure the welfare of children and juveniles. Overlaps of processes and activities made it reasonable to consider consolidating ACS and DJJ under one management. We speculate that employees continuing to identify with their old agencies after six years is an indicator that organizational change components (OCC) – culture, policies and procedures, and communication– were not addressed sufficiently during the merger process. At worst, this could mean incomplete mission alignment and, consequently, ineffective coordination of activities and services, even though the primary reason for merging the two agencies was to effectively align processes and eliminate overlaps.

Historically, agencies are created to fulfill certain mandates, respond to specific needs, and provide identified public goods and services. With the evolvement of public organizations and the constant changes in the provision of public goods and services, it is inevitable that there will be an overlap of activities among agencies. Municipalities are known to be keen on improving coordination among agencies as a way to improve service delivery. However, previous studies on municipal consolidation have long raised doubts about such optimism. On the contrary, approaching municipal consolidation without careful planning can create undesired organizational realities, such as distorted views about the organization’s mission. Freeman and Rossi (2012) presented an alternative approach to inter-agency coordination and warned of issues affecting the new shared regulatory space which will shape the new organizational realities. It is also reasonable to think of inter-agency consolidation as a type of organizational change. Research has shown that no matter how organizational change is designed, the results are likely to be meager compared to the enthusiasm with which leaders speak of the improvements to be reaped as a result of change (Denhardt, Denhardt and Aristigueta 2015).

Organizational, this paper is divided into five sections. The following section provides a review of literature on mergers in the public sector, focusing on organizational factors that determine consolidation outcomes. These factors include pre-merger status, power, culture, and future continuity. The third section presents the methodology used to conduct this study, covering design, tools for data gathering and data processing. The fourth section provides findings and discussion, where we attempt to assign meaning to the tabulated data gathered through questionnaire and follow up interviews. In the fifth section, we close by giving concluding remarks and policy implications.

**Merger in the Public Sector: Rationale and Challenges**

Consolidation in public organizations is neither new nor uncontentious (Fleischmann 2000). A brief glance at the history of merging municipal agencies suggests that one of the driving forces for consolidating services is to reduce costs and enhance delivery of services. It might be noteworthy to point out that most of the studies on consolidation focused on local government and municipalities, not exactly on a merger at inter-agency level within a city or
municipality. Yet, despite the lack of evidence, there is a widespread belief that efficiency in government can be improved by reducing the number of departments and agencies by combining them into a large one. Karcher (1998) argued that new government and locales are usually created for the benefit of a small group of people, not necessarily larger public interests, concluding that voluntary and mandatory consolidation can be a remedy for fragmentation. Making a similar point, Mabuchi (2001) contended that consolidation is likely to increase the efficiency of municipalities and local government. This potential increase in efficiency is often accompanied by confusion about narratives, artifacts, networks, and power, leading to misconception about spaces and identities.

To a degree, the topic has been studied broadly, and it remains a major area of interest for state and local governments, as they strive to enhance services and curb costs. Political forces dealing with fragmented administrative work in multiple agencies have also been a driver for better coordination and alignment, which sometimes can be politically envisioned through inter-agency consolidation by political actors because “lawmakers frequently assign overlapping and fragmented delegations that require agencies to share regulatory space” (Freeman and Rossi 2012, p. 1133). The political forces are understandable, and so is their rationale, but the deployed political solution in terms of consolidation is unlikely to solve the problems of modern fragmented governance, Freeman and Rossi concluded, recommending instead “stronger interagency coordination and improve coordination instrument” (p. 1133). Notwithstanding this, elected officials continue to push for inter-agency consolidation, and, more often than not, they use the functional expediency argument as a rationale. In the following sections, we examine internal and external forces in pre-merger stage, and how they contribute to organizational identification during merging and in post-merger stage, including arguments about efficiency as a conduit for politics.

**Mergers and Identification: Benign Forces with Malignant Outcomes**

Aside from the planned and designed efforts during the merger stages, there are factors that contribute to the way employees may continue to identify themselves in the post-merger stage. Previous studies have documented that perceived external prestige (PEP) and communication influence employees' overall organizational identification in post-merger stage (Kamasak 2011). Bartels, Pruyn, and de Jong (2009) conducted a longitudinal study on employee identification and concluded that “pre-merger identification primarily influences post-merger identification at the same organizational level … Internal communication climate is particularly important for employees' identification with their division. PEP affects employees' identification with the overall organization” (p. 113). The rationale for focusing on PEP is based on self-enhancement as a motive for organizational identification. Since ACS is the larger agency with a better prestige, one could have assumed that, motivated by self-enhancement, DJJ’s employees would quickly identify with the new agency. Unsurprisingly, that is not the case, because there were other factors at play as well. Elstak, Bhatt, Van Riel, Pratt, and Berens (2015) explored the interaction between self-enhancement and the uncertainty reduction motives in shaping identification during a merger. Their study found that the self-enhancement motive and perceived external prestige (PEP) continued to “influence identification during the merger. However, its effects are diminished when considering the effect of the uncertainty reduction motive” (p. 32). Elstak et al. joined the calls for thinking of organizational identification motives beyond self-enhancement, contending that multiple identification motives work during a major organizational change.

Consequently, the pre-merger sense of identity appears to remain intact despite
attempts of mission realignment and coordination. It is interesting to ponder whether such persistence is part of human psychology, e.g., holding on to the past, or rather a result of insufficient efforts to create a new sense of identity in the post-merger stage. While this demands another line of inquiry, one can speculate that the answer is a mixture of both, for research has shown that there are specific determinants of employee’s identification during the merger stage. Using an experimental case study comparing employees who were directly involved to those who were indirectly involved in a merger of police organizations, Bartels, Douwes, de Jong, and Pruyn (2006) tested five factors: (1) identification with the pre-merger organization, (2) sense of continuity, (3) expected utility of the merger, (4) communication climate before the merger, and (5) communication about the merger. These determinants appeared to explain the difference in organizational identification, which is measured based on expected identification before the merger. Bartels et al. concluded that:

In order to obtain a strong identification with the soon-to-be-merged organization, managers should pay extra attention to current departments with weaker social bonds as these are expected to identify the least with the new organization. The role of the communication variables differed between the two employee groups: communication about the merger only contributed to the organizational identification of directly involved employees; and communication climate only affected the identification of indirectly involved employees. (p. 49)

Another way to examine organizational identification during a merger is to use the social identity model as conceptualized in the work of Turner and Tajfel (1986) and Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987). The social identity model posits that people are similar in dress and behavior despite their presumed differences because “groups and situations seem somehow to submerge uniqueness in a sea of commonality, and the same person behaves differently as he or she moves from situation to situation and group to group” (Hogg and Reid 2006, p. 7). Applying the social identity model to organizational merger, Giessner, Ullrich, and van Dick (2011) concluded that “levels of identification with the merged organization are partly explained by status and dominance differences of the involved organizations, by motivational threats and uncertainties during the merger, and by the representation of the post-merger identity” (p.333).

Motivational threat can often be a matter of perception, regardless of what is actually happening. This is exactly where the communication climate comes into play, as discussed earlier. Rumors about the negative impacts of change, such as layoffs and reorganization, are usually rampant during mergers. What is unusual in the case of ACS and DJJ is that years have passed and uncertainties have been cleared, but the pre-merger identification remains relatively strong. In post-merger stage, one can assume that networks–formal and informal–in pre-merger stage were not disrupted enough to open venues for a new coalition and a sense of identity. Status and dominance differences in the pre-merger stage appear to continue to affect values and assumptions, as well as power dynamics. Particularly, power dynamics are likely to be at play during merging and post-merger stages.

In a study that directly examined the group power dynamics in pre and post-merger, Boen, Vanbeselaere, Brebels, Huybens, and Millet (2007) categorized pre-merger identification, pre-merger group status, and relative representation into low/high scale and compared that to a new merger group. Their study revealed that “high pre-merger identifiers identified more strongly with the merger group than did low pre-merger identifiers, but only
when the relative representation was high. Pre-merger status did not influence post-merger identification” (p. 380). Emphasizing the role of social identification process, Fischer, Greitemeyer, Omay, and Frey (2007) contended that mergers have a limited success because they focus on financial and legal arrangements while ignoring human factors. They used social identity theory as a framework to explain the failure of most mergers, assigning three different status groups (high, low, and equal status groups) to thirty-six small groups. The experiment revealed that the members of low-status groups provided the most negative responses to the merger in terms of identification with the merger group, satisfaction with the merger, common in-group identity, group cohesion, and controllability. Boen et al. (2007) concluded that “contrary to expectations, status was not related to the performance of the groups” (p. 203). If one is to extrapolate from this result to the case at hand, low-status group (DJJ employees) should be the ones to respond more negatively to the merger. Equally true, employees with stronger identification with either DJJ or ACS should be expected to embrace the merger and become the merger group, while status and rank were irrelevant in the post-merger organizational identification.

In a similar line of inquiry with slightly different implications, Lipponen, Wisse, and Jetten (2017) argued that pre-merger status of merging partners relative to each other will impact post-merger identification because “relative pre-merger status determines employees' susceptibility to different aspects of the merger process” (p. 692). They specifically argued that post-merger identification of employees from a high-status pre-merger organization will be influenced by pre-merger identification and the perceived change in the status. Employees of a low status pre-merger organization will be strongly affected by the perceived sense of justice about the merger process. The authors concluded that “the extent to which pre-merger identification, status change, and justice are important determinants of post-merger identification depends on the relative pre-merger status of the merger partners” (p. 692). It appears that the pre-merger identification, among other factors, can predict post-merger identification only at the same organizational level, as pointed out by Bartels, Pruyn, and de Jong (2009). Pre-merger status of merging organizations can have a significant impact on employees’ identification to the extent that an individual’s pre-merger identification becomes almost irrelevant without considering the pre-merger status of merging organizations. This observation elevates the discussion about power beyond the individual and group status to the organization’s status at the time of a merger. The pre-merger status can also influence the narrative about the merger itself, and, in turn, the narrative will influence perceptions about justice and identification.

Narratives about the merger, accurate or not, play a powerful role in the reconceptualization of space and identity. On one hand, separating a merger’s narratives from power dynamics, networks, and pre-merger status can be extremely complex. On the other hand, how narratives are constructed and disseminated can be traced and documented. In certain situations, a narrative can be the single most influential factor in employees’ post-merger identification, for a narrative can be the reason for the perceived sense of justice or injustice. A study conducted by Gleibs, Noack, and Mummendey (2010) on in-group favoritism can shed light on how narratives can be crucial to identification. Gleibs et al. focused on the evolving dynamics of social identity processes during a merger at a university, showing that “pre-merger identification increased favoritism, but favoritism also increased pre-merger identification ... These results confirm that issues of identity change and compatibility are crucial aspects in understanding merger adjustment and support” (p. 819).

Within the social construction of meaning spectrum, narratives not only can evolve...
to take on a life of their own, but also can complicate things further for the new merger group. One can easily envision a scenario where employees from a high-status pre-merger organization utilize their existing powerful networks, advance their assumptions and values, maintain their artifacts, and offer favors to members within their networks. On the other side of the aisle, one can also imagine employees from the low-status pre-merger organization congregating at the cafeteria, huddling in the hallways, sharing exaggerated details about who is appointed to lead the transition team, and constructing a deep sense of victimization. By noon, there is a widespread sense of perceived injustice and organizational inequity, which requires a social response. One of the aggrieved proclaims ‘we gave them the benefit of the doubt, and we came with open hearts, only to be ignored and marginalized.’ Whether ingroup favoritism is real or imagined or a natural result of how people in power pick who they trust, now it is a reality for some and necessitates a social action. The narrative is likely to be dramatized even more, and the aggrieved will hold onto their pre-merger identification as a cause. The powerful group might interpret the attitude of the aggrieved, which is meant to be a protest, as a lack of cooperation or a sign of not being on board with the new direction. The old networks and alliances will carry on without disruption, creating even further misunderstandings and misinterpretations, hence a vicious cycle of mutual alienation is created and maintained.

There is also a possibility for creating and nurturing a different narrative, one that emphasizes a bright future and downplays motivational threats and uncertainties. Many studies have shown that organizational identification is a key factor in predicting employees' behaviors during mergers. Employees from the subordinate partners are likely to maintain their old organizational identification in the post-merger stage. Examining projected continuity as a mediator between differential relationship in pre-merger and post-merger identification, Lupina-Wegener, Drzensky, Ullrich, and van Dick (2014) argued that projected continuity mediates the differential relationships, which means knowledge about one’s future in the organization dictates one’s attitude toward the merger process. Additionally, pre-merger identification positively relates to projected continuity in the dominant group but negatively in the subordinate group. Thus, a merger is likely to be more successful if pre-and-post merger identification is reduced or eliminated in the subordinate group because “a key challenge in merger integration is to support high identifiers in the subordinate group in developing a projected continuity or a focus on ‘the bright tomorrow’” (Lupina-Wegener et al. 2014, p. 752).

Another component of narrative and power dynamics lies in the cognitive representations of mergers. Previous studies have indicated that cognitive representations of mergers affect intergroup evaluations, in particular, and performance evaluation, in general. Giessner and Mummendey (2008) examined the cognitive representations of mergers by looking at how three groups with varying identification (one group, dual identity, and two groups) interact with performance feedback (success and failure) to affect intergroup evaluations. They concluded that subgroup salience only indicates pre-merger in-group bias if superordinate group salience is low. However, there are low levels of in-group bias after merger success. The major point is that the higher the identification in the subordinate group, the more in-group bias in the pre-merger and the less in the post-merger. In a nutshell, a sense of unity in organizational identification yields less biased performance evaluation.

As discussed elsewhere, mergers in private and public organizations are often predicated on functional expedience without much attention to the social costs in terms of identity, policies, procedures, and alienation. Recently, scholars started to pay attention to the social impacts of organizational change process triggered by mergers. Using the social
identity approach, Giessner, Horton, and Humborstad (2016) explored the impact of mergers and acquisitions activities on employees and their local communities. Their study highlighted the importance of identity reputation and continuity, intergroup structure, justice, and leadership for managing employee adjustment and identification during the mergers. The authors ultimately called for developing a review guideline for assessing social impacts of mergers.

Without attempting to identify the forces that contribute to post-merger employee’s identification, which has been in the center of debates in recent studies on mergers and consolidation, Cho, Lee and Kim (2014) explored the relationship between employees’ perceptions of relative deprivation—conceptualized as dissatisfaction with their jobs—during a merger process and their turnover intentions. Cho et al. concluded that “employee identification with the post-merger organization was found to fully mediate the relationship between egoistic relative deprivation and turnover intention” (p. 421). The positive correlation between job dissatisfaction and turnover intention is hardly a surprise. What is intriguing though is the role of post-merger identification, which is a result of multiple factors mostly associated with pre-merger status, communication, and continuity. This reality presents post-merger human resources units with daunting dilemmas, because some of the problems with employees’ dissatisfaction appears to be a byproduct of the merger process.

To this end, perhaps the broader question that organizational theorists might want to examine is whether organizational identification is all that good and welcomed, given the need for constant organizational change in response to recurring technological and societal changes. This question raises doubt about organizational identification in the private sector, which has been sold as all positive and good in increasing employees’ productivity, commitment, morale, and loyalty. Even public organizations jumped into organizational identification and social branding. The push for identification is extended to customers and consumers, as well. Speaking to this point, Conroy, Henle, Shore, and Stelman (2017) argued that research on organizational identification has generally suggested that organizational identification is good for individuals and organizations. The authors contended that there could be a negative side to the underlying social identity processes that govern organizational identification, concluding with the notion that:

Organizational identification can lead to unethical behaviors, resistance to organizational change, lower performance, interpersonal conflict, negative emotions, and reduced well-being. Conditions facilitating these undesirable outcomes include situation factors (e.g., identity threats, work characteristics) and person factors (e.g., morality, other identifications).
(Conroy et al. 2017, p. 184)

While the findings of Conroy et al. aimed at bringing a balanced view about organizational identification, they nevertheless indicate that there is an available intellectual space for a whole new theoretical conceptualization of organizational identification in the age of inevitable, fast-pace changes. In this study, we primarily set out to explore the forces that drive employees’ perception of identification in the post-merger ACS. After a deep dive in the literature on employee identification, we arrived at a point of questioning whether organizational identification is all that good, warranting a push for uniformity. These points are likely to be the subject of future theoretical debates. In the meantime, there are still other external forces that might continue to shape employees’ organizational identification beyond
networks, status of individuals and merging partners, assumptions and values, and artifacts. There is no need to emphasize how far external factors can influence internal dynamics. However, looking at external factors as stand-alone forces remains imperative for understanding the context, condition, and climate of mergers.

Political Forces and Mergers: Cost and Quality as a Conduit for Politics

The general agreement among scholars is that municipal consolidation does not reduce costs. Maher (2015) concluded that “for communities that consolidated services, overall expenditures increased in some circumstances and expenditure reductions were only associated with one service: capacity management” (p 393). Moreover, Jimenez and Hendrick (2010) confirmed that municipal consolidation does not reduce cost. Focusing on officers’ perceptions of organizational justice, Grant (2011) studied the consolidation of Louisville and Jefferson County police departments. While the juxtaposition of law enforcement and social services is highly intriguing, because historically there have been opposing perspectives, Grant’s research focused on the drivers of differences in officers’ perceptions of justice and their professional reaction. One could safely assume that these perceptions were likely to have everything to do with pre-merger status, projected continuity, motivational threat, uncertainties, and communication climate. The reality is that all these elements are mediated and influenced by politics in any given public municipal consolidation.

Another study about Louisville and Jefferson consolidation by Reed (2013) focused on Organizational Change Components (OCC): culture, policies and procedures, communications, collective bargaining contracts, and re-defining patrol division boundaries. Reed concluded that “officers' perception of the complexity of merging OCCs was a significant predictor of current support for consolidation…officers’ prior support for consolidation and officers' satisfaction with the results of the merged OCCs were also significant predictors of current support for merger” (p.1). Just like officers’ perception of justice, it was reasonable to assume that OCCs were also likely to be influenced by politics and political motives. This study examined OCC, linking their role in creating conducive conditions for service quality.

It is often argued that consolidation is about quality of service. Political motives sometimes work miracles behind the scene while an economic rationale would be used to justify presented notions. In consolidating municipal governments, there is always going to be a tension between financial and political considerations (Sorensen 2006). The same can be said about inter-agency merger within the same municipality. Commenting on the tension between political consideration and finances in consolidation, Gamrat and Haulk (2005) reviewed mergers in local governments and concluded that:

Proponents claim that by merging the two entities, duplicative services can be consolidated resulting in a leaner more cost effective government. They point to the success of two previous city-county mergers: Metro Louisville and Indianapolis UniGov. However the evidence from these mergers does not create optimism that cost savings or faster economic growth will occur. (p. 3)

Vojnovic (1998) found that streamlining work processes and standards become a challenge for consolidating organizations. Specialization and disruption of skills is another issue to deal with during and after the merger. At a municipal level, Sancton (2001) argued that voluntary consolidation produces better results than being centrally imposed. Using
functional expedience and quality of service argument, Mayor Bloomberg’s rationale for integrating juvenile justice and child welfare programs was to facilitate long-term care for the young people and their families once they enter the juvenile justice system. It is meant to serve as a focused strategy to put the youth on the path toward school, work, and successful adulthood. The overarching goal is to decrease the rate of recidivism for youths, a rate that is traditionally higher among juvenile offenders than adult criminals (ACS 2012).

A report by Bakirtzi, Shoukens, and Pieters (2001) reviewed the merger of social security administration and tax revenues in multiple European countries and concluded that mergers can produce excellent results if organizations can overcome the immediate challenges, such as work processes, culture, mandates, and expectations. Another report by Owen, Kelly, Reed, Pittman, and Wagner (2011) analyzed 41 mergers of nonprofit organizations, contending that in the pre-merger stage, the factors that can be crucial include financial soundness of the merging organizations, external conditions, organizational structure, and leadership. Factors during the merging process include key stakeholder involvement, role of staff in the merger process, integrating formal and informal structures, and providing due diligence to the process. We have already indicated that in inter-agency consolidation, politics will shape and influence all of the factors associated with the merger stages. Research on organizational change has long indicated that commitment is imperative, and lack of employees’ involvement can be detrimental to the process in areas of cultural integration and identification. In the post-merger stage, there are four factors: funding and support, service and culture, organizational capacity, and structure. Once again, political forces seen as external factors will influence funding and support, service and culture, and structure.

As we have seen so far, inter-agency consolidation is an extreme form of organizational change process because it involves change in an organization’s strategies, processes, procedures, technologies, and culture. Although change is known to be inevitable or unavoidable in today’s world, more often than not, organizations struggle to deal with the challenges associated with it. The failure is more likely in situations where change is imposed from the top without careful planning and employees’ participation. For instance, Bolman and Deal (2013) contended that organizations tend to waste resources on strategies to implement change, which often fails to provide little to no improvement, and sometimes it makes the current situation worse. Beer and Nohria (2000) argued that employees accept changes more easily when management adopts a participative strategy which targets organizational culture rather than a top-down approach. Thinking of change as a process can help in careful planning and thoughtful implementation with the inclusion of employees and other stakeholders (Ormerod 2007).

In today’s rapidly changing technology, an organization’s ability to adapt to change is a necessity. Despite this being almost common knowledge, most attempts to implement change in public organizations still fail. Generally, it is true that people resist change, but more importantly employees tend to resist change and automatically assume it will not succeed if they were not involved in the process. Thus, approaching the process of change strategically is paramount. Denhardt, Denhardt, and Aristigueuta (2015) maintained that employees accept change easily when they are made aware of the need, which makes it appear less fearful. These elements are consistent with the projected continuity, uncertainties, and motivational threat as drivers of organizational identification in the post-merger stage. There appears to be the paradox of change as politicians’ use improvement in service quality as a rationale for inter-agency merger while failure to efficiently manage change results in poor
organizational performance, decline in employees’ moral, and waste of resources (Fachruddin and Mangundjaya 2012). Literature on the topic of organizational change is consistent with the notion that the success of change depends on employees’ commitment to the change. Therefore, gaining employees’ commitment and trust can provide a sense of security and increase support for the organizational change. In the following section, we examine the methods used to complete this study.

Methodology
This section explains the methods employed to conduct this study. It covers design and rationale, data gathering techniques, sample, and data processing. We begin with brief description of the study’s overall methodological design and conceptualization, then we follow with descriptions of sample, population, and data processing.

Study design
We used a mixed model combining quantitative and qualitative techniques. In this way, we were able to connect the analysis from the initial phase to the second phase of the study, so that both results can be compared (Sandelowski, Voils, and Knafl 2009). The decision to use both methodological tools is justified by the nature of the research questions that the study set out to answer. While the study is primarily concerned with discerning employees’ perceptions of the merger and how perceptions affect service quality, research has shown that relying on quantitative measures alone in explaining perceptions can be tricky and misleading at times even if the sample is large and representative. This has been a common setback in public opinion polling data in recent times, often rendering them unreliable because “the science of public surveying is in something of a crisis right now” (Geoffrey Skelley, a political analyst at the University of Virginia's Center for Politics, as cited in Williams 2015). People’s response depends largely on how questions were framed and the context within which questions were asked. Consequently, to eliminate a potential bias, we attempted to triangulate by conducting follow-up interviews with participants who responded to the self-administered questionnaire. We also conducted interviews with managers who have been with either DJJ or ACS during the merger process. While managers’ views are not representative, we contend that they are useful in providing deeper insight because they had access to information and networks when the process was initiated.

We used qualitative tools to analyze responses from interviews with managers, as well as the data collected in the follow-up group interviews. Qualitative analysis helped deciphering some of the contradictory quantitative responses, as well as corroborating validity, assigning meaning, and clarifying implications. Fundamentally, we want to deeply understand the forces behind the employees’ continuous identification with their old agencies and why OCCs (culture, policies, and communication) continue to reflect two agencies while there is only one agency with one mission and a new mandate.

Population, Sample, and Data Gathering
Currently, there are about 8,000 employees who work for ACS, of which around 800 are in the Division of Youth and Family Justice (DYFJ). So, the population for this study is close to 8000 employees after the merger. After providing all relevant documents for human subject protection and obtaining the institutional review board (IRB) approval, we distributed a self-administered questionnaire to a sample of 125 (n) participants who signed the consent form and agreed to take part in the study. We tested the questionnaire for reliability and validity with a pilot group of seven participants before distributing them. Of the 125, only 105 (84
percent of distributed questionnaire and 1.0 percent of the total number of employees) participants responded to the questionnaire. We are aware that 1.0 percent of employees is very unlikely to be a representative sample of the merged organizations. In nutshell, this is a convenient sample, for this was an unfunded research conducted during limited periods of access to the field of the study. We hope that using three points of contacts—self-administered questionnaire, follow up interviews with former participants and managers—can help tell the story while acknowledging that we were working with a potentially unrepresentative sample.

Our point of contact with participants was the HR unit at ACS, where employees usually come to resolve their routine personnel-related matters of non-disciplinary nature. In the first phase, we asked those who came to HR during October 2015 through February 2016 to complete the survey. We immediately followed the self-administered questionnaire with interviews with managers. We interviewed 17 staff members in managerial positions who have been with either DJJ or ACS for over 11 years. In the second phase, to address possible perception inaccuracies, we obtained access to the field for another short period of time during which we reached out to 45 former participants who responded to the self-administered questionnaire for in-depth follow-up interviews, but we only received 30 responses.

All respondents were ACS employees at the time who came from various units and locations in the city. While this sampling is not random, we assumed that those who came to the HR unit during the period of study might share similar opinions as other employees. While we have no way of confirming whether those who were asked to fill out our survey are comparable to those who were not reached because of inapplicability, we have no reason to believe that the responses to the questionnaire are not reflective of an ongoing perception about the merger of the two agencies. Given the nature and purpose of the study and time constraints, we believe this methodological design appears to be sound and sufficient for a preliminary exploratory study and can potentially inform future studies in this regard.

Data Processing and Interpretation
We processed the data in two steps. First, we entered the responses from the anonymous questionnaires into Excel spreadsheets (available as Appendix A), where we categorized responses by demographic, agency affiliation, years of service, and responses to ten, close-ended Likert-type questions with responses ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This allowed us to compute descriptive statistics. Second, the contents of the interviews were transcribed verbatim before any analysis was attempted. Simple descriptive statistical techniques are employed to tabulate data collected through the questionnaire.

