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## United States vs. China in Africa: The Policy Battle for Hearts and Minds and the Difference it Makes

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For more than half a century, since the end of World War II, the United States and its European allies—"the West"—have played a dominant role in shaping Africa's outlook and fortunes (Blum 2013). The West consolidated this pioneering role by leveraging both bilateral and multilateral relations, and through the activities of its surrogate institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank (Kopiński and Sun 2014), and has enjoyed a virtual monopoly over its "husbandry" of Africa for decades (Williamson 2012).<sup>1</sup> It is hardly surprising, then, that China's forceful foray into Africa in recent times continues to attract attention (see, for example, Shen 2015; Yi-Chong 2014; Hays 2013; Bangui 2012; Brautigam 2010; Raine 2009; Gu, Humphrey, and Messner 2008; Rotberg 2008; Gill, Huang, and Morrison 2007).

While the epic question of what China wants to accomplish in Africa constitutes the nexus of world attention (Kopiński and Sun 2014; Bartholomew 2012; Alden and Large 2011; Brookes and Shin 2006), it is the notion that China is winning the battle for hearts and minds and is rapidly displacing the West as the dominant economic and political force in Africa (Nesbitt 2011, 1) that makes the West most anxious (Council of Foreign Relations 2006). As Francis Nesbitt (2011, 1) observed, given the West's long-standing agenda for political and economic liberalization in Africa (Davies 2010; Alden and Hughes 2009; Taylor and Xiao 2009), this development epitomizes the most dramatic shift in geopolitics since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Several theories have been advanced to explain China's outreach into Africa (see, for example, Fairbanks and Ncube 2012; Corkin 2011a; van Dijk 2011; Downs 2007; Gill and Reilly 2007, 46). The outreach may be an opportunistic "resource grab" designed to fuel China's own economic growth. China may be flexing its muscle with the intention to either displace the West or signify her arrival on the global stage. China's objectives may also entail sustainable engagement rooted in its rise as a world economic power eager to spread its influence and culture (Grimm 2014; Wang and Zou 2014; Zhao 2014; Kachiga 2013; Eisenman 2012; Bremmer 2010; Alden, Large, and De Oliveira 2008; Koning 2007; Alden 2005).

We believe China's outreach displays elements of all three explanations. Clearly, Beijing desires a piece of the action in Africa and knows that it cannot accomplish this goal without first curtailing the West's enduring stranglehold on the continent (Campbell 2008). In its effort to achieve this ambitious objective, China has predictably propagated an African policy to undercut the West, which endears it to Africans as an attractive "soft-touch" alternative ("buying love") to the dreaded social engineering "conditionalities" ("dispensing tough-love") (Kopiński and Sun 2014) of the West that have brought opprobrium from Africans and their leaders and supporters (Sachs 2012). Of course not to be outdone, the U.S. has assuredly countered with its own "soft" measures such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Africa Command (AFRICOM), and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (Makwerere and Chipaika 2012, 312).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This has never been by design. The USSR and its Russian Successor, not to mention satellite states such as Cuba and Venezuela, have attempted to advance their particular brands of communism against American capitalism.

<sup>2</sup> The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 is a preferential trade

Despite massive investment in Africa, which both buttresses the ubiquitous cry that the “Chinese are coming” (BBC 2012), and, perhaps, substantiates assertions concerning the firmness of Beijing’s commitment to the region (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012), there is little systematic evidence concerning the success of China’s contemporary African adventure.<sup>3</sup> The effectiveness of the Chinese outreach remains an open question requiring careful attention to the attitudes of African citizens and not just to progressive elites exuberant about China’s generosity. This research addresses perhaps the most important question concerning the extent to which China’s influence is undermining American interests in the region: Is it true that China is beating the U.S. in the battle for the hearts and minds of Africans? If so, whose hearts and minds are being won, and what difference does that victory make? Specifically, does it portend China’s supplantation of the West as the dominant force in the continent? Our purpose in pursuing these questions is to shine empirical light on what has been a subject of immense commentary and speculation.

Pew’s 2013 Spring Global Attitudes Survey provides micro-level data for our study. The data set spans six Sub-Saharan African nations (Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda) and contains items permitting appraisal of China’s success in Africa vis-à-vis the U.S. Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana were among the top five African nations to receive Chinese investment through 2013, and Kenya and Uganda among the top 15.<sup>4</sup> These five countries are among the top 15 which have received close to three-quarters of total Chinese investment on the continent (Shen 2015, 89). Our study offers strong evidence that these investments have indeed had a profound effect on Africans. However, we also find that, in order to further this influence, Africans’ lack of enthusiasm for Chinese culture—especially, for China’s state capitalism—is a major impediment that will have to be overcome.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, we outline the historical trajectory of China’s involvement in Africa and present a working hypothesis of the typical African’s acceptance of China vis-à-vis the U.S. This is followed by a description of the data and research. The results are presented in two major sections using both descriptive and inferential statistics. The final part of the paper discusses the implications of the results for African States, the United States, China, and the world moving forward.