For qualitative responses, i.e., the follow-up interviews, all participants’ responses were registered in a Word document file first. These responses were then manually classified in codes, categories, and themes that were prepared based on the research questions and the interview protocol. We used explanatory qualitative techniques that build on preexisting codes derived from research questions. According to Dey (1993), qualitative data analysis involves nine successive steps: data, finding a focus, managing data, reading and annotating, categorizing data, linking data, connecting categories, corroborating evidence, and producing an account. Tesch (2013) suggested that these steps can broadly be divided into two essential stages: de-contextualization and contextualization. As shown in Table (1), during de-contextualizing, fragmented pieces of data can stand alone.

Primarily, contextualization depends upon a systematic process of data interpretation during which overall themes and new organizing principles can be identified. Producing themes is similar to producing an account. During de-contextualizing, we used
priori coding techniques to identify themes pertaining to OCC (culture, policies, procedures, and communication). For new themes, we used emerging coding techniques. To carefully contextualize these responses, we used a team (co-authors) to cross-check the themes derived in order to establish inter-rater reliability. We also relied on OCC during the merger stages: pre-merger, during the merging, and post-merging, as discussed in the previous section.

Table 1: Qualitative Data Analysis Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>De-contextualization</th>
<th>Interpretations</th>
<th>Contextualization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on previously identified codes: research questions and/or literature</td>
<td>Codes that emerge during data analysis</td>
<td>In the de-contextualization stage pieces of data can stand alone; categorization is a purposeful way to tabulate and organize data around logical linkages</td>
<td>It is a method to organize categories broadly; there must be a reasonable assumption as to why two or three categories fit under one theme</td>
<td>The researchers decide what the accounts mean: this is the moment of interpretation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings and Discussion

Of the 105 respondents, 12 had been with ACS for less than five years, 36 between 5 and 10 years, 26 between 11 and 15 years, 22 between 16 and 20 years, and 9 for over 21 years. Moreover, 47 of the respondents were initially hired to work for ACS, 46 for DJJ, and only 12 joined ACS after the merger was completed. The distribution of respondents among the three categories, though random, provided an opportunity for ideal representation of employees’ perception about the three stages of the merger. 93 of the surveyed employees (88.57 percent) were employed when the merger was initiated and implemented. Given that DJJ was taken over by ACS, one would expect that those who were DJJ employees at the time are likely to respond negatively to the merger. This did not appear to be the case. While those who were DJJ employees at the time of the merger were more vocal about their views regarding the process, affiliation with DJJ or ACS did not appear to be a factor in their current views about the post-merger stage. Speaking to this point in a follow-up interview, one of the DJJ respondents stated that:

I believe the merger was the wrong thing for DJJ. It presents a conflict of interest. When we were taken over by ACS (not merged) we lost the sense of family that we had in DJJ (we became the little fish in the big pond). DJJ was used to getting things done with minimal staff. ACS utilizes many staff and things don’t get done and are not followed up.

Another disgruntled, though reasonable, voice added:

The merger was not well thought out in the best interest of the population served. DJJ was law enforcement agency, while ACS is a social service agency. Their missions are different and merging the two creates conflicts of interest. I would need to write my own paper to explain all the reasons and provide credible evidence to support what I say.
Most of the interviewees who held managerial positions when the merger was announced share similar views. There are those who fundamentally thought the merger was not logical in principle. A manager at ACS when the merger was announced echoed these points by stating, “DJJ detains children following their alleged/convicted criminal act. ACS protects the children from trauma, abuse, and neglect. The general missions of the two agencies are very different.” Table 2 summarizes qualitative analysis findings. As we discuss findings in the following sections, direct quotes from interviews will be provided.

### Table 2: Tabulated Qualitative Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding Questions</th>
<th>De-contextualization</th>
<th>Contextualization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Themes</td>
<td>Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-merger stage:</strong> status, projected continuity, motivational threat, and uncertainties</td>
<td>Powerlessness</td>
<td>Employees were largely uniformed, confused, and lack understanding of why these decisions were made, consequently, they know it is top-down approach and there was not much they could do beyond associating with their old networks and identifying and maintaining their culture, assumptions and value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>During merger:</strong> communication, climate, and leadership</td>
<td>Lack of awareness and engagement, top-down approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-merger stage:</strong> Organizational Identification Assumptions, values and and</td>
<td>Different policies and procedure for DJJ and ACS, different understanding of organizations; mission Merger or not we do what used to do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pre-merger Stage**

With regard to the pre-merger phase, we asked three questions pertaining to 1) the logical soundness of the merger, 2) outlining of the process, and 3) training based on the new mission of the ACS. Table 3 shows the distribution of responses regarding the pre-merger phase.

As appears in Table 3, between not sure, disagree, and strongly disagree about 65 (61.9%) of the respondents did not appear to think that the merger was logically sound based on the missions of the two agencies. One respondent made these sentiments very clear by stating that “Our mission is to assist children and families, unfortunately staff was never consulted or trained when DJJ was merged into ACS.” Another added “Both agencies should have never merged. It should have stayed the way it was, or merge DJJ with a different agency, like the Department of Probation.” Some respondents did not oppose the merger, in principle, but they suggested that merging DJJ with an agency with a closely similar mission was a suitable idea. Speaking to this point, one respondent stated that “Bloomberg should have merged the agency (DJJ) with another agency, like Department of Correction, for example.” Another added “DJJ needs to merge with Correction rather than ACS. There might be conflict of interest with ACS.” Yet another exclaimed “How can you merge ACS, that was set to protect children, with DJJ, which works to lock up children! Who does that?” As for...
the planning and training on the imminent merger before its implementation, 64 (61%) and 74 (70%), including not sure responses, of the respondents reported that neither planning nor training was provided. We assumed that if an employee was informed about the merger or trained on the new mission, he or she won’t respond by choosing ‘not sure.’ One employee stated that:

The idea of the merger was not announced to employees. The goals were not presented to me. To this date, I don’t know if the goals were met. Internally, employees were not trained about the practices, policies, etc. As a result, DJJ continues to follow old policies and procedures which place the employees at jeopardy of disciplinary charges.

Once again, many of those we interviewed were of the same opinion. We are only highlighting some of these views. A participant, who held a manager position at the time of the merger, added “there was no explanation or training of how/why the merger was necessary or the goal or purpose of the merger.” Another manager added “I don’t believe that the logic and process… was clearly outlined before the merger.”

**Table 3: Participants’ Responses in the Pre-merger stage (n=105)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/ Response</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The logical soundness of merger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlining the process of merger</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training based on the new mission</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Merging Process**

To examine employees’ experiences with and perception of the merging process, we asked respondents whether they thought the implementation was poorly conceived and carried out. To this, 40 responded either agree or strongly agree, 33 not sure, and 32 disagree or strongly disagree. The fact that 65 (61.9%) thought the idea of the merger was either bad or not sure suggests the poor planning and communication of the rationale to the employees. It must be acknowledged, however, that some of the respondents were likely to continue to think that the merger was a bad idea, not because of planning or lack of knowledge, but, as we have seen, because they believe it was not a sound idea in principle. Table 4 summarizes responses for questions pertaining to the merging process stage.

To this end, one respondent argued that “I think it was not a plan well thought out as far as employees were concerned.” Another stated that “Planning before the merger was insufficient.” A third employee made the case in a point by suggesting that:

Merging the DJJ under the umbrella of ACS was a great idea. However, constant training on both child welfare and DJJ is necessary. The ACS serves youth in both systems (child welfare/DJJ) meaning crossover; worker understanding of both systems helps the youth/family.
Table 4: Participants’ Responses During Merging Stage (N=105)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/Response</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The idea was good but the implementation was terrible</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True merger requires mission-driven training to all</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lack of robust training in both juvenile delinquency and child welfare not only undermines the logic of the merger, but also raises question about any potential improvement in service quality that was intended. When we asked participants whether they thought that a true merger requires mission-driven training, 77 (73.3%) responded agree or strongly agree, while 17 (16.2%) responded not sure, and 11 (10.5%) disagree. One interviewee stated that “effective training for employees is needed.” There are those who think that mission-driven training might not be sufficient to address the deficiencies. A manager elaborated on this by suggesting that:

The agencies merely coexist, but in no way share missions. Nor do the agencies share resources. DJJ titles are specifically for DJJ—juvenile counselor. ACS are specifically for ACS—CPS, CPM. To successfully merge the two, there needs to be one mission, one code of conduct, and exchange of resources (staffing and funding).

Here it appears that the quality of service is undermined by continuous divergence of the two agencies, even though they are under one management. Not only has mission alignment not taken roots, but even job titles reflect the pre-merger affiliations. Differences in culture remain an issue, and communication between DJJ and ACS doesn’t seem to have been improved by the consolidation.

Post-merger Stage
We asked participants whether they perceive the merger as a success, 4 responded strongly agree, 33 agree, 38 not sure, 21 disagree, and 9 strongly disagree. It must be noted here that the response to this question registered the highest ‘not sure’ in the questionnaire. Responses from follow-up interviews helped clarify the contradiction in the response to this question and other questions pertaining to the reasons for success and the existing schism between DJJ and ACS. Table 5 shows the responses to questions relating to the post-merger stage.

One of those who perceive the merger as a success stated that “I believe the merger makes the ACS stronger as it concentrates more on rehabilitation than incarceration of the juveniles.” Another contradicted that image by reporting that “I have not experienced an impact in our work, nor are we informed of what takes place concerning DJJ and our division.” A third respondent added that “the divisions are run separately; the agency overall is divided by the services each division provides.” One possible explanation is that, unlike DJJ workers, many of ACS workers did not have to change the way they carry out their daily duties. Another explanation is that almost all of the 12 respondents who joined the agency after the merger did not seem to have an opinion about the merger impacts or whether it was...
a success or not, but they see and feel the differences. A manager commented that “the merger did not assist ACS in meeting its overarching mission,” adding that “there is a clear distinction between ACS and DYFJ (goals/mission), and the cultural difference remains.” Once again, OCCs culture, policies and procedures, and communication remain unresolved in the post-merger phase, which is likely to have impacted mission misalignment, processes, and overall service quality.

Table 5: Participants’ Responses Post-merger stage (N= 105)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/Response</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The merger has been a success</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The reason for success were planning and implementation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The division between the two agencies is visible</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The merger was about budget not social service</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked whether they thought that the reasons for the merger’s success were careful planning and implementation, the responses were similar to whether they thought the merger was a success in the first place. That appears to be logical and consistent. Participants’ responses may help explain the ambivalence about the merger, as one respondent stated that “The merger is supposed to provide better service for younger children that at times must deal with troubles and juvenile court; there is no evidence it did that”. Another participant added that “Through training and well-designed planning and participation, ACS could provide combined approach to juvenile justice and youth issues in NYC.” A training to align mission and goals that is yet to occur.

The discrepancy became even more apparent when we asked participants whether they believe that a visible division between DJJ and ACS still exists after six years of the merger. Overwhelmingly, 63 (60%) believe that there is a visible division between ACS and DJJ. On first glance, one would expect the response to the question about whether a merger was a success to be consistent with the response to whether a visible division exists or not, i.e., 60% were likely to think the merger was unsuccessful. However, as discussed previously, one usually wouldn’t bother to call something a success or a failure if one is indifferent to the process. But it is easier to notice division because employees continue to identify with old titles and divisions. Once again, follow-up interviews helped clear the seeming discrepancy. One respondent put it this way: “DJJ is still having difficulties adjusting to ACS.” Another respondent concluded that “It wasn’t a good merger, all the workers seem so unhappy, and, without happy workers, they cannot get the job done.”

A manager attributed the visible division between the merging agencies to the fact that “there is no cross-divisional meetings that afford either (DJJ or ACS) to benefit globally from the vast services or resources” and that “DJJ has its own code of conduct while ACS has a different code of conduct, the separation of standards of conduct is the clearest example separate and unequal.” This is a clear example of how OCCs are treated in the post-merger stage—the code of conduct shapes culture, and culture influences communication, processes, and mission. How could there be an improvement in the quality of service when DJJ remains separate within the ACS. A perceptive respondent attributed the sense of division to
resistance, stating that:

When it comes to a merger, both parties should follow the same policy and procedure and have the same mission, but … ACS works this way and DJJ will continue to work that way. Unity is power to success but this merger will continue to be difficult until employees stop saying, I work for DJJ and start saying we work together for the same reason. Training is not the key; acceptance is the key of merger.

Here, force-field analysis could provide insights into why some employees resist the merger (Swanson and Creed 2014). Good explanations of the merger rationale (to improve quality of service) might have eased the resistance, especially since the merger did not involve layoffs or other major negative impacts on personnel. Finally, when we asked participants: in your personal opinion, was there a conflict between the budgetary goals of the merger and the social service goals of protecting children? 49 (46.6%) respondents agreed, 33 were not sure, and 23 disagreed. Of those who disagreed, one participant stated that:

I believe merging the two agencies was a great idea, both agencies are/were dealing with a young population that came together on a number of issues … ACS and DJJ thought about a way to unite the children with their mothers or fathers who were locked up in the system. I believe the focus overall was to unite families. Budgetary concerns are mostly always a matter in bringing together agencies or separating them.

Another similar voice echoed that:

I think the new arrangement was great. It gives youths who are considered dangerous or committed crime an opportunity for improvement. ACS offers many programs for these youths to improve their lives, stay at home with their families, teach them to follow rules and guidelines, and, most importantly, an opportunity to get an education and improve their lives.

An opposing voice stated, “Mayor Bloomberg merged both agencies for financial reasons.” It is evident that the merger has had the logical rationale to improve the outcomes for juvenile by bringing all welfare and deterrence in one house, and some employees see the point. The challenge is whether it did that.

Conclusion
Inter-agency consolidation, whether driven by cost reduction or quality of service, remains a topic that calls for further empirical examinations. Earlier, we speculated that employees’ continuing identification with old agencies indicates that the OCC (culture, policies and procedures, and communication) were not sufficiently addressed during the three stages of merger. While the employees’ perceptions about the merger were not conclusive one way or another—more so in the post-merger stage—regarding the merger success, there is, however, a strong case that culture, policies, and communication remain divergent between DYFJ and ACS, despite being one agency for over six year. Such divergence has implications for mission alignment and employees’ understanding of their roles, which affected the service quality from employees’ perspectives. Employees’ views revealed no evidence that the
merger has positively impacted how well ACS protects children because the Division of Youth and Family Justice is in the house, which still is referred to as DJJ. What purpose would be served having DJJ as part of ACS, if vision, mission, culture, policies, code of conduct, values, and assumptions remain frozen in the pre-merger stage? This is to suggest that our speculations about the merger of DJJ into ACS were confirmed.

There is no conclusive evidence as to why employees perceive the merger of DJJ into ACS this way. Similar to findings from previous studies, it is possible that the pre-merging status of merging DJJ and ACS determined the post-merger organizational identification. It could also be the poor design in the pre-merger stage, coupled with implementation mishaps during the merging stage. It is also plausible that not fully involving employees in the merger process is responsible for the existing divergence between employees’ perceptions and management declared intentions. However, none of these explanations can justify maintaining different policies and procedures. Additionally, there appears to be post-merger internal conflict between the two perspectives: the minority voice, which believe that functional expedience could be achieved, versus those who believe that the tension between law enforcement and welfare, coupled with the way the merger was carried out, is unlikely to improve the service quality. Because of our study’s limitations, it cannot offer broad and accurate generalizations about the merger. Yet, this study revealed signs of an incomplete merger, which may lead to ill-conceived goals and misalignment of the organization’s mission. While the overlap of activities between then DJJ and ACS was used to justify the merger to better serve children and juvenile in NYC, there is no evidence for improvement of service quality based on employees’ views or general news coverage of the agency’s records. Mission-driven training appears to be one approach that ACS management can use to create a sense of one organization with unified goals. For broader policy implications, the reviewed literature, along with findings of this study, suggest that inter-agency merger, like municipal consolidation, neither saves cost nor improves quality of service. An alternative approach to functional expedience calls for a simultaneous, dual process of service merging, leading to complete absorption of one agency by another over a period of time. Finally, an area for future research is on the effect of time on changing perceptions within a merging organization. Intellectually, given all what we know about complex organizations in the 21st century, we must be cognizant of the fact that organizational realities often take a life of their own, including identification, which can make them less responsive to rational assumptions.

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Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University,
The Good, Bad and Ugly of Innovations in Human Services Administration: Evidence from New York Counties

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Long Island University

Jyldyz Kasymova

With a long history of providing welfare services, counties have been under continuous criticism, especially in relation to the lack of innovation and modernization. In this study, the experiences of several countries in New York State were evaluated in order to understand the origins, consequences, and challenges of the modernization of social services. The increasing demand for social safety net programs incentivized counties to operate differently, including utilizing technology. The key innovations in departments of social services related to transitioning from the case-based administration of welfare application to a task-based approach. Numerous advantages of task-based administration were observed, with the most important being effectiveness and efficiency in delegating tasks to workers and examiners, rather than complete cases. Use of the web-based application for welfare services was another element of the modernization of social services. The findings indicate that counties are capable of innovation, even during times of fiscal duress.

Also known as the administrative arm of the government, counties are one of the most understudied levels of local government (Benton 2002). The available research on counties is rather sparse, with existing studies being conceptual or quantitative. Recently, theoreticians have examined counties in numerous ways, including in relation to performance measures (Wang 2002), e-government (Huang 2006; Manoharan 2013), privatization (Brown and Potoski 2003; Van Slyke 2003), politico-organizational structure (Benton 2003; DeSantis and Renner 1994), and service challenges (Benton, Byers, Cigler, Klase, Menzel, Salant, Streib, Svara, and Waugh 2008), to highlight a few.

There are 3,069 counties in the U.S., and they vary greatly in size and population, as well as political dimensions. According to the 2007 Census of Governments, county governments receive just three percent of their overall revenue from the federal government.
At the same time, 33 percent of their total revenue originates from their own home states, while over 60 percent of their budget revenue is generated from their own sources. In general, property taxes account for the largest source (40 percent) of self-generated funds (National Association of Counties n.d.).

The traditionally performed state-mandated responsibilities of counties include property assessment, the maintenance of roads, the administration of elections, and the provision of social services. Among all these duties, providing health and human services is viewed as the key county responsibility (Kemp 2008). In 2002, for example, counties spent nearly half of their resources on social services and education combined. According to the 2002 Census of Governments, counties spent almost $33 billion on public welfare programs, and, in 2001, counties spent approximately 45 percent of their budgets on either social welfare or education.

The economic slowdown in the U.S. has increased the number of recipients of social services in numerous local governments (Wogan 2013). According to the United States Department of Agriculture, over 23 million households across the U.S. participated in the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) in 2013, which is significantly higher than the 15 million participants recorded in 2009 (USDA 2014a). In New York State alone, over three million individuals, or over one million households, reported participating in SNAP in 2013, with the total cost of the program exceeding $5 billion (USDA 2014b). Many states were also motivated to encourage enrollment due to the multiplier effect of the supplemental programs. In 2008, a Moody’s Analytics representative surmised that “increasing food stamp payments by $1 boosted GDP by $1.73” (Zandi 2008), which was attractive for states experiencing economic difficulties to participate in the economic Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program. Both the pressure from states and the growing demand for services forced counties to initiate innovative ways of delivering welfare services, especially human and healthcare services.

A new form of administration, known as a “task-based” (or process-based) approach in administering social services was introduced in several jurisdictions. According to the task-based approach, all cases are separated into different segments, with staff handling specific tasks within a case. This differs from the previous approach, in which a single person handled all aspects of a case. In other words, different workers manage different cases at different stages of the application process (Walters 2011). (See Table 1 for a breakdown of the differences between the two models). The task-based approach is believed to give managers the flexibility to adjust the workloads of caseworkers for particular stages of the application process (Wogan 2013). It also ensures that clients have better access to available caseworkers, as there is no longer the need for a single caseworker to be assigned to a specific case. Furthermore, in many instances, task-based administration emphasizes eliminating face-to-face interview requirements in favor of using technology, as well as the segmentation of an individual application into several steps with either the front-line workers or call centers in charge. In sum, “task-based” administration eliminates the dominating role of a single caseworker in managing individual cases, and, to a certain extent, the burden for organizing the work shifts from all of the line staff to a few supervisors/managers (New York Public Welfare Association (NYPWA) Conference 2010).

The existing literature presents contradictory findings with respect to new methods of administering welfare services. In 2008, for example, Jeffrey Wenger and Vicky Wilkins (2008) examined the use of telephone claims for unemployment insurance in the U.S. and found that automation decreased the discretion exercised by claim administrators. At the same time, many studies stressed the importance of the individual interaction between front-line...
### Table 1: Differences between Case Management and Task-Based Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Management</th>
<th>Task-Based (Process) Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Historical way of doing business in human services</td>
<td>✓ Historical way of doing business in the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Workers are trained holistically how to manage the caseload and provide program support</td>
<td>✓ Workers are trained in-depth in key processes, but have a holistic sense of the big picture. Worker strengths in certain processes are noted and used to get the job done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Worker has an assigned caseload</td>
<td>✓ The job (caseload) is owned by the team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Worker acts as a guide for the individuals in the case to get them through a particular system to receive benefits and/or meet predetermined goals ensuring positive customer service</td>
<td>✓ The task at hand is the driver/guide. Work is broken down into specific processes and prioritized in a manner to provide optimum efficiency and ensuring positive customer service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Staff satisfaction is reliant on customer compliance/caseload status</td>
<td>✓ Staff satisfaction is reliant on the timeliness of task processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ The delivery of services is based on a worker providing an assessment and then arranging, referring, coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating the delivery of services to meet the needs of the individuals and families assigned</td>
<td>✓ The delivery of services is based on the breakdown of specified tasks that are prioritized to meet the needs of individuals and families assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Specialized and unique services are delivered based on the case circumstances</td>
<td>✓ Specialized and unique services are delivered based on the priority of the case circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Normally the customer is involved in the decision-making regarding how a case is to proceed</td>
<td>✓ Customer involvement in the decision-making process is minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Each case is individualized for worker and customer</td>
<td>✓ It is the priority and placement of the task in the process that drives the decision-making of how a case is to proceed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Worker success is based on the overall status of caseload and customer outcomes</td>
<td>✓ Processes are individualized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Worker success is based on meeting daily set standards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: adopted from NYWPA Conference 2011*

workers and the recipients of services (Lipsky 2010; Rosenthal and Peccei 2006). Examining the clients’ perception of the effectiveness of a modernized service delivery, Colleen Heflin, Andrew London, and Peter Mueser (2013) found several problems with online applications for SNAP services, most of which relate to the digital divide (Lenhart, Horrigan, Rainie, Allen, Boyce, Madden, and O’Grady 2003), which primarily implies a limited use of internet among those who use social services more often (low-income, less-educated, and older individuals).

Modernizing the provision of health and human services takes different forms and is broadly defined among states (Selden 2002). In general, it relates to reorganizing
administrative functions, expanding the use of technology, and policy simplification, to highlight a few. In 2004, for example, Florida’s Department of Children and Families introduced the Automated Community Connections to Economic Self-Sufficiency (ACCESS), a technological innovation to provide SNAP, cash assistance, and Medicaid programs (Hulsey et al. 2013). The implementation of ACCESS Florida was based on numerous organizational reforms, as well as the extensive use of technology in delivering services.

This article presents a case study of modernization efforts in selected counties in New York State with respect to social and human services. The only current academic research on this topic is the study by Heflin et al. (2013), which focused on the experience of welfare clients with the implementation of electronic services in Florida. In contrast to Heflin et al. (2013), this study examined administrators’ perceptions of the process of modernizing social services at county levels of governments. Examining the perceptions of county administrators complements previous studies and provides a better understanding of the challenges of improving services at county levels.

The article proceeds in the following format. First, a literature analysis of studies on welfare administration in the U.S is presented. Second, an overview of welfare services in the State of New York is provided. Third, the study methods are discussed. Fourth, specific county cases and findings are presented. This is followed by the conclusion.

Literature Review

The macro-economic slowdown had a significant impact on the socio-economic conditions of local jurisdictions. In 2009, the New York Times published an article revealing that an increasing number of people were receiving SNAP benefits. Within the State of New York, the increase in enrollment was reported to be 35 percent higher than 2007. The average enrollment across New York State counties was reported as 10 percent.

In 2006, Sheila Zedlewski, Gina Adams, Lisa Dubay, and Genevieve Kenney (2006) conducted an analysis of the use of SNAP, Medicaid, and childcare subsidies. They found that only about five percent of low-income working families received all three welfare subsidies, although many were eligible to receive all three. Dottie Rosenbound and Stacy Dean (2011) arrived at a similar conclusion several years later.

Technology is often being used to improve the efficiency of service provisions and to extend applicable services to a wider category of the population. But, it was also found to be effective in eliminating possible discretion exercised by front-line workers. In 2008, for example, Wenger and Wilkins (2008) studied the automation of unemployment claims. Using state-level panel data from 1992 to 2005, they found that telephone claims filing had increased the number of women receiving unemployment benefits. The authors suggested that this was because, compared to an individual face-to-face application process, the telephone application eliminated discrimination against women who were filing unemployment claims.

The Connecticut Department of Social Services started implementing a task-based approach in 2013. Connecticut had a long history of mediocre performance in administering welfare services. The reform began with the Hartford office and expanded across the area. The effectiveness was already evident ninety days after implementation, and the percentage of emergency applications for food stamps completed on time rose from 64 percent to 77 percent within a year (Wogan 2013).

Florida is one of the first states to modernize its welfare delivery system. In 2003, the governor and legislature began investigating outsourcing models of social services due to the existing inefficiencies in social services. At that time, the Florida Department of Children
and Families proposed an alternative option that was based on the extensive use of technology, including creating a toll-free number with an Automated Response Unit to handle routine inquiries (Table 2), without any need for face-to-face meetings with clients. Known as Automated Community Connections to Economic Self-Sufficiency (ACCESS), the new business model was used to deliver Medicaid, temporary cash assistance, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Lange 2009).

Table 2: Summary Application Procedure Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application Activity</th>
<th>Before ACCESS Florida</th>
<th>ACCESS Florida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Paper application</td>
<td>Electronic application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>DCF Customer Service Center</td>
<td>A computer with internet access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full one-hour interview for all; eligibility interview by phone uncommon</td>
<td>One 15-minute (or shorter) interview for most; a second, 45-minute interview for some; eligibility interviews by phone are common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility Interviews</td>
<td>Most expenses, assets, and income require documentation; must submit documentation in person to DCF worker</td>
<td>Most expenses and assets, and some income do not require documentation; self-service submission either in person or by fax</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cody et al. 2008

The system was simplified through several steps. First of all, eligibility for multiple programs was processed through an online application, eliminating unnecessary travels and meetings with individual caseworkers. When necessary, applicants could participate in interviews by telephone (Heflin et al. 2013). The program resulted in a 43 percent reduction in staff, even as caseloads were recorded to be increase from 2002 to 2005 (Heflin et al. 2013).

California is another state that stood at the forefront of welfare services administration reforms. Between September 2007 and September 2008, public assistance programs across California experienced increases in requests for monthly cash assistance for families, emergency assistance for homeless families, SNAP services, and other welfare services. In the environment of increasing demand for public assistance and inadequate staffing, several counties began modernizing the delivery of services. Waiving face-to-face interviews, creating call centers, and arranging out-stations and units according to specific tasks were some of the first steps taken in several counties (Williams 2010). This task-based approach resulted in a significant decrease in application-processing delays. Commentators also noted improved quality in application processing, as more workers had access to each case (Williams 2010).

What does the current administration of social services look like in New York State? With a population of close to 20 million, New York is one of the few states known for being progressive in providing welfare services to the disadvantaged (Van Slyke 2003). Until recently, most social services, especially those related to public benefits, were administered by caseworkers in individual counties. Two events have impacted a recent transformation in social services administration: the 2008 global recession and the adoption of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Specifically, the passage of the ACA has been leading to a centralized, state-level administration of Medicaid.
Social Services in New York State

The State of New York has participated in the expansion of Medicaid since the adoption of the ACA. States that participate in the ACA expansion must provide Medicaid coverage to all state residents below a certain income level. The benefit for participating in the expansion is particularly high for those states that already provide broad eligibility coverage (Holahan, Buettgens, Carroll, and Dorn 2012). This is due to the fact that the federal government reimburses costs associated with Medicaid coverage, at least in the first several years. As a result of this incentive, the State of New York created an online application for residents of the State and began taking over the responsibilities of managing Medicaid, which were previously the direct responsibility of counties. But some counties are still retaining certain functions for Medicaid administration, including processing applications and renewals for individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled and conducting chronic care (nursing home) and alternate-levels-of-care eligibility (New York State Department of Health 2012). As of April 2010, about 4.8 million New Yorkers received coverage through Medicaid (United Hospital Fund 2010).

New York State consists of 57 counties, excluding New York City counties, each with diverse populations and economic conditions. Altogether, New York State’s counties operate under the general provisions of the county law, although there are “charter counties,” which are given greater home-rule power.

In 2009, an average of 15.2 million households in the U.S. received SNAP services. The program provides assistance to low-income individuals and households in purchasing eligible food items for home consumption (United States Department of Agriculture 2010). New York State reported almost 3 million average monthly participants in 2011 (United States Department of Agriculture 2012). In comparison to Medicaid, many counties continue administering SNAP services locally.

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which primarily provides cash assistance to poor families with children, is another service administered at county levels. In March 2013, 158,864 families in New York State participated in the TANF program (Falk 2013; Schott 2012). Temporary assistance requires a face-to-face application procedure and is managed at the county level.

Another social safety net service provided in New York State is the Home Energy Assistance Program (HEAP), which helps households that pay a high proportion of household income for energy during the late fall and winter months and includes a cooling assistance component as well.¹ Applications for benefits related to HEAP are managed at county levels. In 2012, more than 1.4 million households received HEAP benefits in New York State (Montgomery 2013). Other services provided by counties include child and adult services care.

This article identifies social safety services that are being reformed at county levels in New York State. Specifically, it attempts to respond to the following questions. First, what types of innovations are taking place, and in which social safety net programs? Second, how differently are social safety net programs being managed as a result of these reforms, and what are the consequences? To do this, the experiences of six counties are examined, primarily using interviews with responsible administrators at county levels. The findings of this research have important implications for accessibility to services, as well as understanding the origins of innovation at county levels, a jurisdictional level that remains understudied in public administration literature.

¹ please refer to http://otda.ny.gov/programs/heap
Methods
The study features six different counties that reported implementing innovations in the administration of social services. In selecting the cases, a theoretical, rather than statistical sampling, strategy was used (Eisenhardt 1989). Each case was chosen to illustrate different types of reforms and rearrangements taking place. The focus is on emphasizing reforms and innovations with different origins and activities.

Purposeful sampling was utilized to select information-rich cases (Patton 1990). In five of the case studies—Erie, Monroe, Genesee, Tioga, and Broome counties—informal face-to-face interviews were held with the key actors, who also shared internal documents. The remaining case, Schenectady, was built on a document analysis, state of the county address, correspondence, and the evaluation of the legislature and existing literature. Interviews were collected from April 2014 to September 2014. Each interview lasted anywhere from 30 minutes to one hour, and all interviews were conducted over the phone. A copy of the interview questionnaire is attached in Appendix 1.

Comparative Case Studies

Monroe County
With a population of close to 800,000, Monroe County is known for a high poverty level among its residents. In 2013, Rochester, the largest city in the county, became the fifth poorest city in the U.S. An anonymous interview with a county representative at the managerial level was held in May 2014 to learn about innovation practices in the county’s Department of Human Services (DHS), which processes Medicaid, SNAP, and temporary assistance applications. In 2012, it processed an average of 4,400 temporary assistance applications per month and 3,100 Medicaid applications per month, while its active caseload for SNAP averaged over 58,000 cases (Monroe County Department of Human Services 2012). Monroe, as many other counties in New York, has moved toward a task-based administration of welfare programs, instead of the case-based approach. But among all social services, only SNAP is being managed through a task-based approach.

In summer 2013, the DHS implemented a Centralized Document Management (CDM) system. The system primarily entails having all incoming clients’ documents in one centralized electronic system. The system was designed to reduce unnecessary case-processing time. The State of New York provided some assistance with technology. According to Interviewee M, with the new approach, any incoming document or application for services, such as SNAP, is scanned into the web-based system and is “tasked” electronically to a team or a worker within the DHS. The system has generally increased the efficiency of the department. In comparison to modernization in other states, Florida for example, Monroe continues to accept hard copies of clients’ applications. In sum, although SNAP is being processed online through the web-based system, eliminating face-to-face interaction with clients, residents of Monroe have the option of using the online SNAP program or submitting a hard copy of the application. The interviewee noted that some workers initially expressed resistance toward the change, but that the effectiveness of the new system abated their discontent.

Erie County
With a population of close to a million, Erie County is one of the largest and poorest counties in New York State. Based on its 1960 charter, Erie County established a strong elected county executive system, with a legislative branch serving as a county legislature. The elected county
executive enjoys a wide range of responsibilities, including supervising and directing the internal organization of every department, fiscal and financial decision-making, and appointing individual department heads, just to highlight a few (New York State Association of Counties 2009). This study focuses on the child adoption unit in the Department of Social Services, one of over 20 departments within Erie County.

An interview with an anonymous caseworker within the child adoption unit was conducted on May 8, 2014. In total, 12 caseworkers and several other support personnel currently work in the unit. On average, an individual caseworker is in charge of 20 cases. Each individual works with a single case for at least three years. The interviewee discussed how the adoption unit implemented the team-based process in 2011 as a pilot project.

There were several reasons driving the adoption unit’s implementation of the team-based approach, including the view that “the traditional approaches to child welfare casework often resulted in extreme stress and left caseworkers with a feeling of isolation and lack of support” (New York State Child Welfare/Child Protective Services Training Institute 2011, p. 2). It was believed that the team approach would alleviate the stress of the single ownership of casework and decision-making and would promote an environment of complementary skills. In the team-based approach, each caseworker was expected to identify the “so-called” difficult cases that he/she was in charge of. The difficult cases were brought to a special meeting where all caseworkers reviewed them and discussed potential solutions.

Implementing a team-based approach required special training, including “communication within a team, building a rapport, respecting differences.” The interviewee also noted that all caseworkers supported the new approach, in general, and found it to be “effective and useful,” and that a team-based approach eliminated “discretion” and “personal judgment” in deciding difficult cases. The team-based approach was beneficial not only for new personnel but also for seasoned caseworkers. The project was discontinued in 2011, although there was a clear expression of support for the team-based approach among caseworkers.

**Tioga County**

With a population of 51,125, Tioga County is a rural county in New York State. In October 2010, Tioga’s social services department initiated a task-based management approach for SNAP and Medicaid applications. The anonymous interview with a county representative was conducted on May 28, 2014. According to the interviewee, the transition toward a task-based approach from a case-based approach was caused by the unexpected increase in applications for benefits following the 2008 recession. Consequently, Tioga County implemented an e-filing application for Medicaid and for most of its food stamp applications. The interviewee noted that the new practice received wide support among workers and did not have any specific disadvantages.

According to the 2013 annual county address, Tioga completed its first full year using the task-based model for providing food stamps and Medicaid services. Within 2011–2012, it completed 20,874 tasks, using 26,650 telephone calls (Tioga County Legislature 2012). The interviewee pointed out the difficulty of implementing a task-based approach in so-called “intensive case” services, such as child services and cash assistance, and said the use of technology and a task-based approach may be applicable for so-called “cut and dry” service areas, such as SNAP and Medicaid. Tioga began expanding the task-based approach in providing HEAP services in 2014. When asked why all counties were not implementing the task-based approach, the interviewee noted that counties with caseworkers with longer tenure...
might dislike the change. It was also noted that the county size mattered, for example, “larger counties are difficult to modernize immediately.”

**Schenectady County**

Schenectady is one of the first counties that attempted to use the task-based approach in SNAP and Medicaid. In 2004, the county started using it for delivering Medicaid services and, with the support of the State of New York, expanded it to SNAP applications processing. Although the county currently utilizes web-based applications for both services, it cooperates with community-based organizations to administer applications for both programs. Accordingly, applications for benefits can be submitted not only at the Schenectady County Department of Social Services, but also through several community-based organizations that provide clients assistance with SNAP application procedures.

In 2013, Schenectady completed its transition to the task-based processing of SNAP applications (Schenectady County 2013). Several factors influenced the decision to use a task-based approach in SNAP services. These include, but are not limited to, a high caseload-to-work ratio, a backlog in processing new applications, recipients’ complaints, and staff stress (Schenectady County 2011). Schenectady faced several challenges in advancing a task-based management practice, including preparing daily work assignments for each worker, tracking the progress of applications, and assigning tasks based on each workers’ individual strengths and efficiency (Schenectady County 2011).

**Genesee County**

Genesee is a rural county in western New York with a population of 59,454. The County includes 13 towns, six villages, and the City of Batavia, which is the county seat. Two representatives of the county at the managerial levels were interviewed, on May 21, 2014, and May 22, 2014, regarding the recent reforms in the county’s department of human and social services. In early 2014, Genesee started advancing a task-based approach to delivering social services. Prior to that, the county conducted several meetings with other counties, such as Tioga County, to learn about the task-based approach and how to adopt it in Genesee. In addition, Genesee decided to manage SNAP and Medicaid applications through a web-based system, although hard copies of applications for SNAP benefits continue to be administered by the county. The interviews revealed that the county expected both positive and negative results from the innovation.

There are good things about it, and there are some bad things about it. The good thing is that you are also able to hand in the work as required. Supervisors have a better control level to distribute work, which is really a good thing. (Interviewee G)

There are some disadvantages related to the loss of case-based management. Traditionally, caseworkers tended to know assigned cases in details, which led to low error rates in administering cases. A good understanding of individual cases is impossible to retain when benefit applications are managed according to specific tasks by different caseworkers.

Our workers tended to know their clients very well when [a] case-based approach was used. After a while, they knew all nuances, where they [clients] needed extra assistance to get documentations. I think you lose some of that attribution in the task-based approach.
Another potential problem with task-based management relates to the loss of continuity for fraud detection.

… Because I might pick up your documentation two weeks ago, and somebody else may pick it up when it comes in, and somebody different two weeks later might get it. So, they might not be able to put all relevant pieces together. Whereas, when you manage the entire case individually, you can sense that something doesn’t smell right, or something doesn’t fit because you looked at it before.

In sum, a case-based approach appeared to have advantages that were impossible to retain in the task-based administration. Although a task-based approach seemed to be more effective overall, an interviewee in Genesee County stressed several challenges that prevented many counties in New York State from advancing to a task-based approach. These include a specific political climate in a given county, which forces a county to maintain the old manner of administering social services. Second, counties with a larger number of caseworkers and a strong union membership disliked and resisted change.

Broome County
Broome County is one of the few jurisdictions that decided to use technology to administer its SNAP services. With a population of close to 200,000, Broome has over 12 percent of its population living below the poverty line. In 2014, the county reported over 16,000 SNAP caseloads managed by 19 examiners. On average, it receives 600 new SNAP applications per month.

In 2014, the county procured a process and technology improvement grant from the USDA. It was used to support the implementation of an electronic task-based approach in SNAP services and the creation of a call centre (Broom County Department of Social Services 2012).

The call center was established to streamline application-related questions using the motto “one call, one resolution.” Furthermore, call agents were authorized “to make simple case changes while on the phone, document the telephone call, refer the call to other Examiners or Supervisors (for more extensive work/interviews), and provide follow-up requirements to the caller” (Broom County 2014). The call center eliminated the requirement for face-to-face interviews, which traditionally took numerous hours. The county designated a keyboard specialist with the role of entering data into the web-based program, as well as scan documents and applications upon receipt.

According to Interviewee B, the implementation of the call center and the web-based data inputs demonstrated that workers were able to process work more efficiently. Timeliness of the application processing and the decreasing number of clients’ complaints were two important indicators to measure the effectiveness of the new system.

In general, informal interviews conducted with county representatives revealed that the use of technology in modernizing services became necessary as many counties continued to face staff shortages and increasing workloads. Furthermore, the traditional case-based approach caused many delays and increased customer dissatisfaction, specifically in Broome. In Broome, one of the key challenges of using the new approach was the cost of the software program and the time required to retrain workers.
Analysis and Conclusion

Counties remain an understudied level of local government due to their limited accessibility for researchers. At the same time, the menu of county functions is both growing and changing. With a long history of providing welfare services, counties have been under continuous criticism, especially in relation to the lack of innovation and modernization. In this study, the experiences of several counties in New York State were evaluated to understand the origins, consequences, and challenges of the modernization of social services. Almost all of the counties examined faced an increasing workload as a result of the 2008 recession. The increasing demand for social safety net programs incentivized counties to operate differently, including utilizing technology. “Do it or die” is a common idea that was reiterated in several interviews in relation to the need for technology in serving the population. The key innovations in departments of social services related to transitioning from the case-based administration of welfare application to a task-based approach (see Table 3). Most interviewees noted the numerous advantages of task-based administration, with the most important being effectiveness and efficiency in delegating tasks to workers and examiners, rather than complete cases. Use of the web-based application for welfare services was another element of the modernization of social services.

Although, there are concerns about the limited ability of the untrained population to utilize web-based applications, counties were able to address this in several ways. First, they continued working with both online and hard copies of welfare applications. Second, community-based organizations were involved to help clients who required assistance with the online application for social services.

These six cases demonstrated that counties learn from each other about innovations. They also showed that counties tailor specific administrative innovations to local conditions, taking into account things such as a different level of hierarchy within a county, the number of examiners, the number of clients, and the size of the county. It also appears that using technology is necessary in all counties, as most of them continue facing shortages in staff and an increasing demand for social welfare programs, especially in the poorest jurisdictions.

Although the innovative approach has some shortcomings, counties will continue to be under fiscal pressure, and traditional administration formats will need to be adjusted. At the same time, given such a brief history of using these practices, we cannot assert with confidence that new ways of doing things are effective. Additional time is required to evaluate, not only the efficiency of processing applications, but also to analyze the error rate and fraud incidence. Furthermore, a survey of social workers is required to obtain a better understanding of the impact of new ways of managing services within social services departments.

Counties are important levels of local jurisdictions as they provide services to the largest portion of vulnerable populations. This study demonstrated that counties do innovate, especially during times of fiscal difficulty and often with the help of state-level government. It shows that both rural and urban counties of various sizes tend to embrace the changes. In 2002, J. Edwin Benton (2012) pointed out that the modernization of county government could be both the result of the growth of county services or a “by-product of the growth” (p. 12). In this respect, it is expected that counties with a broad repertoire of services may be at the forefront of the modernization of their governmental structure and operation.

As any other study, this study has its limitation. First, it examined a small number of the 57 counties in New York State. Therefore, the findings may have a limited generalizability. Furthermore, in-depth interviews were used as the main source of data for all counties, but the degree of using interviews or existing document analysis varied across
Table 3: Analysis of Six Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Broome</th>
<th>Erie</th>
<th>Genesee</th>
<th>Monroe</th>
<th>Schenectady</th>
<th>Tioga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>197,534*</td>
<td>919,866*</td>
<td>59,454*</td>
<td>749,606*</td>
<td>155,333*</td>
<td>50,243*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below poverty line (%)</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services innovated</td>
<td>SNAP</td>
<td>Child Adoption Unit</td>
<td>SNAP</td>
<td>SNAP</td>
<td>SNAP</td>
<td>SNAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Call center, online technology, task-based approach</td>
<td>Team-based approach in child services</td>
<td>Online technology, task-based approach</td>
<td>Online technology, call center, task-based approach</td>
<td>Online technology, task-based approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did they learn about this new approach?</td>
<td>From other counties</td>
<td>Pilot project</td>
<td>Other counties</td>
<td>Conferences, other counties</td>
<td>State-driven pilot county</td>
<td>Other counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges in doing things differently</td>
<td>Retraining workers, cost of the software program</td>
<td>Unclear, although workers reported to support the innovative approach</td>
<td>Union, resistance of workers</td>
<td>Retraining workers</td>
<td>Retraining workers</td>
<td>Caseworker with a longer tenure may dislike changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other details</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Use of community based organizations in facilitating online applications</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*US Census²

The six cases. Second, the study focused on the perceptions of managerial-level administrators. A future study could address this shortcoming by surveying front-line caseworkers, similar to the studies conducted by Dennis Daley, Michael Vasu, and Meredith Blackwell Weinstein (2002) and Joe Soss (1999). Finally, in the manner of Heflin and colleagues (2012), another study should be conducted across counties in New York with a focus on clients and their perceptions of modernization in social services.

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² http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36107.html

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References


Websites
http://www.ncwss.com/resources/index.html
http://otda.ny.gov/programs/heap

Definitions
Case-based administration: The management and implementation of social services based on individual cases.
Counties: One of several local government levels that exist in some countries, including in the U.S.
Human services: A range of social services provided by counties or other local jurisdictions.
Local administration: The day-to-day activity of a local level of government.
Reforms: A set of innovations in managing organizations.
Task-based administration: The management and implementation of social services based on specific tasks.
Technology: The application of scientific knowledge and tools for practical purposes.

APPENDIX 1
Interview questions
1. In your opinion, what are several key challenges to administer social services in your county?
2. Is your county using an online application process for social services? Please explain.
3. What are some benefits/drawbacks in promoting it?
4. In your opinion, what would be several (2–3) innovative methods of providing social services in New York State?
5. In your opinion, would innovations be common for counties with a larger number of low-income households?
6. What are some key challenges in advancing innovations in counties?
7. Have you heard about the so-called task-based approach? Please explain.
a. Probe: Please tell me about the history of this management style?
8. Is it applicable for your county?
9. Please describe advantages/disadvantages of this management style.
10. In your opinion, what is the role of the state in promoting innovations in counties?
How do you see the administration of social services in 5–10 years in your county?
In the Midst of an Epidemic: How Print Media Shapes Policy Feedback to the Opioid Crisis

Peter Stanley Federman
University of Kansas

As opioid overdoses in Massachusetts have increased in recent years, local media discourse around opioid abuse has correspondingly increased. A content analysis of local newspaper articles reveals that political and administrative officials conceive of Narcan in distinct ways. Administrators, including police and fire officials, have a ‘direct mindset,’ seeing Narcan as a means to accomplish their organizational mission. Conversely, elected officials have an ‘indirect mindset,’ with their primary concerns being cost, legal ramifications, and broad impact, remaining disconnected from street-level concerns. This article expounds upon these divergent attitudes to unpack the implications such divergent approaches have for our understandings of policy feedback and bureaucratic politics in the context of local policy-making.

In local, regional, and state governments across the United States, elected and administrative officials participate in the decision-making process that drives the creation of policy. Bureaucrats and politicians are guided in this process by cultural norms and values, both personal as well as organizational and regional (Allison 1969; Long 1949). The process by which these individuals bargain and represent their priorities in both the formal and informal policy-making process is known as bureaucratic politics. In the case considered herein, that of the policy debate around opioid reversal drugs in Massachusetts, the administrative officials studied are primarily public safety officials, including police officers and firefighters. Despite significant diversification since the 1960s, police and fire departments, organizations whose members often identify as “blue-collar” and “working class,” are overwhelmingly staffed by white men under the age of 65 (Martin 1994; Sklansky 2006). This is the same demographic most impacted by the opioid epidemic in Massachusetts (Sudders 2015).

Considering these statistics, it is possible that “non-rational” factors, such as personal and subjective connections between the bureaucrat and the citizen, as proposed by Lindblom (1959), might have an outsized impact on the execution of policy around opioids. With that in mind, it is not a stretch to assume that these demographics, while not the sole cause of how
administrative officials conceive of their relationship to the opioid crisis in Massachusetts, could play a significant role. The analysis conducted herein seeks to understand how bureaucratic politics, which includes these “non-rational” and personal factors, as well as organizational and cultural influences, impact public discourse around certain types of policy.

All bureaucrats have the ability to enact and sanction policy through their discretionary decision making, which is often driven by parochial values and interests (Appleby 1949; Long 1949). Constantly shifting goals and pressures are a fundamental part of the political and bureaucratic landscape and understanding them is crucial to promoting a functional and cooperative governance structure. It is worth noting that the bureaucrats discussed here are primarily street-level bureaucrats who deliver public services directly to citizens. Street-level bureaucrats’ values are derived not only from the organizational mission of their agency, but from their own societal and cultural value systems. Street-level bureaucrats also engage in advocacy, value judgments, resource allocation, and goal-setting constantly, effectively influencing public service delivery to a substantial degree (Lipsky 1980). These bureaucrats also consider moral and ethical factors in making discretionary decisions, and those engaged in service provision, and narcotics policing in particular, have been shown to utilize moral and ethical considerations in that task (Jensen 2015).

When considering local and state elected officials, past research has indicated that, unlike their national counterparts, local elected officials are not primarily driven by partisanship, but instead by a managerial focus on improving outcomes for their communities. They are driven by intrinsic, extrinsic, and opportunistic motivations, and differentiated primarily by their willingness to run, campaign, and to hold office. Motivated by circumstance and idiosyncratic factors unique to their own communities, they do not perceive of their roles as structural or systematic (Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012), making them not dissimilar to the street-level bureaucrat who conceives of themselves as a “state-agent,” making decisions based not in the particulars of the problem they are addressing, but in service to the larger organization they serve (S. Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000). In this way, the administrative and elected officials whose statements on policy are discussed herein approach the policy-making process from a somewhat similar standpoint: as individuals representing the communities they serve, albeit propelled by different personal and parochial interests.

Once a policy is in place, the public statements of officials responsible for communicating and implementing it can meaningfully influence the opinion of mass publics. This process, known as policy feedback, can influence the opinion of mass publics, which can in turn influence how those impacted by the policy understand their own citizenship and the assignment of political and social standing to those who receive its benefits. This process occurs both among those directly impacted by the policy and those who are not (Mettler and SoRelle 2014). Mass publics formulate their views based on two factors: the visibility of a policy and their own proximity to that policy (Soss and Schram 2007). In the case discussed here, which considers policy concerning the distribution of opioid-reversal drugs to public officials, the policy is exceptionally visible to residents of Massachusetts, as demonstrated through the significant media coverage of its implementation. While proximity to the policy may vary, if overdose rates continue to rise as indicated in the Massachusetts Opioid Working Group report (Sudders 2015) and the recommendations of that same report are followed, it stands to reason that a larger number of citizens may become increasingly proximal to this policy.
Narcan Policy in Massachusetts

There have been several state-wide policies enacted in Massachusetts that have addressed the opioid problem directly, including legislation requiring medical practitioners to share information about opioid prescriptions and mandates that insurance companies provide minimum insurance coverage for addiction (Sudders 2015). However, one particular group of policies has been the focus of significant media coverage: the use of naloxone (popularly known by the brand name Narcan\(^1\)), a drug that temporarily reverses the effects of opioids. Narcan can be administered by injection or with a nasal applicator. It is powerful enough to reverse the effects of an overdose within seconds, providing a short window for the person who has overdosed to receive emergency medical attention. There has been no documented evidence of side effects nor potential for abuse. It is relatively inexpensive, and it has been shown to be effective in lowering overdose rates (Davis, Ruiz, Glynn, Picariello, and Walley 2014; Walley et al. 2013).

A brief timeline of current Narcan policy, drawn from a sample of local newspaper articles on the subject going back two decades, indicates that between 1996 and 2008, there were no references to Narcan in those newspapers. In 2008, local administrative and elected officials began giving quotes to those same local newspapers, in both articles and editorials, regarding the use of Narcan. These discussions included, among other issues, whether police officers, firefighters, paramedics, and other public officials should carry doses of Narcan.

Massachusetts governors Deval Patrick (Democrat, 2007-2015) and Charlie Baker (Republican, 2015-present) have made addressing the opioid epidemic a centerpiece of their respective legislative platforms. Both implemented numerous executive actions that expanded the provision of Narcan, giving state sanction to public safety officials to carry the drug on their person and making Narcan available over the counter for private individuals to purchase. Over time, substantial grants were made available to police and fire departments to purchase Narcan for their officers. Some cities, however, seeing the number of overdoses increase rapidly, purchased the drug as soon as legally possible, even before those grants were available (Davis et al. 2014).