### **China’s Foray into Africa**

China’s engagement with Africa dates back to 618 A.D. (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012, 1). Fairbanks and Ncube partition that involvement into three broad periods. The early phase stretches from 618 A.D. and lasted to 1949 when the second wave of Chinese immigrants arrived in Africa after the formation of the People’s Republic. The second phase lasted from 1960 to 1989, and witnessed both an ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the West, and the subsequent agitation for independence by colonized African states. The third phase in the 1990s saw structural reforms fuel China’s own economic boom and open new

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arrangement that benefits selected products from eligible African countries by providing them duty free entry into the U.S. market.

<sup>3</sup> We must be clear that our purpose in this research is not to engage the discussion on the propriety of American, Chinese, or other countries’ involvements in Africa. As important as that topic is, it is beyond our modest goal here.

<sup>4</sup> The other two are Zambia and Ethiopia. Together, the top five countries make up almost 40% of the total projects in the region.

vistas of opportunity (Wang and Elliot 2014,1013; Taylor 1998) that have boosted Chinese engagement with Africa to new levels (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012). Propelled by a dynamic economy that has sustained a steady average annual real growth rate of about 10 percent for 30 years, China is now the world's second largest economy with a GDP nearing nine percent of the world's total (Lin 2012). Complemented by her massive foreign reserves, China now has the wherewithal to be a serious global player (Yi-Chong 2014). Nowhere is this potential more obvious than in Africa. In 1980, Sino-African trade was a mere US\$1 billion, but by 2011 it had ballooned to US\$155 billion (Yi-Chong 2014; Fairbanks and Ncube 2012). In 2011, China became Africa's largest trading partner with a total volume of US\$199 billion and a trade deficit of US\$28 billion in 2013 (Wang and Elliot 2014, 1014).

As Sino-African trade expanded, so have other forms of engagements. China's investment in Africa jumped from \$490 million in 2003 to \$9.33 billion in 2009 (Lin 2012, citing China Information Office of State Council 2010), while official aid increased from US\$800 million in 2005 to US\$1.4 billion in 2009 (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012). By 2013, Chinese direct foreign investment was US\$20 billion (Shen 2015). During the period 2000-2011, China provided US\$75 billion in aid to Africa, while the comparable figure for the U.S was US\$90 billion. China has also been providing debt relief in substantial amounts (Wang 2007). Beyond trade and finance, China provides aid in education, medical services and civic projects; builds schools and provides scholarships to African students interested in studying in China (Wang and Elliot 2014, 1014; King 2013). China has also provided support for peacekeeping missions in places such as Burundi, Congo (DRC), Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Western Sahara (Wang and Elliot 2014, 1014; Deng and Wang 2012).

While China's initial foray into Africa was channeled through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), both central and provincial (Gu 2009; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009; Alden and Davies 2006), Chinese citizens, private construction, manufacturing, and trading firms now litter the African landscape. It is estimated that there are between 1 and 2 million Chinese citizens residing in the region (Shen 2015; Wang and Elliot 2014, 1013; Grimm 2014; Zhao 2014). The largest concentration of Chinese (more than 100,000 persons) resides in South Africa, but there are also sizable Chinese populations in Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Shen 2015).

As a burgeoning superpower, China has basic needs that Africa can meet. These needs are both political and economic (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012; Taylor 2006). China needs energy, raw materials, and new markets for finished goods, all of which Africa possesses in abundance (Moyo 2013; Eisenman 2012; Tang 2010; Zweig and Jianhai 2005). In turn, Africa has financial and infrastructural needs that China can fulfill. However, what would appear as a symbiotic exchange may only be a veiled exploitation of Africans who receive pittances in return for draining their natural endowments (Makwerere and Chipaike 2012). China has a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its African partners, preferring a *quid pro quo* on typically apolitical terms. However, some see this as nothing more than a strategy to "undercut" the West (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012). This policy has allowed China to engage African nations, even those branded by the West as rogue states. In turn, the West has accused China of undermining the global liberal order by offering itself as a "cheap" alternative to dubious African leaders (Corkin 2011b; Kurlantzick 2007; Tull 2006). With China showing little enthusiasm for changing her policy, the West appears to be softening its own conditionality regimes with programs such as AGOA (Kopiński and Sun 2014). Meanwhile, China has been amassing goodwill, especially among the African ruling elite who now have

unprecedented access to credit and financing (Fairbanks and Ncube 2012).