One significant development in Narcan policy came in 2015, shortly after an extensive report from the Governor’s Opioid Working Group was published. Attorney General of Massachusetts Maura Healey reached a deal with Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, the maker and distributor of Narcan, to offset the cost of Narcan purchased by the state. Massachusetts had been purchasing Narcan at the price of $65 per dose, nearly triple the price of the drug in March 2014. Under threat of lawsuit, Amphastar settled with the state to help offset the cost, allowing the state to make the drug available at a significantly lower cost to cities and towns that wished to distribute it to public safety officials. This settlement made it easier than ever for public safety departments to obtain Narcan and equip their employees with doses of the drug (Healey 2015).

As Narcan has become increasingly available throughout the state and issued to numerous police and fire departments, the number of articles in print media about the use of the drug has increased dramatically. Public officials have frequently commented on the record about Narcan policy, with varying degrees of support and markedly different conceptions of how they view the relationship of Narcan policy to their own work. In 2015, as opioid use in Massachusetts continued to rise, leading members of state law enforcement, health, and legal agencies released this statement:

\(^1\) For purposes of consistency and to match the term most frequently found in print media in Massachusetts, naloxone will be referred to as Narcan throughout.

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Since 2004, more than 6,600 members of our community have died, and behind those deaths are thousands of hospital stays, emergency department visits, and unquantifiable human suffering. We are in the midst of an epidemic. Our response requires a strong partnership between the medical community, law enforcement, the judiciary, insurers, providers, health and human services agencies, elected officials, and the public. Our law enforcement agencies are a critical part of the opioid solution; however, we cannot arrest our way out of this epidemic (Sudders 2015).

This quote, from a report published by Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker’s Opioid Working Group, presents the pressing and complicated nature of opioid abuse in Massachusetts. Opioid addiction is on the rise across the country since 2010, and public officials are increasingly attempting to collaborate in innovative ways to combat this problem (Rudd, Aleshire, Zibbell, and Matthew Gladden 2016). The critical nature of the problem in Massachusetts is evident in the rhetoric that is presented in local print media. In 150 articles that discussed opioids from three Massachusetts newspapers between 2008-2015, the word “crisis” was used 79 times to describe the issue of opioid addiction in the state, while “epidemic” was used 118 times. Within the context of this shifting discourse and active policy-making environment, a crucial question remains unanswered: Do elected officials and administrators differ in their opinions and understandings of Narcan policy, and what significance does this have for the current policy environment and the policy-making process going forward?

Research Design
To examine how public officials view Narcan-related policy and to understand how their discourse concerning the issue might contribute to policy feedback effects, a sample of the public dialogue around Narcan policy in Massachusetts was gathered and analyzed through a content analysis of quotes from public officials in print media. This process allows us to understand the elements of difference in public discourse between administrative and elected officials, their significance for public policy, and how they may influence mass public opinion and policy feedback on this issue. Media coverage has been shown to be a powerful, but understudied, driver of bureaucratic policy-making, and conducting a content analysis of public discourse can be a useful tool in understanding how this discourse influences policy feedback (Wood and Waterman 1993).

The approach to coding these articles resembles customary methodologies of content analysis, keeping in the mind the “systematic and scientific” approach recommended by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). The analysis is conducted with an eye towards engaging in “meaning making” and recognizing “interpretive moments,” both of which are critical elements of a qualitative study that acknowledges, enhances, and promotes the voices of those being studied, as well as the interpretive and analytic voice of the researcher (Yanow 2006). Coding was conducted over an extended period in order to iteratively refine the codes, concepts, and observations created by the researcher. As recommended by Collier, Seawright, and Munck (2004), potential variables and narratives that did not have specific causal influence were not ignored, but instead considered as valuable contextual content to be coded and analyzed.

Three newspapers were chosen to provide data for this analysis: The Worcester Telegram & Gazette, The Fitchburg Sentinel, and The Berkshire Eagle (Pittsfield, MA), each
of which covers local, regional, and national news in Worcester and Berkshire Counties. While this is by no means a random nor representative sample of the discourse in Massachusetts, it is an ideal starting point for this work as it takes into account the public narratives of three cities and surrounding areas where opioid addiction is a significant problem, related issues are covered consistently by the media, and where public officials have frequently gone on the record in print. Additionally, each of these newspapers has full-text articles covering the past 20 years available online, allowing for a comprehensive review of their content.

A search of each newspaper was conducted using the Lexis-Nexis database, covering the years 1996-2016. Each search included the terms “Massachusetts” and “Narcan,” resulting in a total of 151 unique newspaper articles. These included local, regional, and national news; editorials; and community event listings. The articles were downloaded, separated, and appended to a project file in ATLAS.ti, a qualitative analytics software. The articles were first coded to indicate their respective dates, newspaper of origin, and type of article (news, editorial, etc.). Once this was completed, through the previously described iterative process, content codes were created and grouped. After all articles were coded, they were revisited to ensure that codes were appropriately grouped and organized. This process ensures the following analysis will elucidate themes that can be understood using the frameworks of both bureaucratic politics and policy feedback. The emergent themes, codes, and potential conclusions are discussed below.

Data Analysis
In the three newspapers of interest, articles that contain the words “Massachusetts” and “Narcan” in the same piece begin to increase in 2014, appearing in 24 articles total, four times as many as they did in 2013. This number more than doubles in 2015 to 60 articles. The analysis presented here only considers articles published on or before February 17, 2016, but if the first two months of 2016 are at all indicative, it is on pace to exceed 80 published articles that contain these two keywords. Fig. 1 shows the clear trend of an increasing public discourse around Narcan.

Figure 1: References to Narcan and Massachusetts 2008-2016
In addition, as per the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the number of opioid-related deaths in Massachusetts over the same period steadily increased (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Confirmed Opioid Deaths in Massachusetts**

Over the eight-year period that this analysis covers, the type of actor quoted in print undergoes a meaningful shift. Prior to 2014, the majority of articles quote representatives of non-profit organizations, while executive and legal actors remain absent from the public discourse. In 2014, administrative actors are the overwhelming majority quoted, but as seen in Fig. 3, by 2015 the conversation is more evenly distributed around several different relevant actors.

**Figure 3: Type of Actor 2008-2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Actor</th>
<th>2008-2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the type of actor, there is also a clear shift in the level of actor discussing Narcan in print over time. Once again, 2014 serves as the pivot point, with local-level actors...
making up most of those quoted prior to that year. Local-level actors continue to be the primary voices beyond 2013, but state-level actors become much more involved in the discourse beginning in 2014 and increasing in 2015. Given that the analysis conducted herein only includes three regional newspapers, there is understandably very little reference to a greater national conversation or national actors. The evidence presented in Fig. 4 should not be construed to mean that there is no national conversation occurring, but simply that it is not being reported by the three newspapers considered.

**Figure 4: Level of Actor (2008-2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>2008-2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Fig. 5 shows, the *Telegram and Gazette* and *Sentinel and Enterprise* favor quotes from administrative officials. This could potentially reflect the fact that the *Eagle* covers the westernmost county in the state, less centrally located to state administrative offices in Boston than either Worcester or Fitchburg. The Pittsfield area is also more rural and sparsely populated, and therefore has fewer administrative officials at the regional or local level. Further, there is evidence that rural areas are turning to alternative forms of public safety, which may also contribute to the smaller number of police officials quoted (Brunet 2015).

The findings are inherently limited, but they frame the story of the public discourse around Narcan in the print media of Massachusetts. Within that context, it is important to unpack further how both administrative and elected officials represent their views on Narcan policy in these media reports, and what implications that may have for policy going forward. Since these representations are likely to have an impact on the policy environment, as well as public opinion (Mettler and SoRelle 2014; Soss and Schram 2007), these views must be understood both as representations of the individuals stating them (and therefore a representation of the priorities those individuals place on particular issues), but also as potentially predictive information about how Narcan policy in Massachusetts may evolve based on theoretical and practical understandings of policy feedback.
Findings and Conclusions

Administrative actors represent the majority of individuals quoted in the print media reviewed herein, and, therefore, it is likely that their opinions will be the ones that contribute most to shaping the policy environment and discourse going forward. Since those administrators, primarily of fire and police officials, are the individuals utilizing Narcan, it stands to reason that their primary concerns and opinions would be directly related to the application of Narcan, as shown in Fig. 6a. These concerns are overwhelmingly related to availability and training in the use of Narcan, in particular. The concerns of administrative officials do not appear to be backed up by elected officials who, as seen in Fig. 6b, are more concerned with the potential downsides to the widespread use of Narcan, larger issues of legal ramifications, and what Narcan use means for the broader fight against opioid addiction. This leads to a distinct disconnect between the priorities of elected officials and the priorities of both managerial and street-level bureaucrats, indicating the presence of bureaucratic politics in this particular policy-making environment.

When it comes to specific concerns about Narcan, administrators, law enforcement and fire officials are primarily quoted on two specific issues: availability of and training in the use of Narcan. The quotes indicate that these groups of actors are using the public sphere to ask for more availability and training for themselves. Elected officials, while also concerned with availability, are primarily concerned with cost and promoting Good-Samaritan legislation at the state level that would protect those who administer Narcan to a person who has overdosed. Additionally, elected officials have concerns about Narcan enabling drug users by providing a mechanism that could reverse overdoses, the idea that Narcan is an effective way to decrease the broader opioid problem, and a perception that Narcan is just a temporary fix. No elected officials quoted in the print media reviewed are concerned about training in the use of Narcan.

Figure 5: Type of Actor by Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Actor</th>
<th>Berkshire Eagle (Pittsfield)</th>
<th>Fitchburg Sentinel and Enterprise</th>
<th>Worcester Telegram and Gazette</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit</td>
<td>14 22 25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>13 14 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>9 52 39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>8 11 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6 11 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>5 6 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure 6a: Administrative Views of Narcan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded Themes</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Legal ramifications</th>
<th>Opioid epidemic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cost, legal_action, legislative_action</td>
<td>legal_action, pro_good_sam, legislative_action</td>
<td>temp_fix, not_working, enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local</strong></td>
<td>Local elected officials were frequently concerned about the cost of Narcan, citing the need for funding to provide it to police and fire departments. They also saw the procurement of Narcan as a part of the budgetary process, which is a substantively different viewpoint than that of administrators who saw the same issue as one of health and safety.</td>
<td>Local elected officials were not particularly concerned with the legal ramifications of Narcan, though some did reference a potential Good Samaritan Law proposed at the state level that would protect those administering Narcan from prosecution.</td>
<td>Local elected officials saw Narcan as part of a broader pattern of legislative, legal, and administrative attempts to combat opioids. Though less pessimistic than state elected officials about the use of the drug, they did not see expanding Narcan availability and use as an entirely positive development in that fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td>State officials remained concerned with the cost of Narcan, seeing it as a budgetary matter. There was frequent discussion about passing legislation to fund local authorities to purchase Narcan. The state attorney general filed a lawsuit to force the maker and distributor of the drug to lower prices, and this action received significant news coverage.</td>
<td>The attorney general of Massachusetts sued the distributor of Narcan, based on the high cost the state was being charged. Elected officials at the state level attempted to pass a “Good Samaritan” law protecting those who administered Narcan from potential prosecution.</td>
<td>State officials saw Narcan usage in the greater context of the opioid epidemic. Some did not see Narcan as a useful or positive tool, instead noting that Narcan can enable drug users to overdose without serious consequence, or that it was a temporary fix to a long-term problem. Others felt that it was not working to bring down the overdose rate in the state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Police, in particular, though this attitude is echoed by fire officials as well as local and state administrators, feel that the availability of Narcan is good or satisfactory for their departments, that it saves lives, and that sufficient training is available. Though this may seem to contradict the previous finding showing concern about training and availability among these groups, it reflects the fact that multiple police departments provided quotes at different times and to different reporters. While it is true that some police, fire, and administrative officials said training and availability were satisfactory and others said they were not, the key finding here is that these this issue, positive or negative, was overwhelmingly the focus of the comments by these actors.

Elected officials do not have many favorable opinions, although when they do, those opinions generally revolve around the use of Narcan to combat addiction and save lives. These two codes, while undoubtedly favorable towards the use of Narcan, are primarily representative
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**Figure 6b: Elected Officials’ Views of Narcan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded Themes</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Legal ramifications</th>
<th>Opioid epidemic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local</strong></td>
<td>cost, legal_action, legislative_action</td>
<td>legal_action, pro_good_sam, legislative_action</td>
<td>temp_fix, not_working, enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local elected officials were frequently concerned about the cost of Narcan, citing the need for funding to provide it to police and fire departments. They also saw the procurement of Narcan as a part of the budgetary process, which is a substantively different viewpoint than that of administrators who saw the same issue as one of health and safety.</td>
<td>Local elected officials were not particularly concerned with the legal ramifications of Narcan, though some did reference a potential Good Samaritan Law proposed at the state level that would protect those administering Narcan from prosecution.</td>
<td>Local elected officials saw Narcan as part of a broader pattern of legislative, legal, and administrative attempts to combat opioids. Though less pessimistic than state elected officials about the use of the drug, they did not see expanding Narcan availability and use as an entirely positive development in that fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td>State officials remained concerned with the cost of Narcan, seeing it as a budgetary matter. There was frequent discussion about passing legislation to fund local authorities to purchase Narcan. The state attorney general filed a lawsuit to force the maker and distributor of the drug to lower prices, and this action received significant news coverage.</td>
<td>The attorney general of Massachusetts sued the distributor of Narcan, based on the high cost the state was being charged. Elected officials at the state level attempted to pass a “Good Samaritan” law protecting those who administered Narcan from potential prosecution.</td>
<td>State officials saw Narcan usage in the greater context of the opioid epidemic. Some did not see Narcan as a useful or positive tool, instead noting that Narcan can enable drug users to overdose without serious consequence, or that it was a temporary fix to a long-term problem. Others felt that it was not working to bring down the overdose rate in the state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of larger concepts that do not apply directly to the usage or availability of Narcan. Elected officials are not tasked with the actual application of Narcan to individuals, and these codes clearly reflect that difference. Figs. 6a and 6b, on the following pages, indicate the specific delineations of codes within the discourse of both administrative and elected officials.

Broadly, the two streams of thought indicated by these codes can be characterized as direct mindsets vs. indirect mindsets. Police, fire, and local administrators have a direct mindset when it comes to Narcan policy. They have seen people overdose, are tasked with the use of Narcan, and actively seek to accomplish their organizational mission (keeping the public safe), a goal with which Narcan can assist. Elected officials have an indirect mindset, in that they pay for the use of Narcan, ensure that legal ramifications of Narcan application are dealt with, and think about the impact of the larger epidemic. However, by the nature of their jobs, they remain disconnected from the street-level fight against opioid addition.

Throughout the public media discourse on Narcan, specific quotations stand out as examples of this direct v. indirect dichotomy. The box below contains several references to Narcan within the media that demonstrate the direct mindset that street-level bureaucrats, particularly police officials, have when it comes to the usage of Narcan. These are just a few of the observations that occur frequently among police, as well as local administrators and
fire officials, reflecting the view that first responders should be equipped with Narcan regardless of any other concerns. As street-level bureaucrats, they are concerned first with maintaining their own discretionary decision-making, and having the flexibility to utilize Narcan promotes the managerial distance between policy and decision-making that is a critical element of the street-level bureaucrat (Lipsky 1980).

Selected Quotes from Administrative Officials

"I would think, as a first responder, there is no doubt that Narcan plays directly into our role as police to utilize this product," Chief DeMoura said. *Fitchburg Police Chief Robert DeMoura, March 5, 2014, Worcester Telegram & Gazette.*

The Worcester Police Department has trained officers to use Narcan, and Chief Gary Gemme hopes to have it available in cruisers within the next two weeks. *Worcester Police Chief Gary Gemme, August 8, 2014, Worcester Telegram & Gazette*

"We have a request in to the medical director at Heywood Hospital to carry it, and we've been waiting well over two months," Parsons said. "Once we get approval, we'll start training our officers, and they'll be carrying it in the cruisers." *Ashburnham Police Lieutenant Todd Parsons, November 16, 2014, Fitchburg Sentinel & Enterprise*

"We've had instances where we could have used it," he said. "One instance, my officer was there at the scene three or four minutes ahead of the ambulance, and he had to wait for the ambulance to get there to deploy it." *Westminster Police Chief Sam Albert, December 23, 2014, Fitchburg Sentinel & Enterprise*

Elected officials have substantively different observations on the same issues. The box below shows how these responses are distinct from those of the street-level bureaucrats and reflect the indirect mindset of elected officials. In particular, these observations show that the concerns, advocacy, and opinions around Narcan usage by these individuals are based on more indirect concepts, such as cost, legal ramifications, and the greater problems of the opioid epidemic. While elected officials generally state that Narcan should be made available to first responders, they are far more likely to be concerned with larger ramifications, such as cost and legal protections. Observations of discourse in the media help to reinforce what is a clear dichotomy: bureaucratic concerns, advocacy, and opinions are based on experiences and active connections to overdoses and Narcan use, whereas elected officials’ opinions on the same issues are based in contextual understandings, including legal, administrative, and budgetary concerns.

Selected Quotes from Elected Officials

"The so-called ‘harm reduction’ policies of our public health leadership serve to camouflage their aggressive actions for acceptance and normalization of illegal drug use…Common sense tells us that Narcan gives addicts a sense of confidence that they can take their ‘high’ to the point of overdose and live to tell the tale." *Barbara Haller, City Councilperson, Worcester, June 22, 2008, Worcester Telegram & Gazette.*
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[State Senate President] Rosenberg said that he's concerned about what he called the drastic increase in the price of naloxone, adding that the drug is needed more than ever with opiate-related overdoses on the rise, according to State House News Service. *State Senator Stan Rosenberg, April 25, 2015, Berkshire Eagle.*

Flanagan said she's pushing for the bill to include an update to the Good Samaritan law shielding first responders, many of whom now carry the overdose-reversal drug Narcan, from civil liability. Flanagan is also looking for additional training for first responders on the details of the law that protects those who call for help in cases of drug overdoses from criminal prosecution. *State Rep. Jennifer Flanagan, September 24, 2015, Berkshire Eagle.*

[Healy’s] office is also looking at the pricing practices companies use to set prescription drug prices, sometimes reaching out to the manufacturers. In one instance related to the opioid crisis, she said the rising price of Narcan, which is used to treat drug overdose victims, was stabilized through a bulk purchase agreement for Massachusetts communities she worked out with the manufacturer, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals. *Attorney General Maura Healy, December 19, 2015, Berkshire Eagle.*

Implications and Further Research

The major implications of this research are twofold: First, the dichotomy between how administrative and elected officials view what constitutes an effective policy, as well as the differences within those groups, suggests that bureaucratic politics is at work in this policy-making environment, and that it may be useful to study local government policy-making through that lens. As administrative officials continue to voice their concerns and represent their priorities more forcefully and, in more venues, than elected officials, the policy environment may shift towards a high-visibility and increasingly proximate environment. If this is the case, it will be the concerns of administrative officials that will be most influential in shaping future policy. The perpetuation of the ideas put forward by these officials in the press include three significant factors that will shape how the bureaucratic politics of this particular policy debate might play out.

First, policy feedback will continue to push mass public opinion towards the perspectives most often represented in the media. If the trends demonstrated herein continue, this will likely mean a high-visibility high-proximity policymaking environment where public opinion is highly favorable towards the *direct mindset* approach, encouraging officials to carry and utilize Narcan whenever possible. Second, as political attention becomes more focused, both administrative and elected officials may utilize the “politics of information” to suppress, shift, or obfuscate the ways in which Narcan has impacted overdose rates to reflect their preferred policy approach (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). Finally, the state-agent/citizen-agent delineation between street-level bureaucrats and local elected officials will play a role in how each sees their role in the larger context of the opioid crisis, as reflected in the direct v. indirect conceptions of the role of public officials in Figs. 6a and 6b (S. Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000). These dynamics may well play out in other cases of...
public safety, public health, or drug policy, and further research will be necessary to
determine whether these dynamics are unique to the policy area and jurisdiction of this case.

The second implication is the evidence that a shift in the policy environment is either
pending or already in progress within this arena. Soss and Schram (2007) characterize the
policy feedback effects of a given policy as falling into quadrants based on the visibility and
proximity of a policy to a population. This framework provides a tool for understanding how
Narcan policy in Massachusetts may be shifting between quadrants as media coverage of the
issue changes the narrative around both Narcan and the opioid epidemic. Fig. 7 below is a
replication of the framework developed by Soss and Schram, and a representation of how
Narcan policy appears to be shifting between quadrants based upon the trends demonstrated
herein. As Narcan policy in Massachusetts has become a “high-visibility, high-proximity”
issue, the feedback process has become increasingly influenced by mass publics, who are
intimately connected to the policy. Research has shown that other policies that fall into this
quadrant, such as Social Security and income tax, are among the most powerful drivers of
policy feedback (Campbell, 2003; Soss and Schram, 2007).

Figure 7: A General Framework for the Analysis of Mass Feedback of Processes:
Policy Visibility & Proximity

Reproduced and adapted from Soss and Schram, 2007, p 121

This article is a first step towards understanding the differences in rhetoric and policy
positions between elected and administrative officials, and how these splits may impact both
the bureaucratic politics of local government, as well as policy feedback around particular
issues. More work must be undertaken to fully develop the ideas presented here and explain
how the thematic streams described are influenced by the location, culture, and mission of
both individuals and organizations. Future research might include conducting quantitative
analyses of the available information on overdoses, hospital admissions, Narcan purchases,
and other similar indicators of the larger opioid epidemic in other jurisdictions. In conjunction
with understanding the policy environment in which these numbers are reported, it may be
possible to find causal relationships that help to determine why and how policy is created.
Another critical question to consider is the impact of individuals on policy, and how the views of specific groups of bureaucrats and elected officials within a given jurisdiction impact how policy is created and implemented. Groups of individuals can form divided constituencies seeking a similar goal by different means, which in turn can influence how government approaches creating policy. All may agree that the opioid epidemic must be addressed, but the specific ways by which to bring down the number of overdoses may be controversial, even if all groups agree that government policy must address the issue (Karch 2010). Qualitative approaches to answer this question might include interviews, observations, and ride-alongs with public safety officials, and could utilize a story-telling approach similar to Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) or Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel (2014). Quantitative approaches might follow the example of Fleming (2014), who demonstrates that parents utilizing school voucher programs have engaged in political learning and become more politically active. A study of public administrators could gauge the impact of having used Narcan in the field on how those administrators view Narcan-related policies. There are implications within the study of all of these forces, not only for a better understanding of the dynamisms shaping Narcan policy, but for how elected officials, administrators, and street-level bureaucrats can bargain, debate, and form alliances throughout the policy-making process, even if their primary focal points on a particular issue are dissimilar.

Author’s Note: While the data utilized in this manuscript is not currently hosted online, the author welcomes anyone to reach out directly if they have interest in the codebook, models, un-coded, or coded data files used for this project.

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References


Interdistrict Mobility and Charter Schools in Arizona: Understanding the Dynamics of Public School Choice

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This paper investigates the mobility patterns of elementary students enrolled in Arizona’s traditional public school districts and charter schools. We address movement related to two forms of public school choice simultaneously: interdistrict choice and charter schools. Most student movement is interdistrict or between school districts. In Arizona, interdistrict mobility has played a greater role in creating and sustaining an educational market than charter schools. There is also a substantial amount of student movement from charter schools to school districts. Regression analyses suggested that the relationships between different types of student mobility and school characteristics varied across the two sectors. We also document regional differences in mobility patterns, which indicate that education markets vary considerably across and within local contexts.

Many policymakers view market-oriented school choice policies such as charter schools and open enrollment as ways to stimulate competition among schools and provide families with improved schooling options. In this paper, we examine the patterns of interdistrict student movement within the public school sector in Arizona, or student movement between traditional public school districts (hereafter referred to as “school districts”) and between school districts and charter schools. Arizona has supported public school choice through interdistrict enrollment policies and charter school reform since the early 1990s. While focused on Arizona, this analysis has relevance for other state and local...
settings where multiple school choice programs are operating simultaneously because it addresses the student movement generated by two different public school choice policies.

This analysis extends an exploratory study that focused on student movement patterns within metropolitan Phoenix, the largest public school “market” in Arizona, to assess if the patterns we documented are evident statewide and within other areas of the state (Powers, Topper, and Silver 2012). Our research questions are:

a) What are the patterns of student mobility between and within public school sectors in Arizona?

b) What are the relationships between district and charter school mobility rates and other district or school characteristics?

c) Are there variations in the patterns of student movement within and across local markets?

We expected to find differences in the patterns of movement between districts and charter schools and that these differences are associated with district or school characteristics. We also expected to find differences within and across educational settings that reflect regional differences in the configuration of districts and charter schools. Our findings indicate that most students in Arizona move between districts rather than from districts to charter schools. We also document a two-way pattern of movement between charters and school districts. These patterns of student movement are relevant for policymakers in other state and local contexts because can they help us assess the extent to which public school choice policies have fostered the education markets that policymakers envisioned. Given the continual growth in the charter school sector (U.S. Department of Education 2017a), our findings may provide insights about patterns of student movement beyond Arizona. These findings also have implications for school leaders in these settings who must grapple with the fiscal consequences of declining enrollments and the challenges of educating students who move frequently between districts and sectors (Moody’s Investor Service 2013). In addition, if the Trump administration’s efforts to provide school vouchers for tuition at private schools are successful (Klein and Ujifusa 2017), our findings may also help predict the possible effects of introducing voucher programs alongside existing public school choice programs on student enrollments.

A substantial body of research explores the causes and consequences of student movement between public school districts and charter schools (e.g., Garcia 2008; Renzulli and Evans 2005; Weiher and Tedin 2002). Likewise, numerous studies have assessed the characteristics of students who participate in interdistrict choice programs (e.g., Fossey 1994; Holme and Richards 2009; Witte and Thorn 1996) and the influences on school districts’ participation in, and responses to, interdistrict choice (e.g., Fowler 1996; Ghosh 2010). The present study is unique because we document patterns of student movement within the public school sector in local education markets by analyzing both interdistrict and charter school movement in a state with multiple and long-standing school choice policies.

School Choice in Arizona

Charter schools operate in 43 states and the District of Columbia (DC), and enrolled approximately 2.8 million students in 2015-16 (U.S. Department of Education 2017a). They serve a small, but growing, share of public school students. Between the fall of 2000 and the fall of 2015, charter school enrollment increased from 1% to 6% of public school students (U.S. Department of Education 2017b). Forty-six states and DC have some type of open
enrollment policies outlined in their state education codes (Wixom 2017). Mandatory interdistrict open enrollment policies require districts to participate in them, whereas voluntary policies allow districts to choose if they will participate (Wixom 2017). While many states with mandatory open enrollment policies target specific geographic locations, schools, or groups of students (e.g., students attending low performing schools or low income students), Arizona is one of 11 states that does not limit families’ participation in interdistrict open enrollment. As a result, all Arizona school districts must allow students to enroll in their schools, space permitting, regardless of their districts of residence.

Although most public school students do not utilize school choice programs or policies (Garcia 2010; Grady and Bielick 2010; Snyder et al. 2016), expanding school choice has been a long-standing goal of Arizona policymakers. Arizona’s provisions for open enrollment and charter schools were approved by the state legislature in 1994 in a single bill, HB 2002, during a special legislative session (Powers 2009). The open enrollment and charter school provisions in HB 2002 put Arizona at the forefront of the movement to expand public school choice. Arizona was the seventh state to pass legislation mandating open enrollment policies for all public school districts (State of Missouri 2009). Before HB 2002 took effect, Arizona school districts established their own policies regarding the enrollment of non-resident students, and a considerable number of students took advantage of these policies.

According to an early analysis conducted by the Arizona Department of Education, more than 40,000 students opted to enroll in schools outside their assigned school districts in 1992 (Gallagher 1992). Between the 2004-05 and 2007-08 academic years, more than one-quarter of K-12 students in Arizona transferred schools, with just under 15% of students making an interdistrict transfer and approximately 6% of students transferring to a school within their districts of residence (Fong, Bae, and Huang 2010). Likewise, Arizona was the fourth state to pass charter school legislation. In 2015-16, charter schools comprised 24% of all Arizona K-12 schools and enrolled 16% of the school-age population (U.S. Department of Education 2017b). While these figures suggest that Arizona’s public school choice policies have created a unique education market, similarly high mobility rates have been documented elsewhere (e.g., Dauter and Fuller 2016; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004).

Conceptual Framework
Market-oriented school choice policies such as interdistrict choice and charter schools are a means of ensuring that students are not required to attend an assigned public school based on where they live. The key assumption underlying market-oriented choice is that, given the opportunity, many families will strategically seek out and move to better schools for their children, a process we refer to as active choice (Powers et al. 2012). Ideally, schools will

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1 The other 10 states are: Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. Alaska and Arkansas require interdistrict open enrollment for students attending schools in facilities distress, while Vermont limits interdistrict open enrollment to high school students (Wixom 2017).

2 HB 2002 was a compromise from earlier bills considered by the Arizona legislature during the two regular legislative sessions that preceded it (Luther 1995). The final version of HB 2002 did not include a school voucher program in earlier versions of the bill.

3 Minnesota, Iowa, Arkansas, Nebraska, Washington, and Utah passed open enrollment laws before Arizona (State of Missouri 2009).
compete for such students by finding market niches through some form of differentiation (Chubb and Moe 1990). School choice advocates contend that competition will force districts and schools to function as education markets and, thereby, make them more efficient, effective, and responsive to the needs of parents and students (Friedman 1962). As a result, schools will improve over time, as they vie for students, or close, if they lose market share (e.g., Forster 2013; Hoxby 2003).

In essence, market-oriented school choice policies are aimed at facilitating a form of Tiebout choice, where consumers (parents and students) choose residential locations that provide the services that best meet their needs and preferences (Tiebout 1956; Urquiola 2005). These can include districts or schools that offer specific curricular foci (e.g., the performing arts, science, and mathematics), child-rearing philosophies, instructional approaches, or extracurricular activities. Some researchers have argued that active choice facilitated by school choice policies can ultimately benefit students (Hanushek et al. 2004). They claim that when families choose among schools to find better matches, in the aggregate and over time, these school moves will raise school quality as measured by student achievement. Yet, other studies suggest that most school changes depress student achievement (Grigg 2012; Ni and Rorrer 2012). In addition, critics of market-oriented school reforms argue that charter schools and other forms of school choice, such as voucher programs, may increase racial and socioeconomic segregation (e.g., Cobb and Glass 1999; Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, and Wang 2011; Frankenberg, Kotok, Schafft, and Mann 2017; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser, and Henig 2002; Lubienski, Gulosino, and Weitzel 2009; Renzulli and Evans 2005).

Perhaps most importantly, even in states or districts with long-standing school choice policies, most students attend their assigned public schools (Dauter and Fuller 2015; Grady and Bielick 2010) or remain enrolled in the same schools from one year to the next (Garcia 2010). Moreover, most forms of student movement cannot be reliably attributed to active choice. That is, even in states with mandatory interdistrict choice policies, it is likely that some student mobility between school districts is a result of active choice, while other forms of mobility are reactive (Rumberger 2003). Changes in families’ residence or employment often prompt school moves. Some researchers distinguish between active choice and reactive mobility and argue that the latter is more disruptive to students’ learning and lowers school achievement (Hanushek et al. 2004; Xu, Hannaway, and D’Souza 2009).

Literature Review
We analyzed the nonpromotional movement of elementary grade students enrolled in a district or charter school at the end of the 2007-08 school year who transferred to another district or charter school within the local education market at the beginning of 2008-09 for reasons other than “aging out” of elementary grades. Our measures of student movement are district and charter school-level exit and entry rates. We used the Office of Management and Budget’s Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) as our proxy for local education markets because they delineate geographic areas that are socially and economically integrated (United States Census Bureau 2012). While we cannot directly assess families’ motivations for changing schools, we focus on a specific type of student movement, school changes between

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4 Non-promotional movement is student mobility between districts or charter schools that is not due to regular grade level progression.

5 CBSAs are statistical areas that contain minimum populations of 10,000 and include core urban areas and adjacent counties.
school years, because unlike mobility during the school year, these are more likely to be a result of active choice than mid-year school changes. Our assumption is that student movement between sectors (districts to charter schools and vice versa) is more likely to be a form of active choice, as is some of the movement between districts within CBSAs. Because some of the patterns we observe are likely shaped in part by reactive mobility (i.e., some of the student movement between districts), below we provide an overview of research on charter schools and interdistrict choice, as well as findings from analyses of student mobility.

Charter Schools
Nationally, charter schools tend to serve fewer White students and a higher percentage of African American students than traditional public schools (U.S. Department of Education 2016), although there is considerable variation in charter school demographics within and across states and regions (Frankenberg et al. 2011). These demographic differences are attributable in part to locale; charter schools tend to be concentrated in urban areas, particularly in large cities that have greater percentages of minority students. Some studies indicate that charter schools increase racial and ethnic segregation in public schools by increasing the number of racially-isolated schools (Bifulco and Ladd 2007; Cobb and Glass 1999; Frankenberg et al. 2011; Gulosino and d’Entremont 2011; Whitehurst 2017). However, Ritter, Jensen, Kisida, and McGee (2010) critique the claim that school segregation is attributable to charter schools because the traditional public schools these students would otherwise attend are also segregated (see Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, and Orfield’s [2010] response).

Whitehurst (2017) assessed the relationship between a district-level index of public school choice with a measure of the racial imbalance between high school enrollments and the school-age population of the schools’ catchment area for 106 of the largest districts in the U.S. He found a positive correlation between school choice options and racial imbalance for African Americans and Whites; districts with a broader array of policies that enable school choice tend to be more racially imbalanced than districts with more limited choice policies. Choice policies were not associated with racial imbalances of Hispanic and Asian students. Studies using student-level data to conduct finer-grained analyses of student movement patterns confirm these broader trends. Most students who move from traditional public schools to charter schools move to charter schools with higher percentages of racially similar students, although there is considerable variation across groups and locales (Bifulco and Ladd 2007; Frankenberg et al. 2017; Garcia 2008; Whitehurst 2017).

Finch, Lapsley, and Baker-Boudissa (2009) examined the influences that shape non-promotional movement out of charter schools in Indiana. While they did not compare charter schools with traditional public schools, they documented high exit rates from of a sample of 11 charter schools that were more than a year old in 2003-04. Non-White students and lower achieving students were more likely to leave charter schools before they reached the highest grade offered by the schools than their White and higher achieving peers. In contrast, Ni and Rorrer (2012) documented lower turnover in charter schools compared to traditional public schools in Utah. However, Utah’s charter schools tend to serve a predominantly White and more affluent student population than charter schools in other states, so the lower mobility rate they observed may be related in part to student demographics.

Overall, these studies did not address the effects of these demographic patterns and enrollment trends on school districts, although they do provide important insights into broader state or regional enrollment trends, the factors associated with students’ movement to charter schools, and achievement outcomes. They also tend to focus on a single form of public school
choice. In our earlier study of student movement between school districts in metropolitan Phoenix (Powers et al. 2012) we found that urban districts in the metropolitan core tended to have higher rates of mobility and a greater number of students moving between districts, while suburban districts had lower rates of mobility but comparatively higher rates of students moving to and from charter schools. In general, mobility patterns tended to be reciprocal rather than one-way, which may be more aptly characterized as a two-way pattern rather than one that suggests high levels of competition between districts and charter schools.

**Interdistrict Choice**

Most analyses of interdistrict choice focus on the relationship between the characteristics of school districts and outcomes ranging from participation in a voluntary choice program, patterns of student movement, and student demand. District wealth has been identified as a key factor shaping the likelihood that districts will participate in voluntary choice programs (Fowler 1996; Rincke 2006) and how they respond to the loss of students to other districts (Armor and Peiser 1998, Aud 1999). School districts may also be more likely to participate in a voluntary interdistrict choice program if neighboring districts are participating (Fowler 1996; Rincke 2006).

One consistent finding across states is that receiving districts tend to have greater financial resources (e.g., higher per pupil spending, higher family incomes, or property values) than sending districts (Armor and Peiser 1998; Fossey 1994; Holme and Richard 2009; Welsch, Statz, and Skidmore 2010). Some studies suggest that families are more likely to leave districts with greater percentages of minority and poor students than their destination districts (Armor and Peiser 1998; Welsch et al. 2010). However, Holme and Richard (2009) found evidence of different patterns of mobility among White and minority students in metropolitan Denver. While White students were leaving relatively less White and affluent districts for Whiter and lower poverty districts, minority students were leaving Whiter and more affluent districts to attend districts with higher percentages of poor and minority students. The net effect of these patterns was to increase the racial and class segregation of school districts.

These patterns may be partially attributable to differences in student achievement. Reback (2008) found that district achievement was a stronger predictor of transfer requests in Minnesota than measures of socio-economic status and spending. Moreover, districts’ transfer requests tended to increase as test scores in neighboring districts decreased. In a study of the influences on transactional open enrollment flows in Colorado and Minnesota, Carlson, Lavery, and Witte (2011) found that higher achieving districts and lower poverty districts experienced greater student loss than lower achieving districts; transferring students moved to districts with comparatively higher achievement and spending than the districts they moved from. The racial composition of districts was not associated with patterns of student movement once other variables were accounted for. The authors suggested that most families participating in interdistrict choice were primarily concerned with indicators of school quality, such as test scores, but other factors (e.g., the demographic composition of school settings) also played an important role in families’ choices. However, transportation or the lack thereof may also have shaped these findings. In settings where families must provide their own transportation to take advantage of school choice programs and policies, poor families are less likely to participate than more affluent families because poor families have less access to transportation.
Mobility

Research on non-promotional student mobility indicates that there is substantial student movement between schools (e.g., Fong et al. 2010, U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2010). According to Garcia et al. (2010), 15% of Arizona elementary school students changed schools between the 2007-08 and 2008-09 academic years. Charter school students were more likely to change schools (23%) than students enrolled at traditional public schools (13%) (Garcia et al. 2010).

In general, student mobility rates vary by geographic locale and student demographics (Powers et al. 2012). Students in urban areas are more mobile than students in suburban or rural areas (U.S. General Accounting Office 1994; Rumberger 2003). Lower income, minority, special education, and English language learner students tend to have higher rates of mobility than their more advantaged peers (Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber 1996; Fong et al. 2010; Grigg 2012; Kerbow 1996; Kerbow, Azcoitia, and Buell 2003; Lleras and McKillips 2017; Parke and Kanyongo 2012; Rumberger 2003; Schafft 2006; U.S. GAO 2010; Wright 1999).

Some studies have examined the relationship between mobility and school and student achievement. In an early study, Bruno and Isken (1996) found that in the Los Angeles Unified School District the year-to-year mobility rate was negatively related to school achievement. More recently, Parke and Kanyongo (2012) analyzed mobility patterns in a large northeastern urban school district and found that there was a considerable achievement gap between mobile students and their more stable peers, and these gaps were similar across racial/ethnic groups. Scherrer’s (2012) analysis of data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS-K) indicated that students who changed schools between the third and fifth grades had lower reading achievement after controlling for race, student socioeconomic status, and school socioeconomic status (see also Lleras and McKillip 2017). Scherrer (2012) also analyzed the relationship between mobility, school socioeconomic status, and school achievement within a single school district to suggest that student mobility mediates the relationship between school socioeconomic status and school achievement.

As suggested above, some studies of school choice distinguish between different types of mobility and suggest active choice via switching schools to attend a charter school has a positive effect on student achievement (Hanushek et al. 2004), although other studies have produced conflicting findings. For example, Bifulco and Ladd (2007) found that students who left traditional public schools in North Carolina to attend charter schools had lower achievement in both math and reading than their peers who did not change schools and that these effects were particularly pronounced for African American students whose parents did not attend college. Likewise, compared to their peers who did not change schools, students who transferred from traditional public schools to charter schools or another traditional public school in Utah tended to have lower achievement, while students who transferred from a charter school to a traditional public school had higher achievement (Ni and Rorrer 2012). Grigg (2012) found that students in Nashville who changed schools between school years for reasons other than promotion had lower math and reading achievement than their stable peers, which suggests that school moves due to active choice may lower student performance, at least in the short term.

Finally, a limited number of mobility studies address the reasons for student movement. For example, Kerbow et al. (2003) found that students in Chicago moved schools due to residential changes (58%) or concerns about safety or academic opportunity (42%). Their findings also suggested that active choice accounted for a substantial portion of student movement. In contrast, Schafft’s (2006) case study of student mobility in a poor rural New...
York school district indicated that 29% of students entered or exited the district during the 2003-04 academic year, and these moves tended to be an outcome of family poverty and economic instability rather than active choice.

This study extends the literatures described above by examining patterns of movement between school districts and between school districts and charter schools simultaneously, which allows us to make comparisons across sectors and regions. This approach has allowed us to highlight an interesting and seldom studied pattern of student movement. Students moved from charter schools and into traditional school districts at roughly the same rates as students who left traditional school districts for charter schools. In addition, we also document much higher rates of student movement between school districts (at least some of which is attributable to active choice) compared to the rates of students who leave traditional public schools to attend charter schools.

Data and Methods
We analyzed statewide district-level transactional data (Carlson et al. 2011) obtained from the Arizona Department of Education’s Data Warehouse that tracked student enrollment for funding purposes. We also mapped mobility patterns in the three largest CBSAs in the state using ArcGIS to compare and contrast the differences within and across local markets; our maps allowed us to assess the geospatial relationships between the two forms of public school choice. Our data are comprised of district and charter school-level counts of elementary grade students who were eligible for enrollment in one of the districts’ schools at two time points (i.e., they did not “age out” of the grades offered by the district). In many Arizona communities, schools are organized into separate elementary and high school districts that essentially function as separate markets with different numbers of school districts within the public sector (Urquiola 2005). Therefore, we focused on districts and charter schools that served elementary grade students. There are only 27 high school districts in the state that span multiple elementary school districts and cross municipal boundaries. The large number of small elementary districts provides greater options for interdistrict mobility for elementary grade students than for high school students. For example, in central city Phoenix, 11 elementary districts feed into one high school district. In addition, many charter high schools target at-risk students, a market segment, so they are not competing for the general school population in the same way that most elementary-serving charter schools and districts are. Finally, focusing on elementary districts also facilitated mapping because the two types of districts cover the same geographic areas in some regions. The charter schools were largely clustered in city and suburban districts in the two major metropolitan areas in the state, Phoenix and Tucson, although several charter schools were in rural school districts.

Mobility Variables
For each school district and charter school, we had counts of: a) the students who remained enrolled in the same district or charter school between the end of the 2007-08 school year and the beginning of 2008-09 (stayers); b) the students who moved to any other district or charter school within the state (movers), listed by district or charter school; and, c) the racial demographics of stayers and movers. That is, our analysis focuses on elementary grade students who, once enrolled in a district or charter school, moved to another school at the beginning of the following school year. We refer to these students as eligible for re-enrollment in the sections that follow. Our student counts did not include students who moved out of the school district or charter school because of grade-level progression (e.g., non-promotional moves), students who moved out of state, or new students in 2008-09. We
matched this dataset to district-level variables in the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data (CCD) and aggregated the data to calculate the variables used in our analysis:

a) the percentage of students who were enrolled in the school district or charter school at the end of the 2007-08 school year who remained enrolled at the beginning of the 2008-09 school year (stayers);
b) the percentage of students who moved to another school district or charter school within the state at the beginning of 2008-09 (movers);
c) the percentage of movers who attended a school district with the same CBSA;
d) the percentage of movers who attended a charter school within the same CBSA;
e) the percentage of students entering the school district or charter school at the beginning of 2008-09 from any school district or charter school in the state (incomers);
f) the percentage of incomers who attended another school district within the same CBSA in 2007-2008, the previous academic year; and
g) the percentage of incomers who attended another charter school within the same CBSA in 2007-08.

We also calculated the percentage difference in reenrollment as the difference between the number of the district or charter school’s eligible re-enrollment students at the beginning of 2008-09 minus the re-enrollment sample at the end of 2007-08, divided by the re-enrollment sample in 2007-08.

Districts and charter schools without complete information on the sending or receiving districts/schools, or those that were missing information on the CBSA from the CCD were omitted from the dataset. This strategy excluded a handful of charter schools that closed. Our goal in this analysis was to assess movement between districts and charter schools that were open for business over the two-year period of the study, rather than forced moves due to school closures. While some of the school districts in our sample are small, we did not exclude them from the analysis because there is a wide range in school district size in Arizona. In 2008-09, 20% of all school districts in Arizona served 100 or fewer students, while 12% served 10,000 or more students.

Our final dataset contains almost the full population of elementary grade districts and approximately half of the charter schools in the state. While our data allow us to assess

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6 Categories c and d are subcategories of category b. Likewise, categories f and g are subcategories of category e. We used the CCD to identify district type (school district or charter school) and to match districts and charter schools to the CBSA. The denominators for categories a through d were the total of stayers plus movers, or all of the students in enrolled in elementary grades in each district at the end of 2007-08 who were eligible to re-enroll at the beginning of the following academic year (2008-09). The denominators for categories e through g were the total of stayers plus incomers. These counts are provided in Table 1 as Students End 2007-08 and Students Beg. 2008-09, respectively.

6 See also Carlson et al. (2011), which retained small districts in multivariate analyses.

7 Nineteen small elementary districts located outside of CBSAs were not included in the analysis. The majority (63%) of these served fewer than 100 students. Likewise, there were
movements between public school districts and charter schools, it underestimates student movement within the traditional public school sector because we cannot track intradistrict movement. Our data also do not allow us to address within-year mobility, which is a different although related phenomenon. Our goal in this analysis is to provide insights into why students and families, once enrolled in a district or charter school, leave that setting and enroll elsewhere. Likewise, while our data allow us to examine interdistrict and charter school mobility at one point in time, the patterns we document here may change as the number of charter schools expands and charter school enrollment increases.

**Demographic and Achievement Variables**

Our dataset also included counts of movers and stayers by race/ethnicity, which we used to calculate variables for the percentages of students attending the districts and charter schools in our sample that were eligible to re-enroll by race/ethnicity and the race/ethnicity of movers. These variables allow us to assess the possible impact of student mobility on district and charter school demographics. That is, do the patterns have the potential to increase racial segregation in districts and charter schools?

Once the dataset was constructed, we merged it with additional variables drawn from the CCD and state achievement data. Two additional demographic variables are drawn from the CCD: a) the percentage of students in the district or charter school who have an individual education plan (IEP); and b) the percentage of students eligible for free and reduced lunch.

For district and charter school achievement, we used the district-level Normal Curve Equivalent (NCE) on the state-administered Terra Nova tests in Reading, Language Arts, and Mathematics, which we averaged across all elementary grades tested. Because the 2007-08 scores were released after the 2008-09 school year began, we used the 2006-07 test results because it was the achievement data that was publicly available when families were making their schooling decisions for 2008-2009.

Our analysis proceeds as follows. After providing descriptive statistics for both sectors, we analyze the patterns of movement to and from school districts and to and from charter schools separately. We begin by analyzing each type of within-CBSA movement, using regression models. Next, we analyze how mobility flows work together by identifying high and low mobility districts. Our final analysis examines mobility within the three largest CBSAs in the state: Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Tucson, and Yuma.

**Results**

Our full sample contained 177 school districts and 233 charter schools. While the descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 highlight important differences between the two sectors, the sizable standard deviations on most variables indicate that there was considerable variation within each group. For example, while charter schools served far fewer elementary grade students than the school districts, there was also a wide range in district size (from four elementary grade students who were eligible to re-enroll to more than 32,000). The median eight unified school districts, all located outside of CBSAs, that served fewer than 13,000 students in total in 2010-11 that were not included in the analysis.

8 Charters operated by the same educational management organization (EMO) function as a district in the analysis and are treated as districts in the CCD and the state achievement data. Our sample contained 233 of the 281 elementary-serving charter schools that were open during both years of the study. The loss in cases is due in part because the charter schools were treated as districts when the data was aggregated.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>School Districts</th>
<th>Charter Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=177) Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>(n=233) Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students End 2007-08 (#)</td>
<td>2598 (4809)</td>
<td>187 (240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Movers (#)</td>
<td>207 (324)</td>
<td>35 (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students Beg. 2008-09 (#)</td>
<td>2590 (4781)</td>
<td>190 (239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Incoming (#)</td>
<td>196 (324)</td>
<td>39 (66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage difference</td>
<td>-.85 (6.41)</td>
<td>13.13 (107.47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobility Variables**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movers (%)</td>
<td>9.25 (6.12)</td>
<td>21.69 (11.91)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movers to Local School Districts</td>
<td>53.54 (29.08)</td>
<td>66.06 (22.54)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incoming (%)</td>
<td>8.40 (4.32)</td>
<td>22.75 (16.39)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incoming from Local School Districts</td>
<td>55.58 (30.45)</td>
<td>67.22 (24.48)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incoming from Local Charter Schools</td>
<td>9.66 (10.62)</td>
<td>20.03 (19.21)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Demographic and Achievement Variables**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End of 2007-08 (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>46.14 (29.32)</td>
<td>55.37 (28.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>39.72 (28.45)</td>
<td>28.65 (25.72)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>2.90 (3.72)</td>
<td>6.81 (7.92)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>9.81 (23.53)</td>
<td>6.07 (17.39)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>1.43 (1.79)</td>
<td>3.10 (3.82)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movers (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>47.84 (30.36)</td>
<td>53.52 (29.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>33.47 (27.32)</td>
<td>28.39 (26.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>3.96 (5.80)</td>
<td>7.67 (11.48)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>11.61 (24.50)</td>
<td>6.25 (17.33)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>1.43 (2.82)</td>
<td>3.30 (6.89)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP (%)</td>
<td>12.83 (5.49)</td>
<td>9.31 (7.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP missing (%)</td>
<td>.02 (.15)</td>
<td>.06 (.24)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRL students (%)</td>
<td>55.26 (24.95)</td>
<td>47.10 (28.30)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRL students missing</td>
<td>.12 (.33)</td>
<td>.30 (.46)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Reading</td>
<td>49.32 (7.13)</td>
<td>51.79 (10.52)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Language Arts</td>
<td>48.97 (6.72)</td>
<td>51.87 (10.73)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Mathematics</td>
<td>49.72 (7.35)</td>
<td>51.34 (11.21)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement Missing</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locale</td>
<td>N (%)</td>
<td>N (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>26 (15)</td>
<td>132 (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb</td>
<td>12 (7)</td>
<td>41 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>33 (19)</td>
<td>20 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>106 (60)</td>
<td>40 (17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
district served approximately 600 elementary grade students.

We began by examining general mobility patterns by sector before distinguishing between movement to and from charter schools, which is clearly active choice, and other types of mobility. We used t-tests to assess the statistical significance of the between-sector differences in means we observed. Our initial analysis indicated that, on average, 9% of the students attending local school districts and 22% of students attending charter schools enrolled in a new district or charter school between the end of the 2007-08 and the beginning of the 2008-09 academic year. The percentage of students entering each sector roughly mirrored these figures (Table 1). In general, school districts and charter schools with high rates of movers (out-migration) also had relatively high percentages of incoming students (in-migration). The correlation between the percentage of students moving out of districts or charter schools and the percentage of incoming students was .58 (n = 410, p < .001). The sample of charter schools had, on average, much higher rates of both in- and out-migration than the school districts.

When we disaggregated the overall mobility rates to examine how much student movement occurred within the CBSA and by destination, it was clear that interdistrict mobility in Arizona is substantial. Even though charter schools have higher rates of mobility overall, because they are a much smaller sector of local public school “markets,” there are many more students moving between school districts than between charter schools. These figures also indicate that interdistrict mobility in Arizona was higher than in Colorado and Minnesota over the same period (Carlson et al. 2011). In addition, the percentage of students who entered charter schools from local school districts was similar to the percentage of students who exited charter schools for local school districts, which suggested a two-way pattern of student movement (Powers et al. 2012). On average, about two-thirds of the students leaving school districts moved within the CBSA (54% to another district and 13% to a charter school), compared to 87% of charter school students. A majority (66%) of students leaving charter schools moved to school districts within the CBSA, while 21% moved to local charter schools. The state averages for incoming students roughly mirrored those of movers in each sector. These figures suggest that a substantial portion of charter school mobility is due to active choice, and one important type of active choice is enrollment in a school district after attending a charter school.

The 177 school districts in our sample served a lower percentage of White, African American, and Asian students and a higher percentage of Hispanic and American Indian students than the charter schools. Many of the differences in demographic composition were statistically significant. The racial demographics of the students who left our school districts were similar to the demographics of the school districts, as were the demographics of incoming students (not shown). As a result, the racial demographics of the elementary grade students enrolled in either sector changed very little from the end of 2007-08 to the beginning of 2008-09. School districts also served higher percentages of students with Individual Education Plans (IEPs) and students eligible for free and reduced lunch, and the cross-sector differences were statistically significant. However, a substantial number of districts (12%) and charter schools (30%) were missing information on the latter.