There also is evidence that ordinary Africans have begun to perceive China's impact on their economies (Wang and Elliot 2014). In fact, the outcry that the U.S. is losing its grip on Africa is predicated on China's heavy investment in infrastructure and development projects, which are offered to Africans at lower transaction costs (Kopiński and Sun 2014). In short, while the West has been "preaching" the seemingly illusive gospel of democracy, good governance, and disease eradication, China has been investing in local projects and buying its way into the hearts and minds of Africans (Kopiński and Sun 2014). The implication is that the typical African's acceptance of China is instrumental (as opposed to ideological), linked to the benefits Chinese investments bring to local African economies. If this assumption is true, it sets the stage for expecting that China will "outdo" the U.S. in Africa based on African's recognition of China's central role in their nations' economies. Accordingly, our two working hypotheses can be deduced from this assumption, as follows:

*H<sub>1</sub>: The African Acceptor of China will be one who sees China as playing both a robust and positive role on the country economy. That is, perception of her role in the economy will explain China's acceptance by Africans.*

*H<sub>2</sub>: Greater perception of China's role in the country economy will explain higher levels of Chinese acceptance by Africans vis-à-vis the U.S.*

## **Data and Methodology**

Our inquiry is based on data generated by the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey, conducted between March and April, 2013 on national probability samples of adults 18 years or older in six Sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda).<sup>5</sup> These six countries are by no means representative of all of Sub-Saharan Africa, but they include some of the most significant countries of the region with respect to population size, economics, and politics. Pooling the data for these countries is appropriate since the same multi-stage cluster sampling and stratification techniques were employed throughout to generate the country samples. Moreover, Pew used face-to-face interviews to generate the data for these countries. Given the nature of the data, our analyses and projections are subject to the typical limitations of both self-report and cross-sectional data.

Two kinds of analyses are performed. First, we calculate patterns of responses across survey items that permit comparisons of perceptions between the U.S. and China. These descriptive statistics (percentage indices) are then used to assess China's success in winning hearts and minds vis-à-vis the U.S. by subtracting China's scores from those of the U.S. on a number of dimensions. A positive value indicates a gap greater for the U.S., while a negative value indicates a gap greater for China. To address the second prong of the question concerning whose hearts and minds are being won over by China, we turn to regression analysis. Here, we estimate the effects of demographic and other factors associated with Africans' acceptance of China. This latter approach allows us to profile the African Acceptor of China (AAC).

## **Winning Hearts and Minds**

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<sup>5</sup> See the top of Table 1 for distribution of the probability sample.

Some of the survey items allow preference between U.S. and China. Other items permit only independent validation without necessarily forcing a comparison or choice between the two. We define an African Acceptor of China (AAC) as one who, when given a choice between the U.S. and China would consistently opt for China, and who evaluates China positively on an item which measures approval/disapproval or acceptance/rejection. We culled 10 items which measure these attributes as follows: "Have favorable opinion of country;" "Country is a threat to survey country;"<sup>6</sup> "Best model economy to follow;" "China will replace the US as the world's superpower;" "Think about others in making decisions"; "Good that their ideas and customs are spreading here;" "Like their way of doing business;" "Like their music, movies & television;" "Who our country should have strong ties with;" and "Is more of a partner with our country." We coded each question such that a positive response for China equals "1" and a negative response equals "0," for a range between 0-10, where 0 would represent the lowest score for acceptance of China, while 10 will represent the highest. Reliability analysis for the 10-count scale produced an acceptable Cronbach's Alpha of .695.

### **Independent Variables**

The independent variable of primary focus is "Perceived Chinese role in the economy." Two questions are used to measure it. Question 81 asked: "How much influence do you think China is having on economic conditions in (the survey country)?" We coded the responses "A great deal" and "A fair amount" as "1," and "Not too much" and "No influence at all" as "0." The follow up question (81b) asked: "If a great deal or fair amount in question 81—Right now, is China having a positive or negative impact on economic conditions in (the survey country)?" Again, positive responses were coded as "1" and negative responses as "0." Positive answers to 81 represent perceived robustness of China's role in the economy, (CER), while 81b represents both robust and positive role (CERP). Besides demographic factors, three other variables were introduced as independent variables. One measures personal while the second measures national economic outlook. The third is an instrumental variable that acts as a surrogate for respondents' orientation toward liberalism.