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9 Our main variables of interest account for district or charter school size because they are the number of movers or incoming students by sector, divided by the total number of elementary students eligible to re-enroll. There were no substantial differences in the correlations when the sample was divided by sector.
Student achievement in the charter schools was marginally higher than achievement in the school districts across all subjects, and t-tests indicated that the differences in achievement were statistically significant. Most of the charter schools (75%) were located in cities and suburbs, while more than half of the school districts were in rural areas. In the analysis that follows, we begin with a more detailed analysis of mobility to and from school districts, followed by our analysis of charter schools.

**School Districts**

We used a subset of the variables shown in Table 1 to predict the characteristics associated with each type of mobility using ordinary least squares regression (OLS). The variables in the models predicting the percentage of movers (columns 1 and 2) were the characteristics of the districts students were moving from, while the variables in the models for percentage of incoming students were the characteristics of the districts students were moving to. Because we were missing information on the variables for the percentage of students with an IEP and achievement, our final model is based on a reduced sample of 161 school districts. However, t-tests indicated that there were no differences between the full sample and the regression sample (descriptive statistics for the regression sample are available from the authors by request).\(^\text{10}\) Percentage White students is the omitted variable. Because districts varied considerably in the percentage of movers or incoming students and size (see Table 1), we also included these variables in the model. For the latter, we used the number of eligible students who could re-enroll in an elementary grade (Students End 2007-08) as a proxy for district size. We also included the indicator variables for locale; city is the omitted comparison category.

Larger districts had more incoming students from charter schools, which is likely because larger districts are more likely to have a greater number of charter schools within or near their boundaries. Student demographic variables were associated with some, but not all, forms of student movement to and from school districts. For example, school districts with higher percentages of Hispanic students were more likely to have higher rates of movement to and from local school districts, which may reflect the high rates of mobility among these groups. Districts with higher percentages of Hispanic students also had lower rates of mobility to charter schools. The results for the percentages of African American, American Indian, and Asian American students were less consistent across the models, which is likely because these are relatively small groups compared to Hispanic and White students. All else held equal, the percentage of students with IEPs was negatively associated with movement to charter schools. This may be because families receiving special education services in a school district are less likely to be attracted to charter schools, which tend to have less capacity to provide such services. Charter schools could also discourage families whose children have disabilities from enrolling (Zetino 2017). IEP services may also be a pull factor that encourages families to remain enrolled in a school district.

Districts with lower student achievement had higher rates of movement to charter schools, which is not surprising. Yet districts with higher achievement had higher rates of student movement to other school districts. This finding is inconsistent with the theory underlying school choice reforms; we would expect that students would be more likely to remain enrolled in higher performing districts. Our models could also reflect two different

---
\(^{10}\) We did not include percentage of free and reduced lunch students in the final model because it would have resulted in a substantial loss of cases for both districts and charter schools.
dimensions of student mobility: a) reactive mobility between small districts serving high percentages of poor and minority students, and b) active choice of students within higher achieving districts who seek to move to districts with higher achievement than the districts they initially enrolled in (Carlson et al., 2011). However, the achievement of the receiving district was not a significant predictor of student movement into school districts from other districts or from charter schools. Interdistrict choice – which may or may not be a form of active choice – was the dominant form of school choice overall and the main form of student movement in districts with high percentages of underrepresented minority students. In addition, there were no clear patterns between student movement and student achievement. Finally, districts located in towns had less movement to and from school districts, which could reflect their relative isolation compared to urban districts.

Table 2 Regression Analyses Predicting Mobility from and to School Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Movers to Local School Districts (%)</th>
<th>Movers to Local Charter Schools (%)</th>
<th>Incoming from Local School Districts (%)</th>
<th>Incoming from Local Charter Schools (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-28.89 (28.09)</td>
<td>84.98*** (14.63)</td>
<td>37.21 (28.35)</td>
<td>13.85 (11.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movers (%)</td>
<td>1.83*** (.45)</td>
<td>-.13 (.24)</td>
<td>.29 (.52)</td>
<td>.32 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incoming (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Students End 2007-08 (.0004 (.01))</td>
<td>Hispanic (.48*** (.10))** (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students End 2007-08</td>
<td>.0004 (.001)</td>
<td>.0004 (0.0)</td>
<td>-.0000 (0.0)</td>
<td>-.29*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.48*** (.10)</td>
<td>-.29*** (.38)**</td>
<td>.34*** (.70)</td>
<td>- .04 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>.85 (.72)</td>
<td>.05 (.38)</td>
<td>2.09** (.70)</td>
<td>-.26 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>.21 (.12)</td>
<td>-.29*** (.06)</td>
<td>.02 (.12)</td>
<td>-.003 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>.95 (1.61)</td>
<td>1.00 (.84)</td>
<td>1.45 (1.57)</td>
<td>1.37* (.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP</td>
<td>-.17 (.48)</td>
<td>-.50* (.25)</td>
<td>-.70 (0.48)</td>
<td>-.04 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Mathematics</td>
<td>.83* (.42)</td>
<td>-1.03*** (.22)</td>
<td>.16 (.42)</td>
<td>-.08 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb</td>
<td>6.25 (8.40)</td>
<td>-1.35 (4.38)</td>
<td>5.16 (8.47)</td>
<td>-3.04 (3.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>-16.46* (7.25)</td>
<td>2.83 (3.77)</td>
<td>-18.10* (7.30)</td>
<td>-.13 (3.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-3.18 (6.66)</td>
<td>-3.22 (4.47)</td>
<td>-3.43 (6.72)</td>
<td>-2.79 (2.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (n=161)</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p< .10. *p< .05. **p< .01 ***p< .001

While the regression analyses provide insights into the factors that, on average, have
the strongest relationships with the different types of mobility we identified, we were also interested in understanding the joint effect of student inflow and outflow on districts and charter schools. That is, were some districts and charter schools experiencing high rates of loss via students leaving without similar rates of student inflow or vice versa? In our initial analysis, we found that in general, within the 27 city and suburban districts in metropolitan Phoenix, districts with high percentages of movers also had high rates of incoming students (Powers et al. 2012). To determine if this pattern held with the statewide sample, we identified the districts that were in the lowest and highest quartiles for movement in and out of the district and cross-classified them, as shown in Table 3. Table 4 provides the characteristics of each group of schools.

Table 3 Cross-Classification of Districts by Mobility Quartiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Districts</th>
<th>Low % Movers</th>
<th>High % Movers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low % Incoming</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High % Incoming</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just over half of the districts (25) that had the highest percentages of exiting students were also among the districts with the highest percentages of entering students, which we describe as high mobility districts. Similarly, half of the districts with the lowest percentages of exiting students also were among the districts with the lowest percentages of exiting students (low mobility districts). Few districts had very high rates of out-migration and low rates of in-migration or vice versa. Nine of the high mobility districts were small districts with fewer than 100 students in the sample; in only three of these, a handful of students moved to a charter school within the CBSA. Most of the high mobility districts (80%) were rural districts, so the demographic characteristics of this group closely matched the profile of the rural districts in the sample, which were smaller and served higher percentages of White students than the full sample of districts. On average, 80% of the exiting students in high mobility districts enrolled in another district or charter school within the CBSA, although there was a substantial amount of variation within the group.

In contrast, only three of the low mobility districts served fewer than 100 students, and two of these were extremely small districts with less than 10 students. Fifty-four percent of the students who left these districts moved to other districts or charter schools within the CBSA, which suggests that almost half of the students who moved left the local area. Low mobility districts also served a substantially higher percentage of American Indian students than the average for school districts, which indicates that many of these districts are located in or near reservations. On average, high and low mobility districts served a higher percentage of students with IEPs than the full sample of schools, but the percentage of students with IEPs in low mobility districts was more than twice the average of the full sample (see Table 1), which suggests that special education services may be an important factor keeping families enrolled in school districts. Conversely, on average, high mobility districts served lower percentages of students receiving free and reduced lunch than the full sample, while low mobility districts served higher percentages of free and reduced lunch students.

Although low mobility and high mobility districts did not differ substantially in 11 Descriptive statistics for rural districts available on request.

- 70 -
Table 4 Districts by Mobility Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Mobility (n=25)</th>
<th>Low Mobility (n=22)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students End 2007-08 (#)</strong></td>
<td>1110 (1323)</td>
<td>1983 (3185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Movers (#)</strong></td>
<td>152 (179)</td>
<td>88 (171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students Beg. 2008-09 (#)</strong></td>
<td>1113 (1334)</td>
<td>1985 (3187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Incoming (#)</strong></td>
<td>155 (186)</td>
<td>91 (174)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobility Variables**

- **Movers (%)**: 18.08 (26.06) for High Mobility, 3.51 (1.53) for Low Mobility
- **Movers to Local School Districts**: 66.40 (26.07) for High Mobility, 38.26 (30.22) for Low Mobility
- **Movers to Local Charter Schools**: 13.82 (17.97) for High Mobility, 16.04 (22.56) for Low Mobility
- **Incoming (%)**: 14.24 (3.51) for High Mobility, 3.50 (1.65) for Low Mobility
- **Incoming from Local School Districts**: 69.42 (30.38) for High Mobility, 37.99 (32.66) for Low Mobility
- **Incoming from Local Charter Schools**: 8.26 (10.60) for High Mobility, 8.45 (11.09) for Low Mobility

**Demographic and Achievement Variables**

**End of 2007-08 (%)**

- **White**: 49.36 (33.16) for High Mobility, 41.46 (37.34) for Low Mobility
- **Hispanic**: 5.41 (5.78) for High Mobility, .76 (1.03) for Low Mobility
- **African American**: 41.30 (28.17) for High Mobility, 45.56 (41.30) for Low Mobility
- **American Indian**: 2.22 (2.70) for High Mobility, 11.45 (25.44) for Low Mobility
- **Asian American**: 1.72 (1.75) for High Mobility, .75 (.95) for Low Mobility

**Movers (%)**

- **White**: 54.04 (35.28) for High Mobility, 36.11 (35.49) for Low Mobility
- **Hispanic**: 6.62 (8.81) for High Mobility, .76 (2.00) for Low Mobility
- **African American**: 34.83 (27.81) for High Mobility, 36.90 (38.82) for Low Mobility
- **American Indian**: 3.12 (4.48) for High Mobility, 16.25 (29.38) for Low Mobility
- **Asian American**: 1.40 (2.18) for High Mobility, .88 (1.56) for Low Mobility

**IEP (%)**

- 14.03 (8.40) for High Mobility, 26.48 (21.18) for Low Mobility

**FRL students (%)**

- 51.76 (24.25) for High Mobility, 59.36 (25.93) for Low Mobility

**Mean NCE Reading**

- 47.93 (6.82) for High Mobility, 47.19 (6.56) for Low Mobility

**Mean NCE Language Arts**

- 47.04 (4.77) for High Mobility, 47.56 (6.05) for Low Mobility

**Mean NCE Mathematics**

- 48.23 (5.66) for High Mobility, 47.74 (6.52) for Low Mobility

**Achievement Missing**

- .24 for High Mobility, .09 for Low Mobility

**Locale**

- **City**: 2 (8) for High Mobility, 3 (14) for Low Mobility
- **Suburb**: 1 (4) for High Mobility, 0 for Low Mobility
- **Town**: 2 (8) for High Mobility, 10 (45) for Low Mobility
- **Rural**: 20 (80) for High Mobility, 9 (41) for Low Mobility
average achievement, both were slightly below the state average. In general, student mobility to and from school districts was only weakly related to district achievement. If student mobility to and from districts was driven by district achievement, then we would expect the highest achieving districts to have the highest percentages of in-migration and the lowest percentages of out-migration, but this was not the case. For example, only 10 of the districts in the highest quartile for mathematics achievement were also among the districts with the highest percentage of incoming students. Finally, except for two small districts with fewer than 50 students in the sample, the demographics of the highest mobility districts did not change substantially from 2007-08 to 2008-09. In these districts, the movement of 10 students made a substantial difference (changes of five percentage points or more) in the distribution of students by race.

**Charter Schools**

In Table 5 we repeat the regression analyses we conducted on the school district sample with the charter school sample. As in the analyses shown in Table 2, the variables in the models predicting the percentage of movers (columns 1 and 2) were the characteristics of the charter schools the students were moving from, while the variables in the models for percentage of incoming students were the characteristics of the charter school students were moving to. Because we were missing information on the variables for the percent of students with an IEP and achievement, our final model is based on a reduced sample of 198 charter schools. As with the district sample, t-tests indicated that there were no differences between the full sample and the regression sample (descriptive statistics for the regression sample are available from the authors by request). In contrast to the school district models, the variables for percentage of movers and percentage of incoming students were statistically significant and mirrored each other, indicating that, in general, students from charter schools with higher percentages of movers were moving to other charter schools. Likewise, charter schools with higher percentages of incoming students had higher percentages of students coming into the schools from other charter schools rather than school districts. As the percentage of Asian American students in a charter school increased, the percentage of students moving to another charter school increased, although this finding is difficult to assess given the relatively small percentages of Asian American students enrolled in Arizona’s school districts and charter schools.

The statistically significant coefficients for achievement could reflect the location of charter schools. Charter schools with higher percentages of incoming students from school districts tend to be located within or near the boundaries of lower achieving school districts, which is reflected by the negative coefficient for achievement and vice versa. Charter schools with higher percentages of incoming students from local charter schools tend to be located in or near districts with higher achievement. The positive coefficient for movement to school districts and the negative coefficients for movement to and from charter schools for charter schools located in towns and rural areas likely reflects the limited numbers of charter schools

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12 This pattern held when we looked at district achievement for the districts with the highest percentage of movers. Average mathematics achievement for these 37 districts was less than two percentage points lower than the remaining 125 districts (achievement data was not available for 15 districts).

13 For example, 54% of the students leaving high mobility districts were White, as were 57% of the students moving into the district. As a result, the demographics of eligible movers in this group of districts were virtually the same over the two time points we analyzed.
in these areas. Finally, the $R^2$ was relatively low for all models. Comparing across the regression models for school districts and charter schools suggests that there were different processes underlying student movement between districts compared to student movement between districts and charter schools.

As with the analysis of school districts presented above, we cross-classified the charter schools that were in the highest and lowest mobility quartiles. The patterns of mobility for charter schools mirrored those of the school districts. Forty-three percent of the charter schools that had the highest rates of out-migration also had the highest rates of in-migration.

Table 5 Regression Analyses Predicting Mobility from and to Charter Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Movers to Local School Districts (%)</th>
<th>Movers to Local Charter Schools (%)</th>
<th>Incoming from Local School Districts (%)</th>
<th>Incoming from Local Charter Schools (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>92.89*** (7.36)</td>
<td>14.14 (14.14)</td>
<td>117.89*** (18.22)</td>
<td>-5.17 (13.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movers (%)</td>
<td>-.38* (.15)</td>
<td>.22+ (.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incoming (%)</td>
<td>.37** (.13)</td>
<td>.32*** (.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students End 2007-8</td>
<td>-.004 (.01)</td>
<td>-.005 (.01)</td>
<td>.0002 (.01)</td>
<td>-.002 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.01 (.08)</td>
<td>-.04 (.06)</td>
<td>-.05 (.09)</td>
<td>-.08 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>.27 (.21)</td>
<td>-.09 (.17)</td>
<td>.08 (.23)</td>
<td>.13 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>-.014 (.11)</td>
<td>.07 (.09)</td>
<td>-.009 (.12)</td>
<td>.06 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>-.83+ (.44)</td>
<td>.81* (.36)</td>
<td>-.68 (.48)</td>
<td>.47 (.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP</td>
<td>-.14 (.32)</td>
<td>-.09 (.26)</td>
<td>-.51 (.36)</td>
<td>-.20 (.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Mathematics</td>
<td>-.32 (.23)</td>
<td>.12 (.19)</td>
<td>-.64* (.25)</td>
<td>.44** (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suburb</td>
<td>4.44 (.380)</td>
<td>-.07 (.310)</td>
<td>1.28 (.42)</td>
<td>1.79 (.313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>town</td>
<td>-1.90 (.51)</td>
<td>-11.27* (.432)</td>
<td>-3.29 (.591)</td>
<td>-8.65* (.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>8.76* (.445)</td>
<td>-15.04*** (.362)</td>
<td>-8.4 (.490)</td>
<td>-5.53 (.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ (n=198)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likewise, half of the charter schools with the lowest rates of out-migration also had the lowest rates of in-migration. High mobility charter schools ranged from some extremely small schools (two enrolled fewer than 10 elementary school students who were eligible to re-enroll at the end of 2007-08) to the largest charter school in the sample, which served over 2,200 elementary school students in 2007-08. Low mobility charter schools ranged in size from one rural charter school that enrolled 10 elementary school students to another rural charter school with more than 1,500 students. In general, the rural charter schools had the lowest mobility rates, which could reflect the limited education markets in those areas. Most of the high mobility charter schools were located in urban areas, although five of the 25 (20%) were
located in rural areas.

### Table 6 Cross-Classification of Charter Schools by Mobility Quartiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charter Schools</th>
<th>Low % Movers</th>
<th>High % Movers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low % Incoming</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High % Incoming</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7 Charter Schools by Mobility Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Mobility (n=25) Mean (S.D.)</th>
<th>Low Mobility (n=30) Mean (S.D.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Students End 2007-08</td>
<td>165 (446)</td>
<td>371 (350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Students Beg. 2008-09</td>
<td>180 (463)</td>
<td>361 (339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Movers</td>
<td>41.66 (11.65)</td>
<td>8.01 (3.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Moving to Local School Districts</td>
<td>55.31 (26.10)</td>
<td>66.19 (25.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Moving to Local Charter Schools</td>
<td>19.53 (17.28)</td>
<td>18.36 (19.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Incoming</td>
<td>45.15 (13.58)</td>
<td>6.15 (2.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Incoming from Local School Districts</td>
<td>61.13 (26.26)</td>
<td>67.24 (28.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Incoming from Local Charter Schools</td>
<td>18.12 (19.11)</td>
<td>20.80 (21.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of 2007-08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% White</td>
<td>54.40 (26.10)</td>
<td>66.10 (30.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% African American</td>
<td>8.40 (7.54)</td>
<td>2.94 (3.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic</td>
<td>25.95 (21.70)</td>
<td>18.65 (24.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% American Indian</td>
<td>8.14 (12.20)</td>
<td>7.85 (24.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Asian American</td>
<td>3.11 (3.75)</td>
<td>4.46 (5.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% White</td>
<td>54.30 (26.92)</td>
<td>64.42 (33.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% African American</td>
<td>7.49 (9.20)</td>
<td>2.64 (4.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic</td>
<td>23.20 (21.82)</td>
<td>18.38 (23.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% American Indian</td>
<td>12.57 (18.32)</td>
<td>5.87 (20.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Asian American</td>
<td>2.44 (5.04)</td>
<td>5.36 (10.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP (%)</td>
<td>12.19 (7.70)</td>
<td>13.13 (20.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP missing</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRL students (%)</td>
<td>54.76 (27.37)</td>
<td>31.94 (31.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRL students missing</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Reading</td>
<td>45.23 (7.73)</td>
<td>58.13 (10.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Language Arts</td>
<td>45.96 (8.29)</td>
<td>57.78 (10.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Mathematics</td>
<td>42.02 (7.75)</td>
<td>58.53 (11.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement Missing</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locale</td>
<td>N (%)</td>
<td>N (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>16 (64)</td>
<td>11 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb</td>
<td>2 (8)</td>
<td>7 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>2 (8)</td>
<td>4 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>5 (20)</td>
<td>8 (27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Compared to low mobility charter schools, high mobility charter schools served lower percentages of White and Asian American students and higher percentages of African American and Hispanic students. Both high and low mobility charter schools served higher percentages of students with IEPs than the full sample of charter schools; however, high mobility schools served substantially higher percentages of students who were eligible for free and reduced lunch than the full sample and low mobility schools, which may be a function of locale as a majority of the high mobility schools were located in urban areas.

High mobility charter schools also had lower achievement than the full sample of charter schools and substantially lower achievement than low mobility charter schools (between 12 and 17 percentage points, depending on the subject). This pattern is consistent with what we might expect if families are choosing schools based on student achievement. Yet fewer than half (39%) of the charter schools in the lowest quartile for achievement were among the schools with the highest rates of outgoing students. Likewise, only 12% of the lowest achieving charter schools were among the schools with the lowest rates of incoming students, which suggests that families’ choices of charter schools are not primarily driven by quality as measured by student achievement. Because many of the high mobility charter schools were small (19 of the 25 served 100 or fewer elementary students), the movement of a few students could substantially change the demographics of a school or group of schools from one year to the next. That said, as a group, the only major change in demographics was that the highest mobility charter schools served approximately four percent fewer White students and the percentage of Hispanic students they served increased by approximately the same amount.

Table 8 Descriptive Statistics by CBSA and Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale</th>
<th>Tucson</th>
<th>Yuma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Districts (N=64)</td>
<td>Districts (N=14)</td>
<td>Districts (N=8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Movers</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Moving to Local School Districts</td>
<td>9.86 (4.49)</td>
<td>14.46 (7.56)</td>
<td>7.74 (5.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Moving to Local Charter Schools</td>
<td>15.25 (11.22)</td>
<td>15.96 (13.36)</td>
<td>14.27 (10.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Incoming</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% In coming From Local School Districts</td>
<td>7.51 (17.92)</td>
<td>80.49 (28.25)</td>
<td>79.19 (19.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% In coming From Local Charter Schools</td>
<td>12.52 (9.49)</td>
<td>14.87 (8.16)</td>
<td>4.99 (5.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Students End 2007-08</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Students Beg. 2008-09</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRL students (%)</td>
<td>N (%):</td>
<td>N (%):</td>
<td>N (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP (%)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Reading</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Language Arts</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean NCE Mathematics</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement missing</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
<td>Mean (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CBSA Analysis
Our final analysis compared district mobility and charter school mobility within and across the three CBSAs where the largest numbers of students in the state reside: Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Tucson, and Yuma. These three CBSAs served 86% of the students attending traditional public schools in Arizona. We provide descriptive statistics for the school districts and charter schools within the CBSA. We also created maps of the CBSAs showing the districts and charter schools in our samples using ArcGIS. The maps depict the districts and charter schools within each CBSA; the districts are shaded based on the average of percent movers and percent incoming. This analysis allowed us to better understand and compare the spatial dimensions of three very different educational markets, and visually represent the relationship between charter school location and interdistrict mobility (Lubien ski and Lee, 2017) in a way that cannot be captured in a table of descriptive statistics. However, the descriptive statistics also helped us interpret some of the patterns we identified using the maps.

Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale. In the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale CBSA, there are 64 districts that range from small rural districts serving fewer than 100 students, small central city elementary districts that serve between 1,200 and 20,000 students and large unified districts serving 25,000 students or more. There are 11 small elementary districts in the central city area that feed into a single high school district. Four other elementary districts classified by the U.S. Census Bureau as city districts send students to high school districts with attendance boundaries that cross the Phoenix city limits. The five remaining city districts located north and east of the central city area are larger unified districts. Figure 1 illustrates how charter schools in the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale CBSA are fairly evenly distributed across the central city area and within the largest district in the CBSA, the Mesa Unified School District. The map also highlights how there are relatively few charter schools in some of the districts with the highest mobility shown in blue, as well as a substantial number of charter schools distributed across the lowest mobility districts, which are shown in yellow.

To provide a snapshot of the range of student movement patterns within the CBSA, we compared movement patterns to and from the 15 elementary districts with those of the three unified districts that are classified as large city districts in the CCD. The two groups of districts had very different demographic profiles. In Arizona’s public schools, the two largest demographic groups are Whites and Hispanics. The 15 elementary districts were predominantly Hispanic in 2007-08 (69% on average), while the unified districts were majority White (71%). Likewise, the elementary school districts served a much higher percentage of free and reduced lunch students (70%) than the unified districts (25%). On average, 11% of the students attending schools in the central city elementary districts in 2007-08 moved to other districts or charter schools at the beginning of 2008-09. Virtually all of these students moved within the CBSA; most (82%) moved to other districts and another 13% moved to charter schools. The figures for incoming students to the districts were roughly the same although the average rate of incoming students from charter schools was slightly lower (11%). The unified districts had lower overall rates of movement out of the districts (five percent on average) and while 92% of the movers went to districts or charter schools within the CBSA, they moved to charter schools at a much higher rate (22%). As with the elementary districts, the figures for incoming students mirrored those of the outgoing

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14 The scale of the mobility variable on the three maps is different because district mobility varied across the three CBSAs.
students. Overall, these patterns indicate that the unified districts in the Phoenix metropolitan area tended to serve more advantaged students who are more likely to engage in active choice.

While we found similar differences between the elementary and unified districts in the much smaller (seven in total) group of suburban districts in the CBSA, within the rural districts there did not seem to be a clear difference between the movement patterns of elementary and unified districts. On average, the rates of movement in and out of the rural districts were similar to the city elementary districts (10% and 11%, respectively), although comparatively fewer (85%) of the students attending rural districts moved within the CBSA. Both rural and suburban districts were more diverse than their central city counterparts. While the percentage of Hispanic students was slightly higher than the percentage of White students in both groups of districts, neither group was a majority. Except for rural charter schools, which had lower average rates of out-migration (17%) and higher rates of in-migration (25%) than all charter schools in the CBSA, we did not find any clear differences in the mobility patterns across groups of charter schools when we divided them by locale.\footnote{The pattern was the reverse for the three charter schools located in areas classified as towns by the U.S. Census Bureau, but it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from such a small group of schools.}

**Figure 1 Phoenix CBSA School Districts by Average Mobility and Charter Schools**

**Tucson.** Most of the charter schools in the Tucson CBSA are located within the Tucson Unified School District (TUSD). There are smaller numbers of charter schools within the unified school districts that adjoin TUSD: Sunnyside, Flowing Wells, and Amphitheater (see Figure 2). TUSD, Sunnyside and Amphitheater served the largest numbers of students in the...
CBSA. While it did not have the highest percentage of students leaving the district, 32% of the students who left TUSD at the end of 2007-08 attended charter schools within the CBSA in 2008-09. While TUSD’s rate of incoming students was slightly lower than the rate of outgoing students, close to the same share (28%) of those incoming students left charter schools to attend traditional public schools in TUSD. Not surprisingly, given the number of charter schools within and near its borders, TUSD had the highest rates of charter school in-migration and out-migration within the CBSA. The mobility patterns for the surrounding districts were similar but not as extreme – relatively high rates of out-migration to charter schools and similar rates of in-migration from charter schools.