National economic well-being is a tertiary scale comprising the following questions: 1. "Now thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe the current economic situation?" (four options collapsed into good/bad); 2. "Over the next 12 months do you expect the economic situation in our country to improve?"; and 3. "When children today in our country grow up, do you think they will be better off or worse off financially than their parents?" Personal economic well-being is measured on a binary scale combining the following questions: 1. "Now thinking about your personal economic situation, how would you describe it?" (combination of four good/bad); and 2. "Over the next 12 months do you expect your personal economic situation to improve?" The instrumental question, 71, asked: "How important is it to you that people have access to the Internet without government censorship?" "Very important" and "Somewhat important" were coded as "1," and "Not too important" and "Not important at all" were coded as "0." Poverty status needs some explanation. Question 182a asked: "Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food for your family?" Instead of income, we used this question to measure affordability. Although the income variable was included in the survey, we had concern regarding its capacity to express consumption levels across countries. First, it was

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<sup>6</sup> This item was recorded for the 10-count scale to make it amenable to an additive scale measuring a positive outcome. Thus, not a threat=1, and threat=0.

denominated in each country's local currency. While this problem could be ameliorated by converting to some common standard, such as American Dollars, that would lead to additional concern that real consumption levels might be lost in such a conversion.

The regressions are performed at two levels. The first are three macro-specifications introducing country fixed-effects. The models for men and women allow us to compare the effects of the independent variables across gender. There are strong theoretical reasons to anticipate differential rates of gender acceptance of China on the one hand, and gender acceptance of China based on perceived contributions to the economy on the other hand. The first is ideological, while the second is pragmatic. Extant literature suggests that men are more prone to accepting and tolerating outsiders (Golebiowska 1999). Thus, African women may not warm up to China as readily as African men. On the other hand, structural inequalities embedded in the social and economic systems of African countries (particularly as it relates to education and employment) continue to channel limited resources and opportunities toward men, impoverishing and relegating women to second-class citizenship (Rebouché 2006). Any infusion of new life and expansion of the economy will make the system more robust and benefit women disproportionately (Olowu 2006). Accordingly, while African women may not welcome China as readily as African men, rational group self-interest driven by the fact that women may benefit far more from all aspects of China's "generosity" than men may increase the marginal effects on the likelihood of China's acceptance for women vis-à-vis perceived China's effect on the economy. The Fixed-Effects Feature (CTR) holds respondents from particular countries together throughout the iterations, controlling for country-specific factors. The second set of regressions is performed at the country level. The equations we estimated are of the form:

$$ACC = a + b_1CER + b_2CERP + b_3X_n + b_4CTR + e, \quad (1)$$

(Where, ACC is the 10-count scale of African acceptance of China with a mean of 5.03, standard deviation of 2.48, and Cronbach's alpha of .695; CER is the respondent's perceived robustness of China's role in the economy; CERP is both the respondent's perceived robustness and value of China's role in the economy; X is the vector of other explanatory variables including demographics; and CTR is the set of country dummies introducing the fixed-effects feature). Since the dependent variable is continuous we use OLS regression to estimate the models.

### **Empirical Findings**

The profile of the 5,043 respondents is displayed in Table 1. Men and women are nearly evenly distributed in the sample. The profile captures what can be expected of a stratified random sample in Sub-Saharan Africa: Older adults of approximately middle age (according to the World Bank 2012, life expectancy at birth in the region is 56 years). The average age is 35, with the men being slightly older (36.1 years) than the women (34.7 years). Men are more likely to be employed, while women are both poorer and more likely to be married. Women are less likely to have received formal education, though the gender gap disappears at the primary/grade-school level. The second type of gap occurs at higher levels of educational attainment, where men are clearly advantaged. Thirty percent of respondents are Muslim and 42 percent are urban residents. The mean on country well-being is 1.54 out of 3 (about 51 percent), while that of personal economic well-being is 1.16 out of 2 (about 58 percent). The men are more enthusiastic about internet liberalization. About 68 percent of the

respondents report that China has a robust role in their economies. China’s rating on the 10-count scale is moderate, mean of 5.03 (about 50.3%), with some gender gap.

**U.S. vs. China in Africa**

The first set of data comparing Africans’ assessments of the U.S. and China is presented in Table 2. The last category labeled “USA minus China” reports the percentage differences indices for the entire sample (“All”), “Men,” and “Women.”

**Table 1 Sample Composition and Descriptive Statistics**

Respondents	All Respondents	Men	Women
All	5043	2537	2506
Ghana	799	408	391
Kenya	798	458	340
Nigeria	1031	517	514
Senegal	800	358	442
South Africa	815	408	407
Uganda	800	388	412
Variable	Weighted Means		
Age	35.4	36.1	34.7
Unemployed	59.7%	53.2%	66.2%
Married/cohabitating	50.3%	56.7%	57.3%
Education			
None	11.8%	8.9%	14.6%
Primary	23.5%	20.3%	26.8%
Secondary	47.1%	49.7%	44.5%
University	17.6%	21.1%	14.1%
Religion (Muslim)	30.1%	28.4%	31.8%
Poverty status	58.2%	56.4%	59.9%
Urban	41.9%	40.8%	43.0%



Acceptance of China (10-count)	5.03 <sup>a</sup>	5.34	4.72
Chinese economic role robust	68.3%	73.1%	63.9%
Economic role robust/positive	50.0%	54.4%	45.7%
Internet liberalism	65.4%	70.1%	60.7%
Econ well-being self (2-count)	1.16	1.19	1.14
Country Economy (3-count)	1.54	1.57	1.51

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<sup>a</sup>sd=2.48.

As noted earlier, a positive value indicates a disparity greater for the U.S., while a negative indicates a disparity greater for China. This final category addresses both the robustness of the differences between USA and China and the magnitude of the gender gap.

Africans have favorable opinions of both countries, although they are clearly more favorably disposed to the U.S. (margin = 8.7%). African women are more favorably disposed to the U.S., but both men and women have more favorable opinions of the U.S. Moreover, greater proportions of Africans view China's power and influence as a threat. While only about half of the respondents see U.S. free market capitalism as the best model for their countries, Africans overwhelmingly reject Chinese state capitalism. In fact, this particular item produces one of the widest margins between the U.S. and China (margin = 24.0%). Africans score the U.S. as the world's leading economic power (margin = 37.6%), though they are also clear that China will eventually replace the U.S. as the world's superpower (margin = -5.3%). On the question of whether the U.S. and China consider the interests of their countries in making international policy decisions, Africans score the U.S. 67.1 percent, China 63.8 percent, with a 3.3 percent differential. Another area of marked difference pertains to exporting of ideas and culture, ways of doing business, and cultural trappings such as music, movies, and television. Respondents overwhelmingly favor the U.S., and the margins are quite robust (7.7%, 12.4%, and 22.6% respectively). Africans admire both countries for their technological advances, but tend to prefer what the U.S. brings to the table (margin = 8.5%).

Most Africans believe that the U.S. has more influence on their countries generally (margin = 6.9%) and a little less on their countries' economies specifically (margin = 3.2%). When asked whether that influence is good or positive Africans tend to score both the U.S. and China at similar levels. These comparisons produce the least disparity between the two countries. If forced to choose, Africans clearly prefer closer ties with the U.S. (35.0% vs. 24.2%; margin = 10.8%), although a fair proportion (29.1%) responded that they would prefer closer ties with both countries. This item produces a robust gender gap (7.6% vs. 14.1%): African women are more sanguine about the U.S. than men. Finally, on the partnership question, Africans score both countries highly, although the U.S. has a slight edge (margin = 3.7%).

Do these data corroborate the notion that China is winning the battle for hearts and minds in Africa? Frankly, based on the strength of our findings, our initial inclination is to dismiss the insinuation with a resounding no. Still, we can imagine how one with a different point of reference could form a contrary opinion. If one's idea of China becoming the

dominant force in Africa is rooted in the prism of which country Africans consider as the world's superpower, then Africans' firm position that China will replace the U.S. would seem to have placed that assertion beyond debate. However, to address the question adequately, one must interrogate the core issue of what the respective influences of the two countries means beyond an immediate preoccupation with aid, infrastructural development, and the dance of symbolic politics.

Unless one is prepared to accept the narrative that American and Chinese forays into Africa are artifacts of pure benevolence, one must turn to the investment and return dynamic for some explication of motives. If China's ultimate goal in Africa is rooted in its rise as a world economic power eager to spread its influence and culture globally, it faces a huge obstacle in two major areas. First, compared to U.S. free market capitalism, Africans roundly reject China's state capitalism.

**Table 2 African's Ratings of USA and China**

Survey Item	Mean Score %						% Difference		
	USA			China			USA minus China		
	All	Me	Wome	All	Me	Wome	All	Me	Wome
	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	
Favorable	77.0	78.6	75.3	<b>68.3</b>	<b>72.0</b>	<b>64.5</b>	8.7	6.6	10.8
Threat	44.4	46.5	42.3	<b>50.2</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>47.7</b>	-5.5	-6.2	-5.4
Best model	52.2	54.9	49.4	<b>28.2</b>	<b>29.0</b>	<b>27.3</b>	24.0	25.9	22.1
Leading eco:	57.3	59.1	55.5	<b>19.7</b>	<b>22.1</b>	<b>17.2</b>	37.6	37.0	38.3
Replace US	34.4	37.0	31.8	<b>39.7</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>35.0</b>	-5.3	-7.4	-3.2
Consider Others	67.1	69.7	64.4	<b>63.8</b>	<b>67.5</b>	<b>60.0</b>	3.3	2.2	4.4
Ideas	54.8	57.0	52.6	<b>47.1</b>	<b>49.7</b>	<b>44.5</b>	7.7	7.3	8.1
B. model	72.9	75.4	70.4	<b>60.5</b>	<b>63.8</b>	<b>57.1</b>	12.4	11.6	13.3