Unlike the Yuma and Phoenix CBSAs, on average the districts in the Tucson CBSA served approximately the same percentages of White and Hispanic students as the charter schools. The school districts in the Tucson CBSA served a substantially higher percentage of American Indian students than the charter schools. One of the state’s largest American Indian reservations is located within the Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified School District, a rural district that is geographically distant from the urban center where charter schools are concentrated (see Figure 2). In 2007-08, 97% of the students eligible to re-enroll in Indian Oasis were American Indian. Finally, also unlike Yuma and Phoenix, average student achievement was approximately the same in the districts and charter schools within the Tucson CBSA, although the higher standard deviation for the charter schools indicates that there was greater variation in achievement within the charter schools in the CBSA than there was across the school districts.

Figure 2 Tucson CBSA School Districts by Average Mobility and Charter Schools

Because there were a substantial number of districts and charter schools missing information on the percentage of free and reduced lunch students served, it is difficult to draw clear cross-sector comparisons on that variable.
Of the three CBSAs, the Yuma school districts and charter schools had the lowest mobility rates. While the charter schools appear to have a high rate of incoming students, given that they served 5% of the elementary students in the sample in 2007-08, the number of students moving to charter schools is small. Within the Yuma CBSA, the three districts with the highest average mobility (shown in blue in Figure 3) were also the districts with the highest percentage of students leaving the districts (movers) and did not have any students leave for charter schools or enter the district from charter schools. This is likely because they were geographically distant from the charter schools in the CBSA. Because these were among the smallest districts in the CBSA in terms of enrollment, the numbers of students leaving and entering the districts was low. In the four largest districts in the CBSA, between 11% and 24% of their movers left to attend charter schools. However, between five and 16% of their incoming students entered from charter schools. These districts adjoin one other in the Southwest corner of the state. As Figure 3 highlights, the three charter schools in the sample are clustered within two miles of one another in the Yuma Elementary District near the border of the Crane Elementary District, and within 10 miles of the other two districts’ borders. Finally, the demographics of the two sectors varied considerably. While only 17% of the students attending public schools in the school district were Hispanic, 35% of the charter school students were White. Likewise, the three charter schools served a substantially lower percentage of free and reduced price lunch students (64% on average) than the school districts (79%).

In all three CBSAs, charter schools served a higher percentage of African American students than the school districts although their overall representation in the sample was low. In both Yuma and Phoenix, the charter schools served a substantially higher percentage of White students and a substantially lower percentage of Hispanic students, which may be an outcome
of White flight to charter schools in these education markets. As in our previous analyses, the demographics of eligible re-enrollees in these school districts and charter schools changed very little from 2007-08 to 2008-09.

Discussion

While most analyses tend to focus on the effects of a single school choice policy such as student movement from traditional public schools to charter schools, we assessed how students move between different sectors of the public school market in Arizona, a state with long-standing public school choice policies. By analyzing interdistrict and charter school mobility simultaneously, we provide a more nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of public school choice. Not only do patterns of student movement to and from charter schools differ from movement between school districts, but public school choice policies also affect districts in varied, yet systematic ways. That said, the use of enrollment data provides only suggestive insights into the motivations behind these enrollment decisions – namely, whether the mobility patterns explored above were the result of active or reactive school choice.

Our basic finding across these analyses is that even in a state with a well-established charter school movement, most student movement is interdistrict mobility or movement between school districts. Given that the charter school sector in Arizona is small relative to the traditional public school sector and charter schools are not evenly distributed across the state, this is not surprising. Although proportionally, charter schools tend to have higher rates of students leaving or entering schools than school districts, in absolute terms, these are relatively small numbers of students. The average charter school received 24 elementary school students at the beginning of the 2008-09 academic year from school districts within the CBSA and eight students from local charter schools. In contrast, on average 179 elementary school students left school districts for other districts or charter schools within the CBSA: 142 to school districts and 37 to charter schools. In both cases, the figures for incoming students mirror those of outgoing students. Thus, the type of public school choice that is the most well-known and receives the most attention from policymakers is not the dominant form of school choice in Arizona. In most districts, over half of exiting and entering students move within the CBSA. This suggests that, to the extent they are competing for student enrollment, school districts are largely competing with other school districts rather than charter schools. In Arizona, interdistrict mobility has played a greater role in creating and sustaining the “educational market” than charter schools. Because students may move between school districts within a CBSA because of household changes that prompt a school move, we cannot definitively attribute this form of student movement to active choice.

While in some districts a substantial percentage of students leave to attend charter schools, students are also leaving charter schools to attend traditional public schools at roughly similar rates. That is, mobility between charter schools and school districts is two-way. While charters schools may attract students away from traditional public school districts when they are initially enrolling in schools, in general, charter school students are a mobile group and most students who leave charter schools enroll in school districts. Yet in absolute terms this is a small number of students. Although there is considerable variation in student mobility between districts and charter schools, overall these patterns of student movement did not alter what are by now well-established patterns of stratification within and across each sector.

Our regression analyses, which assessed the relationships between school characteristics and the different types of student movement, suggest that demographic
characteristics and student achievement are more strongly related to movement to and from school districts than charter schools. Our findings suggest that student mobility in school districts serving large percentages of minority students is likely motivated by reactive mobility rather than active choice. Conversely, special education services may be a pull factor that encourages families to remain enrolled in school districts.

The cross-classification of schools by degree of mobility further illuminates the patterns we identified in our regression analyses, and specifically, the finding that in both sectors, mobility tends to be two-way rather than a pattern that suggests competition (Powers et al., 2012). Some of the differences we observed between the two sectors are likely attributable in part to location. High mobility districts were predominantly small rural districts that ranged widely in size from extremely small (serving fewer than 100 elementary school students) to above average. Finally, the CBSA analysis highlights regional differences in patterns of mobility and how education markets vary considerably within and across local contexts. It also indicates that many districts with relatively high mobility rates do not have a strong charter school presence, which again underscores how most student movement in Arizona is between public school districts. Mapping district mobility patterns in relation to charter school location also highlighted how it is important to pay attention to the geospatial dimensions of school choice.

Conclusion
While our study focuses on the educational marketplace in Arizona, a state with a long history of supporting student choice options and policies, our findings have relevance for policymakers and practitioners beyond the Arizona context. First, our study indicates that the patterns we identified for metropolitan Phoenix in our earlier study were also evident statewide and within other local markets (Powers et al., 2012). Our simultaneous analysis of interdistrict and charter school mobility suggests that Arizona’s open enrollment policy may have a greater effect on student enrollment decisions and student mobility than simply the presence of charter schools alone because the movement between districts is proportionately larger than the movement to and from charter schools. It is likely that this pattern is not unique to Arizona but will be evident in other states that have interdistrict choice policies and charter schools operating simultaneously. In other states with multiple school choice policies such as Michigan and Ohio, and in particular those with mandatory open enrollment (Education Commission of the States, 2018), open enrollment may have a greater effect on student enrollment decisions and student mobility than charter schools alone.

Second, patterns of mobility vary considerably across districts. Districts with higher rates of in- and out-mobility may find it useful to work with neighboring districts to mitigate the effects of these two-way patterns of student mobility, which include the fiscal consequences of declining enrollments and the challenges of educating students that move frequently between districts and sectors. Third, the analysis also highlights how a substantial number of students move from charter schools back into traditional public school settings, an understudied phenomenon. This between-sector movement may be important for researchers interested in understanding how school choice works in other settings to address in their analyses (Powers, 2017). We need to better understand the characteristics of charter schools with high mobility rates as well as the characteristics of students who leave charter schools to return to traditional public schools and how these movements shape their educational careers. Fourth, our findings reinforce the findings in previous studies of school choice programs and charter schools that low-income and minority students are more likely to move in and out of lower-performing charter schools and school districts. Finally, in this study we
are only able to address patterns of student movement but we do not know the motivations of families that underlie these patterns. To fully understand how families engage with school choice policies, researchers, policymakers, and practitioners need to better document and analyze the reasons for student mobility before we can conclude that these enrollment patterns reflect families’ active use of market-based school choice policies.

Authors’ note: We would like to thank Haiying Dong and David R. Garcia for their help in getting this project started. We also appreciate the helpful feedback we received from David C. Berliner, Gene V Glass, Margarita Pivovarova and the reviewers.

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References


Does Political Rhetoric Framing of Public Policies Thwart Political Participation? Latinos Say Yes, and No: Implications of Latino Civic Engagement in a Trump World

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Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design (1997) states that policymaking is a process through which knowledge is socially constructed and is a domain in which power elites manipulate symbols, rhetoric, images, and distort logical lines of inquiry to justify policies that privilege certain social groups, while stigmatizing and disenfranchising others. Policies act as lessons, and individuals, in turn, then internalize messages on their value to society based on the policies that are assigned to them. Using qualitative data in the form of in-depth interviews conducted with Latinos in Arizona, this paper asks, Do Latinos characterize S.B. 1070 as a degenerative policy, and, if so, what is the impact of this policy on their civic engagement? Findings show that S.B. 1070 is a degenerative policy that causes harm by obstructing the political integration of Latinos and Latino immigrants in the United States, as they report feeling increasingly targeted by the state and repeatedly portrayed as criminals and threat to national security. As a result, Latinos tend to be alienated and have little-to-no desire to engage in conventional forms of political participation; civic engagement attitudes are shaped and formed on the premise that participation is futile, as the state does not care for them and will, instead, politically gain from their disenfranchisement. This paper provides insight on how stigma will likely result in Latinos’ withdrawal from political participation given the current policy initiatives proposed and/or implemented, now that the Trump administration is in power. Public administration, as the action part of government, has the opportunity to play a crucial role in changing these policy dynamics into a more positive scenario, one in which democracy is strengthened, instead of stifled, that upholds key values of social justice and equity in its interactions with the constituents it serves (especially by street-level bureaucrats), and is devoted to community building and improvement.

This paper uses Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design (1997) to evaluate whether Arizona’s infamous immigration legislation Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070\(^1\) meets the

\(^1\) S.B. 1070 was amended to be House Bill 2162.
criteria of a “degenerative policy design” (p. 6). This specific type of policy design is comprised of implicit or explicit social constructions that target and stigmatize certain societal groups; as a result, groups who are socially constructed as deviants and criminals experience political marginalization and disenfranchisement, lose trust and/or belief in formal government processes, and, ultimately, withdraw from formal political arenas based on their exchanges with the state. This type of degenerative policy design is made possible by a manipulation by those who are in power positions (and in power relationships) who exploit the use of policy dynamics in the interests of their own personal political gain. “Such policies distort our understanding of citizenship and pervert the capacity of public policy to solve problems and serve justice” (1997, p. 6).

Levels of conventional Latino political participation (e.g., electoral voting) are persistently low in comparison to all other racial and ethnic groups in the United States (U.S.), even when controlling for level of education and socio-economic status. Barriers to parity in political participation represent barriers to social equity. Meanwhile, the national media coverage on the politicization of immigrants, national security, and refugees/asylum seekers continues to climb and gain exposure on all national media outlets and social media. The national political discourse shaped by the Trump administration has been used, just as Schneider and Ingram describe, by manipulating political images and rhetoric to create the social construction that Latinos are “criminals and rapists” and, therefore, undeserving of state resources and in need of discipline and punishment.

This research empirically tests the “translation dynamics” causal mechanism of Schneider and Ingram’s theory by asking Latinos directly about the messages they internalize as the result of public policy initiatives and the political discourse framing these. Using qualitative data, this paper asks, Do Latinos characterize S.B. 1070 as a degenerative policy, and if so, what is the impact of this policy on their civic engagement?

Findings confirm that S.B. 1070 is a degenerative policy, as S.B. 1070 causes harm by obstructing the political integration of Latinos and Latino immigrants, who feel increasingly targeted by the state and socially portrayed as criminals. As a result, Latinos tend to be alienated and have little-to-no desire to engage in formal political participation. Public administration, as the action part of government, has the opportunity to play a crucial role in changing these dynamics into a more positive scenario; one in which democracy is strengthened, rather than stifled; that upholds key values of social justice and equity in its interactions with the constituents it serves (especially by street-level bureaucrats); and is devoted to community building and improvement. Local government initiatives that aim to facilitate immigrant integration and build trust in government among disenfranchised communities are discussed.

**Conceptual Framework**

Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design (1997) describes how the social construction of groups determines not only the type of public policies afforded to them, but even how the implementation process will likely unfold based on the underlying assumptions tied to each group’s identity. Groups are socially portrayed as deserving or undeserving of beneficial policy and positive government intervention. Undeserving groups are presented as deviants, criminals, and a threat that society must be protected from, justifying the use of unequal policy burdens created and administered by the state. These policy burdens garner mass amounts of public support because policymakers manipulate symbols, rhetoric, images, and distort logical lines of inquiry to justify policies that “afford privilege to some and stigmatize and disenfranchise others” (1997, p.6). It is noteworthy that Schneider and Ingram believe public
policies comprise a series of ideas, assumptions, and symbols that may not be explicitly, formally written in text, but whose embedded beliefs and values become evident through practices, symbols, and discourse. Since policymakers socially construe identities that are linked to how public policies are designed, then it is the state itself that is responsible for creating and/or perpetuating social inequality. This makes public administration an especially relevant area of inquiry, since the way in which bureaucracies are administered (both formally and informally) is critical in setting the tone of how individuals interact and experience government. Discrimination at a structural level, the “accumulated institutional practices that work to the disadvantage of racial minority groups even in the absence of individual prejudice or discrimination” (Link and Phelan 2001), is then an issue of bureaucracy.

Groups socially constructed as deviants or criminals are punished through disproportionate policy burdens that are the result of careful political strategy by those in power, because “stigma is entirely dependent on social, economic, and political power” (Link and Phelan 2001). Political leaders manipulate policy dynamics to “create a constituency on whom they can confer benefits and receive the accolades not only of the group itself, but of the broader public who believes the government has achieved a public policy success” (Schneider and Ingram 1997, p. 6). This is why this paper argues Latinos, especially foreign-born Latino immigrants, meet the criteria to be placed in the deviant category—they collectively lack the social and political clout as well as economic resources to challenge their negative social image, yet political leaders are able to reap vast political gains in their careers by making use of this calculated political opportunity and punishing an “undeserving” group. This was observable during the 2016 presidential campaign, as illustrated by candidate Trump’s xenophobic political rhetoric. After the election, in the first week of his presidency, Donald Trump signed an executive order comprised of anti-immigrant policy measures, including a border wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, a travel ban from Muslim-majority countries, and vastly expanded resources for immigration enforcement, meaning detention and deportation. Groups are politically used as scapegoats and construed as social problems, especially during moments of economic downturn; Latinos and Latino immigrants make for easy targets, and this is unlikely to change due to the group’s low levels of social and political capital. “Latinos, over the years, have consistently represented over 90% of those in immigration detention, prosecuted for immigration violations, and removed as ‘criminal aliens.’ The consequences have resulted in the devastation of Latinos, their families, their communities, and the countries of their origin, thereby contributing to their inability to gain economic and political stability” (Vasquez 2015, p. 599). Latinos are chosen for punitive policy because they lack social and political clout and economic resources; then, because of this oppressive process, the group is hindered from advancing to a social position in which increased levels of social, political, and economic support are possible. This dysfunctional cycle is a serious problem; it perpetuates inequality because it lacks self-correcting mechanisms, it deceives and discourages active citizenship, and, ultimately, results in long-term policy failures that are detrimental to democracy (Schneider and Ingram 1997, p. 5).

The political gain that results from punishing a deviant and powerless group has similar effects to allocating social benefits to a positively construed and powerful group; the former, however, is attractive to political leadership because punishing deviants (even if to serve a mainly symbolic purpose) can provide substantial political gains without having to spend scarce tax dollars. This political payoff for policymakers makes the use of deviant punishment even more attractive during times of economic hardship (Schneider and Ingram 1997). This is relevant to the current context since, due to the great recession of 2008, governments at all levels have fewer financial resources and have been cornered into making...
budgetary cuts, resulting in challenging and highly politicized decision-making processes to determine which policies and programs to fund and which to eradicate.

Schneider and Ingram (1997, p. 6) state that individuals interpret and internalize the messages they experience from government based on their social category. Policies are lessons that reveal how much (or how little) social groups are valued by society. The social category of individuals shapes and sets the tone of interactions between them and the state. These exchanges and policy experiences create citizens who either feel valuable and believe in government efficacy, because these formal systems have traditionally worked for them, or, conversely, these exchanges and/or policies result in individuals who withdraw from formal political processes, because they consider it futile since they believe government does not care for them, making political participation a waste of time.

Governments actively send messages and lessons through policy. The messages that individuals internalize because of their experience with policy (and a given policy’s political discourse, framing, and administration) are critical in shaping political participation patterns, and participation is critical for the functioning of democracy. Participatory democratic theorists have long argued that institutional arrangements leave their imprints on citizens; these processes determine the educative effects of political participation on citizens (Soss 1999b, referencing Pateman 1970). Soss (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), in his formative work on welfare programs and these programs’ recipients, has conducted numerous studies that provide confirmatory empirical evidence that government interactions do shape adult political learning and their subsequent political action; “as citizens participate in welfare programs they learn lessons about how citizens and governments relate, and those lessons have political consequences… Program designs structure clients’ experiences in ways that shape their beliefs about the effectiveness of asserting themselves at the welfare agency. Because clients associate the agency with government as a whole, these program-specific beliefs, in turn, become the basis for broader orientations toward government and political action” (Soss 1999b, p. 364).

This paper begins with an overview of Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) description of the process by which those in power socially construct knowledge and frame problems in a perverse way that allows political leaders to capitalize and make professional gains. Then, the history of how Latinos and Latino immigrants came to be socially constructed as a multidimensional threat as it relates to policymaking is divided into four threat categories and summarized: the first theme portrays Latinos as a threat to public safety by tightly linking immigration and criminality—“crimmigration” in the public discourse; secondly, Latinos are routinely presented as an economic threat consuming scarce public resources, taking jobs from natives, and affecting labor and wages; third, this group also represents a symbolic threat to culture, language, assimilation, and America’s national identity; and finally, in a post 9/11 world, the most recent theme describes Latinos and Latino immigrants as a threat to national security. “Immigrants have been subjected to stigma, discrimination, and violence throughout the nation’s history. Yet it was only at the end of the twentieth century that immigration law became so enmeshed with criminal law that the ‘penalty of deportation’ became ‘most difficult’ to divorce… from the conviction,’ as the Supreme Court concluded in 2010” (Garcia Hernandez 2013, p. 1460).

This paper suggests that Latinos’ social construction has created a stigma and image portrayal deeply linked to criminality and insecurity, which then culminates as a barrier to political participation because Latinos have been indoctrinated as undeserving and are mere quiescent observers of government. The social construction and manipulation of image executed by the state against Latinos is not reserved for those who lack legal immigrant status.
The net that was cast in suspicion of “the other” is wide and continues to widen; according to a national poll, Americans “mistakenly believe that most immigrants are undocumented or illegal” (Magana and Short 2002). The tight link between immigration and criminality is a precise example of Schneider and Ingram’s work that explains how leaders politically maneuver symbols, frame issues, and pass public policies that are undemocratic, faulty, and hinder political integration and democracy as a political strategy; this is done at the expense of stigmatized groups that lack the social and political capital to challenge a compromised democracy. The paper continues with research methods, data and findings, and concludes with a discussion of the practical implications of these findings, especially for local government and municipal administrators.

Socially Constructing “Problems” by Power Elites
Michelle Alexander (2012), author of The New Jim Crow, recently said in an interview with Krista Tippett that the most heterogeneous societies are the most punitive (Alexander, 2016). Indeed, the “politics of punishment” are used strategically for calculated political reasons among leading policy makers and can be quite effective. For example, a recent Retro Report by the New York Times titled “Welfare and the Politics of Poverty” (Sughrue 2016, May 1) presents how Democrat Bill Clinton politically capitalized from his harsh welfare reform bill in the 1990s by openly punishing welfare recipients; these individuals were repeatedly framed and portrayed by politicians and the media to the public as lazy, abusive of the public assistance system, and a threat to scarce public resources. In retrospect, the report argues the bill did not succeed in its stated objectives of reducing the number of Americans in poverty, ending the need for social welfare programs, or decreasing social inequality in America. However, this welfare bill can be interpreted as a success in that it communicated harsh symbols and divisive political rhetoric; it propelled Clinton’s political career by adding legitimacy and increasing public support for him in his punitive stance against the villains in this story, the poor and unemployed.

Those in power opportunistically craft and define social “problems,” frame these issues as urgent social threats, then present their proposal of government intervention as the best (sometimes, the only plausible) solution. In this sense, Trump’s concept of fake news is no novel phenomenon, because empirical facts have never mattered, only public perception. From a democratic perspective, “dishonest or deceptive policies undermine citizenship and confidence in a democratic government” because of their role in perpetuating inequality (Schneider and Ingram 1997).

An illustration of personal gains by manipulating perverse policy dynamics is evident in an Arizona governor’s political career, Jan Brewer. What was supposed to be a “slam dunk campaign for the Democrat [Terry Goddard],” ended up an easy re-election for Governor Brewer in the midterm elections in 2010 (Newton 2010). The win was credited to the politics of S.B. 1070; it was “fueled by her staunch support of Arizona’s controversial immigration law.” Arizona newspapers’ headlines following the 2010 midterm elections included statements like “Jan Brewer rides Arizona’s immigration law to victory; Governor’s wide lead over Dem Goddard highlights comeback,” “Brewer’s Immigration Boost,” and “Brewer’s Political Fortunes Reversed” (Medrano, 2010; Newton, 2010; Nowicki, 2010).

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Another article reported on the rise of Brewer’s political favorability among the public by claiming Brewer’s “political fortunes were reversed by her signing of and strong support for the state’s new immigration law.” Her approval ratings also increased after she signed S.B. 1070 (Rasmussen Reports, 2010). These excerpts illustrate the political benefits of imposing punitive policies on undeserving, negatively portrayed groups who lack the social, political, and economic resources to challenge these negative stereotypes.

Trump seamlessly continues this abuse of immigrant groups. Trump announced his candidacy, and, though initially not taken seriously, went on to win more primary contests than any of his opponents. In his presidential announcement speech, Trump said,

When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists, and some, I assume, are good people. (Lerner 2015)

A key cornerstone of the Trump Campaign, which won more state contests than any of his opponents, was a promise to build a wall along the southern border with Mexico. Footage of rallies show large crowds cheering in support of Trump’s promise to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico. This illustration showcases how politically advantageous the use of rhetoric, framing, and symbols can be.

Trump’s political rhetoric frames immigration as a dire problem and immigrants as a threat that is multidimensional. Firstly, immigration is framed as an economic threat in which immigrants are taking jobs, driving down wages, and are responsible for a lagging economic recovery that continues to shrink the middle class. Secondly, Latino immigrants (especially those of Mexican origin) represent a symbolic threat that jeopardizes America’s culture and national identity (see Huntington, 2004); thirdly, Trump’s political rhetoric and framing suggests there is also a real safety threat in which American citizens need protection from Latino immigrants’ criminality, including gangs and organized crime tied to smuggling of drugs. Lastly, Trump creates the perception of a real security threat in which the U.S.-Mexico border is a vulnerability that endangers national security and must be protected. The four politicized frames that manipulate the Latino image in the U.S. will be elaborated on next.

Overview of Negative Social Construction and Framing of Latinos

The domestic theater that frames immigrants as a threat, and its accompanying political rhetoric by politicians and the media calling for government intervention through legislation, is anything but novel; it can be traced to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Nevins 2002, p. 97) and has been reinforced consistently by both Democrats and Republicans (for example, Clinton had Operation Gatekeeper and Bush had Operation Streamline; see Vasquez 2015, p. 639). Rhetorically, expanding “criminal” to “criminal alien” has cast a wide net of blame and suspicion on the threat of “the other.” The practical implications of this framing can be seen in disproportionate burdens and discrimination against Latinos and Latino immigrants (see, for example, Moreno Saldivar 2015 for disproportionate red tape burdens on Latinos; see Moreno and Riccucci, forthcoming, on discriminatory and racial profiling local policing as an extension of immigration enforcement). “Crime control and migration control have become so intertwined that they have ceased to be distinct processes or to target distinct acts, for both noncitizens and individuals suspected of being noncitizens” (Garcia Hernandez 2013, p. 1457). Because of government’s history of escalating its restrictive immigration and

3 Trump also publicly called for a ban of Muslims traveling to the United States as a counter-terrorism strategy.
security measures, a growing concern for advocates of social justice is how this targets foreigners and immigrants. It is troublesome when citizens and legal residents are profiled and stripped of their legal rights because the threat of “the other” continues to grow, and government discretion in this policy area continues to widen.

Although people of “numerous nationalities enter the U.S. without proper permissions to overstay their visas,” this negative image is “disproportionately most enforced on Mexicans and [following the attacks of September 11th] Muslim men” (Spiro 2010). Still, politicians, power elites, and policymakers have exploited politics to their advantage by also making the site of the U.S.-Mexico border a contentious one; the border is a theater stage crafted for the American domestic audience that elites use to make constituents feel safer and garner political support. However, this is problematic when we consider the U.S. has known for decades that over 65% of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. did not enter illegally via the border but are visa overstayers (Andreas 2000). Policy efforts that have militarized the border and escalated the levels of resources diverted to this area can then be objectively defined as policy failures (Chebel d’Appollonia 2012). Yet, the U.S. continues with more of the same political rhetoric, framing, and policies to portray symbolic images to its domestic audience, and, based on Trump’s wins in state contests, this proves to be more politically effective than presenting actual facts.

**Immigrants’ Economic Threat**

An often-manipulated image is the one that frames immigrants as taking more than they give to the American economy, of being welfare-seekers who disproportionately consume scarce public resources, and of depriving citizens of jobs. However, studies show “the mere presence of immigrants, both legal and illegal, in the economy results in a net gain in taxed, both federal and local, as well as overall spending in consumption” (Magana and Short 2002). The fact is illegal immigrants “pay income taxes, property taxes, sales taxes, and even Social Security” (Reyes 2010). There is an economic benefit to immigration not accurately portrayed through national media outlets, but this is in accordance with Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) notion that knowledge is also socially constructed, and what we certify as true may not always be so. “Any social construction can be legitimate without constraints from ethics, facts, empirical and scientific evidence” (p. 75).

**Immigration + Criminality = “Crimmigration”**

Increasingly, there is a retreat from “framing noncitizens as contributing members of society on the path to full political membership as citizens… [these are] reimagined as criminal deviants and security risks. They are people to be feared, their risk assesses, and the threat they pose managed” (Garcia Hernandez 2013, p. 1460). A field of study with a growing literature that combines the study of criminal justice, law, and immigration enforcement has been dubbed “crimmigration” and shows how closely linked criminality and immigration are, especially in political rhetoric, and this spreads easily and quickly through various large media outlets.

Nationally, there has been a portrayal of immigrants as criminals. “Hispanic, and particularly Mexican, immigrants are often stereotyped as criminals” (Warner 2005-06). Research, however, shows that “immigrants have a lower potential for criminality and a lower rate of criminal recidivism” (Warner 2005-06).

Clinton, who represents the first time the Democratic Party started using the term “illegal immigration” (a term in use by Republicans since 1984), added to this image portrayal of Latinos and immigrants through his own federal immigration legislation, the Illegal...
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. His legislation prioritized businesses and employers, while criminalizing immigrant laborers, failing to acknowledge that Latino immigrants exist to meet the U.S.’s demand for cheap labor. The Clinton administration defined the border as both the site of the problem and solution of the problem, despite having evidence to the contrary on visa-overstayers (Andreas 2000). Clinton’s immigration legislation included measures that brought “tougher sentencing, double penalties, construction of physical barriers [along the U.S.-Mexico border], and use of technologies and equipment on the border [originally intended for military purposes]” (Andreas 2000). Clinton also subtly advanced the perception of immigration as a cultural threat in the U.S., legitimizing concerns about Latinos’ affecting American values and language, and fueling beliefs that Latinos do not assimilate fast enough. Evidence on cultural affects of Latinos also points to the contrary (for example, see Cornelius 2005; Citrin et. al 2007).

An increased reliance on criminalizing Latino immigrants, despite the empirical facts available that can discredit these claims, has become institutionalized and, therefore, legitimate. This is a component of the theory of policy design—Schneider and Ingram (1997) point out that pathology underlying policymaking can be indoctrinated through the social construction of a reality that becomes widespread and accepted because it is repeated by “culture, socialization, history, the media, literature, religion, and the like. The social construction of knowledge refers to the way facts experiences, beliefs, and events are certified as ‘true’” (p. 75). Policy decisions are critical because they determine the rights each class of migrant enjoys, as well as how aggressively those rights are enforced” (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005, p. 112).

**Immigration and the New Security Paradigm**

Immigration enforcement post 9/11 has expanded so much that this area of research is now a standalone field—the securitization of immigration governance (Chebel d’Appollonia 2015). This refers to how political elites frame immigration as a security issue. In the U.S. and in Europe, immigration policy is framed and presented as counter-terrorist policy and vice-versa.

Because of these post 9/11 developments, I argue that applying Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) work to Latinos and/or Latino immigrants requires a number of revisions. Schneider and Ingram originally present punitive policies as a means of communicating symbols and messages and gaining public support without spending large sums of tax dollars. In the evolution of immigration governance and the policy dynamics embedded in this policy area, however, this is not the case at all. Aside from the unquantifiable cost of demoralizing groups that are deemed unworthy, invaluable, and dispensable to government, in the specific case of criminalizing immigrants, this has been a very financially costly endeavor. The escalation of securitized immigration policies is largely symbolic, and these policies fail to meet their intended outcomes (Chebel d’Appollonia 2012). The cost can be classified into two categories: the case of Arizona’s legal fees in defending S.B. 1070 in court, and the dollar amount invested in the escalation measures and expansion of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

For the state of Arizona alone, after Arizona passed S.B. 1070, District Court Judge Susan Bolton blocked the most controversial components of the law. The state filed for an

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4 Figures for the War on Terror, now added to policy dynamics of this area are astronomical and not reflected here.
appeal, asking for removal of the injunctions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled against Arizona, and let the previous decision stand (Lacey, Appeals Court Rules Against Arizona Law, 2011). Arizona Governor Jan Brewer spent nearly $1.5 million on the legal defense of Senate Bill 1070 (Duda, 2011), now amended as House Bill 2062. By creating the threat of the illegal alien, the INS and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection became the fastest growing federal agencies; the INS annual budget tripled from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion, and the Border Patrol’s budget also increased by approximately 150% in 1998 (Andreas, 2000). The Immigration Reform of 1996 included the construction of physical barriers along the border and the implementation of new and more advanced technologies to be used for border security; it was then the use of modern warfare equipment along the international border was introduced and has remained. During the Bush administration, the Secure Border Initiative hired military contractors to apply some of the same technology used in Iraq and Afghanistan along the international border. “The Bush administration intends to not simply buy an amalgam of high-tech equipment to help it patrol the borders—a tactic it has also already tried, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, with extremely limited success. It is also asking the contractors to devise and build a whole new border strategy that ties together the personnel, technology and physical barriers” (Lipton, 2006). The Initiative also increased the number of Border Patrol Agents from 11,500 to 18,500. Still, using the tools of modern warfare for border security is significant because it marks the use of war equipment at a time of no war; it is meant to convey symbolism to its domestic audience and placate public fears about an out-of-control border. It is also significant because there have been many “elaborate border technologies that have proven to be ineffective and wasteful” (Lipton 2006). For example, in Arizona, a $6.8 million aerial vehicle used to patrol the border at night along a 300-mile stretch crashed within a year of its use, raising skepticism about the effectiveness of high-tech equipment for border security purposes. The Initiative, begun by the Bush Administration, eventually awarded the military contract to Boeing and should be by now covering the entire 2000-mile international border with Mexico. However, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano announced in March 2010 the “virtual fence” project would come to a halt, after $1.1 billion had been spent on the project with “little to show for it beyond the two testing sites in Arizona” (Archibold 2010). Napolitano said the project had “produced little more than headaches for the federal government.” Billions of dollars have been spent on border security, so, contrary to Schneider and Ingram’s premise, in the case of immigration and security policy, this politically successful and “degenerative policy” has succeeded at negatively constructing the immigrant as a deviant and targeting this “nuisance” for political gains; however, in doing so, it has incurred the cost of billions of dollars, a deviation from traditional degenerative policies.

Evidence of Policies as Lessons, Messages
Policy decisions send messages to citizens and are powerful when we consider that these can communicate to individuals how much or how little government values them. A quantitative, three-wave study done by Brodkin et al. (2010) provides empirical data to corroborate this argument. Brodkin et al. found that individuals opt for voluntary exclusion from social programs because of interactions with the rules, modes of governance, and informal practices of an administrative organization. This study examined two different social welfare programs and the motivations behind eligible individuals who voluntarily left the program; the study concludes that administrative procedures have the potential to lead to nonparticipation. This is critical in understanding that individuals do internalize messages about their self-worth based on how government treats them; when individuals decided to leave the program for
nonprocedural reasons and not for reasons tied to eligibility, the authors concluded that these
individuals were targeted with disproportionate amounts of red tape, creating a deliberate
barrier of highly scrutinized, means-tested processes that sent a message to individuals about
their value to the state. Additional research on administrative burdens by Moynihan, Herd,
and Harvey (2014) show that vulnerable populations experience administrative burdens in the
form of additional learning, compliance, and psychological costs.

Researchers have long emphasized institutional design in administering social
programs, as this determines the quality of rights experienced by recipients. King and
Waldron (1988) emphasized the institutional form of provision is even more critical than the
fact of provision; rights of social citizenship exist only through “provision for need that is
given universally, that is provided without supplication or stigma, and that avoids as far as
possible the invidious operation of official discretion” (p. 422).

This argument becomes invaluable to the field of public administration when we
consider that the distance between the administration of policies and the individuals who
experience them is a short one, especially when considering the role of street-level
bureaucrats. Edelman (1988) discussed the policymaking process as one often relegated to
the status of a distant “spectacle;” however, Soss (1999b) makes a critical argument—public
bureaucracies are immediate experiences with government for citizens.

Legislatures may host more dramatic political activities, but the police station, the
motor vehicles office, and the Internal Revenue Service are more likely to supply citizens
with lessons about government that ring with the truth of first-hand experience. From
mundane encounters at the post office to the more total experience of prison life, public
bureaucracies should be studied as sites of political learning. (p. 376)

This makes Schneider and Ingram’s work on policy dynamics, from the perspective
of public bureaucracy and administration, even more impactful.

Policy Lessons’ Impact on Political Participation
Sapiro (1994) emphasizes that social programs are critical sites of adult political learning.
Soss’s (1999a) research on the AFDC social welfare program provides empirical evidence of
public social programs creating stigma in its participants, affecting their attitudes on
government efficacy (based on the messages they internalized) and their political
participation; not surprisingly, participants were deeply discouraged from any sort of political
action. Soss found that one hundred percent of participants interviewed in his study reported
feeling stigmatized in society by their participation in the AFDC program. Based on their
participation in this welfare program, AFDC recipients reported feeling insecure and more
inclined to political isolation, not engagement. Previous research explains that welfare
recipients accept negative stereotypes of fellow recipients, and actively seek to distinguish
themselves from this group; this ultimately leads to serious social and political implications
(Briar 1966; Goodban 1985; Rank 1994; Seccombe 1999). Soss’s research aligns with social
control theory, which suggests that institutions can reinforce the marginality of the poor both
through the messages they convey to the public as well as the messages they communicate to
its recipients. When clients participate in welfare programs, they gain lessons about how
governments work and with whom they relate to; these lessons shape patterns of political
participation. Welfare recipients have responded with quiescence; similarly, Latinos react to
immigration and security policies with acquiescence responses, as well.
Data and Methods
This study collected original qualitative data in the form of 28 in-depth interviews in the State of Arizona. Deliberate, purposive sampling method was used to ensure variation in a number of critical characteristics mentioned in the literature, including educational attainment, immigration status, and generational cohort (see Tables 1-4). The cities of Phoenix, Yuma, and San Luis are included, and all Latinos are of Mexican heritage.

Purposive sampling (Teddlie and Yu, 2007) was used to include interviews with Latino noncitizens who are ineligible to vote. The purposive sampling began with participants who self-selected themselves and volunteered to participate when informed of this research project in Yuma, Arizona. Recruiting participants for this study was done through snowball sampling and fieldwork; the researcher asked for referrals to continue the data collection process and gave participants specific criteria to include as much variation in participants as possible.

Initial interviews were conducted in the cities of Yuma, San Luis, and Phoenix in 2012. Follow-up interviews were completed in 2016, once the presidential campaign was in full effect. Arizona participants represented first, second, and third generational cohorts and included undocumented, permanent legal residents, and naturalized citizens. Structured interviews using open-ended questions were used. Each interview lasted on average 50 minutes. Respondents were allowed to choose whether to have the interview in English or Spanish; eight were done in English, and the remaining 14 were done in Spanish.

Table 1 Characteristics of Participants in Arizona

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Gender</th>
<th>Immigration Status</th>
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<th>Age</th>
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<tr>
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<td>College: 4</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>No College: 3</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Female:7</td>
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<td>College: 2</td>
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<td>50-59: 2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Foreign-Born Participants in Arizona (N= 14).
*Four of these participants shared during interview they had been undocumented for a period of time in the U.S.*

This study consulted interview questions previously used by Soss (1999a) in his research with welfare participants to address concerns of question validity and reliability. Soss asked participants their views on who and what influences public policy decisions; why political outcomes turn out the way that they do; whether governments do what citizens want; whether governments listen to “people like me;” whether political action is effective; whether “people like me” could influence government decisions. These questions are appropriate for this study because they contain the “framing dynamics” portion from Schneider and Ingram’s (1997, p. 74) model. This causal mechanism of the cycle includes aspects of the experiences of individuals with a given policy; the messages, interpretations, and lessons these individuals deduce from this experience; the conceptions of government and the role of citizens; and, finally, patterns of political participation. Below are the primary research questions:
1. Do you think there is a “Latino identity” in the U.S.?
   • If so, how would you describe how the “Latino identity” is portrayed in the U.S.?
2. Did S.B. 1070 have an effect on your interactions with local and state government entities? If so, how so? Please explain.
3. Did S.B. 1070 have an effect on your political participation? For example, did it make you want to participate more or less? (Probe allows for distinguishing between conventional political participation methods and unconventional.)
4. Do you think political participation is effective?
5. Does your local government make you feel valued? In what ways, or why not?
   • Does your state government make you feel valued? In what ways, or why not?
   • Does your federal government make you feel valued? In what ways, or why not?
6. Can you and people like you affect government, i.e. influence government decisions?

Table 2 Characteristics of Participants in Arizona

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
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<th>College Education</th>
<th>Age</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>No College: 3</td>
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<td>Female: 7</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>50-59: 1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Native Participants in Arizona (N= 14).

Findings
This study provides evidence that S.B. 1070 is a degenerative policy, as Latinos do internalize messages from governments at different levels, which they overwhelmingly report as a discouraging factor to political participation. Latinos overwhelmingly report feelings of inferiority and marginalization and don’t have much desire to participate in either conventional or unconventional forms of participation, as a result of policy like S.B. 1070. However, these effects were mitigated by several factors, the first being geographical location; responses within the State of Arizona varied greatly depending on location.
It is important to note all participants considered S.B. 1070 discriminatory and conducive to discriminatory practices, such as racial profiling by local police. All sites expressed general distrust of local law enforcement and were especially fearful and demoralized because local police are now deputized as immigration enforcers, thanks to policy initiatives like S.B. 1070. Latinos internalized messages of low social value: “we are just criminals,” and “they...
[politicians] only come to us during election time to pander and make empty promises.” Latinos described Republicans as blatantly racist, but expressed disillusionment with the Democratic Party for being silent and not fighting demeaning rhetoric.

Participants experience unequal effects of S.B. 1070, dependent on generational cohort, whether foreign or native born, English proficiency, rural or urban location, color of skin, and affiliation with community-based organizations. These variables affected respondents’ beliefs about whether rules and scrutiny were increasing by law enforcement at local, state, county, and federal levels. Participants with green cards (legal permanent residents who are noncitizens) felt fearful of voicing opposition or interacting with governmental entities and expressed greater insecurity since, though they had legal status, they did not have citizenship. Though they would like to consider political mobilization, the most dominant emotion was fear.

Foreign-born immigrants who had become naturalized citizens were also very fearful in drawing any public attention to themselves. Participants explained that post S.B. 1070, their interaction with government consisted of harsher exchanges, including longer lines of questioning and increased targeting by local police who are now deputized to act as immigration enforcers; they described these changes as permanent and likely to be emboldened even further with the presidential candidates trying to appeal to white voters. Even participants with college degrees in professional careers who are naturalized citizens perceived increased and deliberate targeting based on their pronunciation of English, their foreign-born status, and/or their skin color; their views on political action were overwhelmingly pessimistic because “priorities on who matters is made very clear.”

In 2012, participants overwhelmingly expressed feeling ignored by the federal government for not intervening on their behalf when being targeted, discriminated, and “racially profiled” by S.B. 1070, suggesting that individuals internalize messages from governments at different levels in a given policy area and distinguish between the messages they infer from one government unit to another. The interviews provided in-depth responses by participants in which they make clear distinctions between government levels. They attributed S.B. 1070 to the state and considered it blatantly racist and deliberate in its targeting of LatinX immigrants; however, they attributed the separate non-response (as they characterized it) of the federal government as insufficient, internalizing a separate message from the federal government that ultimately reinforced Arizona’s racist message. Participants explained that to the federal government, “we [LatinX in Arizona] don’t matter to them,” “we are not a priority,” and “we are forgotten.”

Responses confirm the framing dynamics that Schneider and Ingram (1997) outline in their theory of policy design, with participants referencing the way Latinos are socially construed throughout the United States, but especially in Arizona. In 2016, this theme was emphasized once again. “Trump is not new, it is bolder and louder, but we have been treated as criminals, perceived as inferior and unworthy for all of our history in this country.”

The narrative on the criminalization of Latinos was a prevalent response at all interview sites. “We are not criminals. We are not drug dealers. We are not terrorists. Yet the state only emphasizes the welfare myth, the image of unintelligent lowly Mexicans, the drugs, the crime.” “My whole life, being Mexican has carried a negative connotation. It implied we were poor, unable to speak English, a criminal in a gang, we eat beans, and probably here undocumented.”

This criminalization, participants explained, facilitated the momentum that made the passage of S.B.1070 possible in 2010, “This was all built on lies, not on any real economic analyses or facts.” Interviewees expressed their feelings of being treated as inferior through...
discrimination. They described S.B. 1070 as a “slap in the face, it sent a clear message—we are not wanted here,” and sadly expressed the context of living in Arizona post S.B. 1070, “you are treated as if you’re guilty, as if you are a criminal, not a human being.” Only one participant from the 28 collected throughout Arizona did not use the word “target.” All other remaining interviewees described feeling like targets in Arizona after S.B. 1070. “We cannot trust the government here; it made us a target, it has made us the enemy.” “Even though the federal government challenged Arizona’s law, it was still not enough, it showed us that we are not important enough to them, since we were left to bear this abuse on our own.” “The damage of S.B. 1070 was done when it was passed; the federal judicial challenges could not remedy this, the message had already been sent and could not be taken back.” One participant unknowingly summarized Schneider and Ingram’s policy dynamics saying, “the trigger [for S.B. 1070] was the changes in the global economy, the gap between classes is becoming wider. This was a political opportunity for Brewer that fell from the sky; the economy suffers, she blames the voiceless, becomes the hero, and wins her re-election term.” Respondents generally expressed this sentiment again in 2016, “governments work incrementally, the foundation was there; the ground pieces have been laid. Of course, Trump has a real opportunity [to win the presidency].”

About their attitudes on political participation, Latinos in Arizona overwhelmingly expressed disillusionment and disappointment, and articulated their desire to not participate in formal political activities because they felt “there is no point;” the few who diverged from this sentiment were native Latinos belonging to second or third generational cohorts who had been educated in the U.S. and were fully fluent in the English language. Overwhelmingly, participants felt like “second-class citizens” with little faith in American democracy. Because of the state’s policy decisions, they felt deliberately targeted and perceived their citizenship and civil rights debased.

Generational cohort proved to be critical in whether Latinos were discouraged after S.B. 1070 or after hearing the punitive anti-immigrant discourse coming from the presidential candidates; second and third generation participants (whose family members were all of legal status, who were completely proficient in English, and whose color of skin was not profiled by local law enforcement) were the least affected.

The main differences among the participants exist in the impact on their motivation for political action. Community-based organizations (CBO), which are also tied to geographical location (metropolitan areas have the presence of four-year universities and more local collective mobilization efforts by local non-profit organizations), play a critical role in organizing Latinos for political action—through both conventional and/or unconventional forms. When asked if they would be participating in efforts to demonstrate against anti-immigrant initiatives, Latinos in the City of Phoenix were the most optimistic about participation because they were more likely to be affiliated with community-based organizations that helped educate and mobilize the Latino community. These sorts of organizations, however, did not have a presence in the smaller towns of Yuma and San Luis. These smaller border towns lack of community-based organizations may have led to the “silent reaction to S.B. 1070” Latinos showed in their lack of mobilization efforts. This difference led to different responses on whether government cared for people like them; in Yuma and San Luis where CBO’s are less prominent, participants emphatically responded no, government did not care about them at all, and, so, any subsequent political action would be futile. In Phoenix, however, where Latinos participants were more likely to be actively connected to a social network, the answer was much more positive. Respondents were more optimistic about getting government to hear their collective voice; the answers indicated that...

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government could not ignore its constituents because of their size and unity, even if not originally a priority for government, they would not go ignored if they collectively mobilized.

Lastly, Latino participants commented on the security narrative that has become more prevalent since 9/11, which is consistent with the evolving literature on the securitization of immigration (Chebel d’Appollonia 2012). Participants discussed how the criminality narrative had expanded to include the threat of “terrorist.” Latinos from cities of Yuma and San Luis, which are geographically close to the southern border with Mexico, especially spoke at length about this. One said, “I felt a very strong wave of negativity towards people like me in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, as if all foreigners are also terrorists.” This suggests that Latinos in the U.S. are disproportionately likely to experience the effects of securitization, a phenomenon that warrants further study and inquiry, especially as it relates to the use of discretion of public administrators. This has been an observable connection made by the Trump administration in targeting immigrants, calling Mexicans criminals and deliberately pointing to Muslims as a serious security threat, as well.

**Discussion**

These findings are especially important because they illustrate that the media, the debates, and the political rhetoric that nationally frame immigration send negative messages to Latinos and suggest that the scope, reach, and potential to do harm through these means can quite substantial. Political rhetoric used to frame policy discussions can deter individuals who are already vulnerable and marginalized from engaging in political processes, thwarting their civic engagement.

**Limitations**

The contribution of this study is that it includes direct responses from Latinos and Latino immigrants themselves, including legal noncitizens, as well as undocumented individuals who are traditionally left out of empirical studies on political participation and their underlying motivation. It is important to note a few limitations in this research design. These include the fact that Latinos in the U.S. are far from monolithic, and responses cannot be over generalized. In addition, the political mobilization of minority groups has been empirically demonstrated to be affected by a number of factors, with a large faction of the literature emphasizing the importance of contextual factors. The context of a Trump presidency may be instrumental in politically mobilizing Latinos if opportunity structures are present, even if they have traditionally been discouraged by their experience with degenerative policy designs.

Although Schneider and Ingram (1997) predict that targeted groups are more likely to engage in demonstrations, rallies, and marches, or other forms of protest politics, this may be problematic in the context of a securitized immigration sector. Government discretion is ample, and record deportations took place under the Obama administration and are now off to a substantial start under the new Trump regime. In the first 100 days of the Trump presidency, immigration apprehensions and arrests increased by about 38%, all other things equal. Under the wide range of discretion allocated to the state, the predicted increase in protest politics may not be plausible for foreign-born immigrants residing in the U.S. More research is needed on whether securitization affects unconventional forms of political participation, especially since these channels of informal participation may be the only course available to Latinos who are not citizens.

This research also cannot speak to whether policymakers’ motivations are deliberate in the underlying communicative process that causes individuals to interpret and internalize
policy messages and lessons a certain way. However, this research assumes that, whether deliberate or not, the damage of degenerative policies is done as soon as the deliberation process politicizes and frames issues using symbols that target certain groups, which is why this area of policy dynamics is imperative to study and correct.

Future lines of inquiry can research the securitized immigration sector, examining the political actions of Muslims after 9/11 in the U.S. For example, London has recently elected its first Muslim mayor, Sadiq Khan, through a political campaign dominated by issues of religion and ethnicity. This can provide insight on how to transform policy design to encourage political participation of targeted groups, and, ultimately, a greater level of political representation of targeted groups. These possibilities challenge the use of degenerative policies.

Local governments are also resisting the new federal administration’s fervent targeting of immigrants. For example, deportation proceedings overwhelmingly begin with immigrants stopped by local police in routine stops. Since 9/11, local law enforcement has been deputized to enforce immigration status, which accounts for the ever-growing number of immigrants in detention awaiting deportation proceedings. In response to this, local governments have formed over 100 sanctuary cities throughout the country, aiming to cooperate less with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and prohibit federal agencies from collecting immigrants after non-violent routine stops (i.e. traffic violations). These local governments are actively voicing their aim of ensuring immigrants feel safe and trust their local government. Other municipalities have begun using city identification cards that do not include immigration status and provide some protection for immigrants when local law enforcement ask for a current form of ID. These local measures are innovative responses to the punitive tone of the Trump administration’s actions in terminating the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. These measures by local government administrators and the role of community-based organizations will become increasingly important; currently, the Trump administration is seeking to add an immigration question to the next census, which could be catastrophic. Many Latinos may not participate, and federal and/or state funding in areas most in need of public resources would find their budgets slashed.

Conclusion

Existing policy dynamics communicate messages to both recipients and the public at large. Scholars have suggested that these policy dynamics can result in marginalization and disenfranchisement of certain groups. For example, social control theory suggests welfare programs exist to isolate and punish those who are categorized as “failures” in society. “…welfare policy…is an affirmation of majoritarian values through the creation of deviants. The poor are held hostage to make sure that the rest of us behave” (Handler 1995, p. 8). Instead of encouraging solidarity and inclusion, the social welfare system isolates and marginalizes the poor. In the end, recipients who receive welfare benefits are caught in a system that perpetuates their social class status and remain very poor; this ultimately assures the marginalization of these individuals continues within the materialistic society that is the U.S. (Piven 1995).

This dysfunctional cycle that perpetuates social inequality is exactly why Schneider and Ingram (1997) warn against the use of degenerative policies. The write, “The contents of public policy are strongly implicated in the current crisis of democracy” (p.5). The practical effects of degenerative policies are detrimental to the functionality of democracy. We can see this in individuals’ perceptions of government efficacy; their levels of trust in the
public sphere and in political processes is closely linked to their experiences with public policy and its implementation.

Degenerative policy dynamics lead to a compromised form of citizenship. As some groups are stigmatized by those in power, who politically calculate opportunities and risks based on the use of politicizing images, rhetoric, and symbols, these groups learn that the right to equal citizenship is an illusion. If inequality exists, power elites can accommodate those who society deems as “deserving,” and, then, politically capitalize from these policies. Then, those who belong to groups socially portrayed as undeserving and deviant lose faith in political systems. They lose trust in the processes that exist to provide individuals means by which to hold government accountable. Without the mechanism of political participation, the demand that faulty, undemocratic policies be corrected becomes unattainable to those that live and experience those policies daily. Without the mechanism of political participation, it is impossible to achieve political representation of those whose interests are marginalized, so that government interventions that result in disparate impact or unequal policy burdens can be curbed.

A practical implication of this research is the critical role street-level bureaucrats play in the social and political integration process of Latinos and Latino immigrants. This is a critical component of Latinos establishing and strengthening their levels of social and political capital. Local administrators can be a driving force in community development and in strengthening relationships between local law enforcement and the communities they represent and are meant to protect. Accepting the notion that policies and their implementation are sites of political learning, public administrators can use policy implementation as a site to teach constituents that values of social equity and equal citizenship are not just empty rhetoric or illusions, but real pillars of the public sphere.

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