Like music	59. 7	62.7	56.7	<b>37. 1</b>	<b>41.0</b>	<b>33.0</b>	22. 6	21.7	23.7
Admire tec	82. 3	85.4	79.2	<b>73. 8</b>	<b>77.1</b>	<b>70.4</b>	8.5	8.3	8.8
Good econ	61. 5	64.2	58.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Influence	72. 4	75.0	69.7	<b>65. 5</b>	<b>69.2</b>	<b>61.7</b>	6.9	5.8	8.0
Inf. good	68. 4	67.5	69.5	<b>68. 1</b>	<b>67.5</b>	<b>68.8</b>	0.3	0.0	0.7
Inf. econ	71. 5	74.4	68.5	<b>68. 3</b>	<b>73.3</b>	<b>63.3</b>	3.2	1.1	5.2
Positive	73. 4	72.6	74.3	<b>73. 2</b>	<b>74.1</b>	<b>72.1</b>	0.2	0.5	2.2
Country ties	35. 0	35.2	34.9	<b>24. 2</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>20.8</b>	10. 8	7.6	14.1
Partner	71. 4	74.2	68.6	<b>67. 7</b>	<b>70.7</b>	<b>64.7</b>	3.7	3.5	3.9
Respect	71. 3	75.0	67.6	<b>52. 8</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>48.0</b>	18. 5	17.4	19.6
Democrac y	73. 6	77.0	70.3	-	-	-	-	-	-

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Figures in parentheses are corresponding questionnaire numbers. N for all = 5,043; N for men = 2,537; N for women = 2,506.

Second, Africans prefer American ideas and customs, business practices, and cultural trappings, such as popular music, movies, and television, to Chinese alternatives.

It is clear, then, that the case for China's supposed superiority in winning hearts and minds has been overstated. This conclusion is noteworthy given the finding that Africans evaluate the two countries as virtual equals on their respective roles in their countries and economies.

### **U.S. vs. China across African Countries**

The country data are displayed in Table 3. Kenyans have favorable opinions of both countries; admire both nations for their technological advances; see both countries as potential partners in development; and would like to see their country cultivate and maintain close

relationships with both nations. The average Kenyan believes that China will usurp the U.S. as the world's superpower. Kenyans reject China's state capitalism by a robust margin (21.2%); see China's power and influence as a greater threat to their country (margin = -7.9%); and prefer American ideas and culture (margin = 5.3%), ways of doing business (margin = 13.0%), and cultural trappings such as music, movies, and television (margin = 20.0%).

Ghanaians have a more favorable opinion of the U.S. (margin = 16.0%), believe the U.S. poses less of a threat than China (margin = -28.0%), and prefer the American economic model (margin = 28.0%). Similarly, Ghanaians prefer American ideas (margin = 5.7%), American ways of doing business (margin = 22.4%), and American culture (margin = 14.0%). Ghanaians believe the U.S. is a better partner than China (margin = 5.4%) and would prefer to see their country develop stronger ties with the U.S. (margin = 13.3%).

Nigerian respondents indicate the most favorable attitudes toward China. Indeed, if one focuses on Nigerian responses exclusively, the notion that China is "taking over" Africa could easily be sustained. Nigerians score China higher than the U.S. with respect to favorability (77.2% vs. 71.9%) and view the U.S. as a greater threat than China (37.7% vs. 29.8%). Although Nigerians see the U.S. as the world's leading economic power, they believe that China will replace the U.S. as the world's superpower by a hefty -39.5 percentage point margin. Nigerians believe China weighs their country's concerns in its foreign policy decisions more than the U.S. does (61.9% vs. 68.3%). While Nigerians reject China's state capitalism by the widest margin of any other country (54.2% vs. 18.0%), unlike other Africans, they prefer Chinese ideas and culture (61.2%), and Chinese ways of doing business (76.8%). Nigerians see the U.S. as having a slightly greater influence on their country and about the same level of influence as China on their economy, but Nigerians believe that Chinese influence is more positive. Finally, Nigerians believe their country should cultivate ties with China (18.4% vs. 34.2%), although 34.1 percent of the respondents prefer close ties with both countries. Not surprisingly, Nigerians rate China a better partner than the U.S. (63.2% vs. 71.9%).

The Senegalese have highly favorable opinions of both countries (81.0% and 76.9%). The Senegalese see the U.S. as the world's leading economic power (71.8% vs. 11.3%), but they also indicate a mild belief that China will overtake the U.S. as the world's superpower (35.3% vs. 38.5%). Senegalese are not sold on China's state capitalism (18.7 percentage point differential). Moreover, the Senegalese score the U.S. higher with respect to ideas, culture, and cultural trappings by 8.5, 10.5, and 28.2 percent differentials respectively. Although the Senegalese give high marks to both countries on their contributions to their country and economy, they prefer closer ties with the U.S. (40.1% vs. 16.6%); although 33.9 percent responded that they would like closer connections with both countries. Finally, the Senegalese rate the U.S. as a better partner (83.9% vs. 77.8%).

Though South Africans vastly prefer the U.S. to China on favorability rating (72.5% vs. 47.9%) and judge the U.S. to be the world's leading economic power, they also believe China will eventually overtake the U.S. as the world's superpower. South Africans reject China's state capitalism, and are not enthusiastic about Chinese ideas and culture (57.5% vs. 37.2%). They dislike Chinese business practices (67.7% vs. 42.8%) and cultural trappings (71.7% vs. 21.3%). South Africans believe both countries have a significant amount of influence on their country (78.0% and 71.7%) and economy (72.8% and 70.7%). South Africans prefer closer ties with the U.S. (30.7% vs. 19.6%), though 29.8 percent responded that they would prefer closer ties with both countries. Finally, South Africans rate the U.S. as a better partner (58.8% vs. 50.8%).

Ugandans have more favorable opinions of the U.S. (72.8% vs. 58.6%), but, seemingly paradoxically, they judge the U.S. to be a greater threat to their country, though the margin is small (51.6% vs. 48.4%). Ugandans recognize the U.S. as the leading world's economic power and are the only respondents who reject the notion that China will eventually eclipse the U.S. as the world's superpower (42.8% vs. 25.0%). Ugandans give China higher marks for its technological advances (61.9% vs. 78.3%), but reject China's state capitalism (49.3% vs. 32.8%), ideas and culture (44.0% vs. 31.1%), business practices (64.5% vs. 52.9%), and cultural trappings (46.6% vs. 28.5%). Ugandans say the U.S. has a greater influence on their country (69.1% vs. 54.3%) and economy (69.5% vs. 55.1%) and believe that this influence is positive. The question on which country to cultivate closer ties with produced the highest rating for the U.S. (51.8%) and the lowest rating for China (14.9%). A relatively small percentage of Ugandans (19.4) prefer closer ties with both countries. Finally, Ugandans prefer the U.S. to China as a partner (70.4% vs. 57.9%).

### **The African Heart and Mind Being Won by China**

The first set of regressions estimating the effects of various factors on Africans' acceptance of China are arrayed in Table 4. One specification (All) is for the full sample, while the other two are sub-sample specifications for men and women. Overall, the results provide strong evidence of a positive relationship between China's perceived role in the country economy and respondents' acceptance of China. Respondents who say China has a robust role in their economy are more likely to report acceptance of China ( $\beta = .13, p < .001$ ). Moreover, those who say China's role is both robust and positive give China greater acceptance ( $\beta = .39, p < .001$ ). Perusal of the results reveals that no other single variable approaches the magnitude of the marginal effect accorded to this factor. The equations for men ( $\beta = .12, p < .001$ ) and women ( $\beta = .38, p < .001$ ) suggest a substantial gender gap on the effect of this factor. Overall, however, our working hypothesis on the potential effects of gender receives strong support. First, the gender variable shows that African women are not as enthusiastic about China as African men ( $\beta = -.05, p < .001$ ). However, perceived China's contributions to the economy influences acceptance by men and women differentially, with its marginal effect clearly greater for women. This instrumental result is consistent across all models.

Several other variables produce notable results as well. Older adults are not as accommodating of China as their younger counterparts. Educated Africans accept China more readily, while the unemployed, particularly unemployed women, are less likely to accept China. This result on unemployed women buttresses the finding above that women who stand to benefit from China's largess are more likely to welcome China. Those who are more liberal and who score their countries' economies as doing well are also more likely to accept China, again, totally in line with the instrumental expectation.

**Table 3 Ratings of USA and China across Countries**

	Kenya		Ghana		Nigeria		Senegal		South Africa		Uganda	
	USA	China	USA	China	USA	China	USA	China	USA	China	USA	China
Favorable	<b>80.6</b>	<b>78.4</b>	84.6	68.6	<b>71.9</b>	<b>77.2</b>	81.0	76.9	<b>72.5</b>	<b>47.9</b>	72.8	58.6
Threat	<b>62.4</b>	<b>70.3</b>	31.2	59.2	<b>37.7</b>	<b>29.8</b>	33.3	36.6	<b>52.5</b>	<b>62.7</b>	51.6	48.4
Best model	<b>57.9</b>	<b>36.7</b>	55.3	27.3	<b>54.2</b>	<b>18.0</b>	50.5	31.8	<b>45.3</b>	<b>25.4</b>	49.3	32.8
Leading econ	<b>65.4</b>	<b>19.9</b>	52.6	19.5	<b>52.5</b>	<b>26.4</b>	71.8	11.3	<b>46.0</b>	<b>25.8</b>	57.4	13.1
Replace US	<b>37.5</b>	<b>48.6</b>	36.0	40.4	<b>28.8</b>	<b>68.3</b>	35.3	38.5	<b>28.1</b>	<b>46.3</b>	42.8	25.0
Consider others	<b>79.2</b>	<b>77.2</b>	60.7	57.8	<b>61.9</b>	<b>68.5</b>	67.4	61.6	<b>72.8</b>	<b>66.4</b>	62.1	49.8
Ideas	<b>60.9</b>	<b>55.6</b>	37.7	32.0	<b>57.8</b>	<b>61.2</b>	70.1	61.6	<b>57.5</b>	<b>37.2</b>	44.0	31.1
B. model	<b>81.0</b>	<b>68.0</b>	75.7	53.3	<b>73.3</b>	<b>76.8</b>	75.3	64.8	<b>67.7</b>	<b>42.8</b>	64.5	52.9
Like music	<b>58.1</b>	<b>38.1</b>	57.4	43.4	<b>63.1</b>	<b>54.5</b>	60.0	31.8	<b>71.7</b>	<b>21.3</b>	46.6	28.5
Admire tec	<b>85.3</b>	<b>74.9</b>	83.4	77.5	<b>86.3</b>	<b>86.7</b>	83.6	76.8	<b>75.8</b>	<b>61.5</b>	61.9	78.3
Good econ	<b>77.7</b>	-	65.0	-	<b>54.7</b>	-	50.6	-	<b>59.6</b>	-	63.1	-
Influence	<b>84.8</b>	<b>78.9</b>	68.0	62.3	<b>69.7</b>	<b>66.4</b>	65.4	58.9	<b>78.0</b>	<b>71.7</b>	69.1	54.3
Inf. good	<b>68.5</b>	<b>74.6</b>	58.6	57.6	<b>68.4</b>	<b>80.6</b>	76.9	71.1	<b>64.6</b>	<b>52.2</b>	74.5	68.9
Inf. econ	<b>83.0</b>	<b>83.3</b>	70.1	65.0	<b>68.2</b>	<b>69.6</b>	66.4	65.9	<b>72.8</b>	<b>70.7</b>	69.5	55.1
Positive	<b>79.8</b>	<b>80.5</b>	61.4	60.9	<b>71.6</b>	<b>86.2</b>	84.6	78.7	<b>66.4</b>	<b>57.8</b>	77.0	69.2
Country ties	<b>36.8</b>	<b>32.8</b> (27.2)	37.3	24.0 (28.9 )	<b>18.4</b>	<b>34.2</b> (34.1)	40.1	16.6 (33.9 )	<b>30.7</b>	<b>19.6</b> (29.8)	51.8	14.9 (19.4)
Partner	<b>78.9</b>	<b>76.9</b>	75.7	70.3	<b>63.2</b>	<b>71.9</b>	83.9	77.8	<b>58.8</b>	<b>50.8</b>	70.3	47.1
Respect	<b>73.4</b>	<b>32.1</b>	71.2	50.4	<b>71.7</b>	<b>61.9</b>	71.6	58.5	<b>69.7</b>	<b>44.3</b>	70.3	47.1
Democracy	<b>81.6</b>	-	72.1	-	<b>74.7</b>	-	76.6	-	<b>64.2</b>	-	72.6	-
	<b>N=798</b>		<b>N=799</b>		<b>N=1031</b>		<b>N=800</b>		<b>N=815</b>		<b>N=800</b>	

Entries are cumulative percentages. <sup>a</sup>Figures under USA represent responses of China will never replace the U.S. as the world's superpower, while those under China represent responses of China will eventually or has already replaced the U.S. as the world's superpower. <sup>b</sup>Figures in parentheses are percentages that volunteer that they would prefer to have close ties with both U.S. and China.

Finally, the country dummies confirm what was revealed by the descriptive data. Except for Senegal, which does not indicate a significant difference with Nigeria, the results suggest that, compared to any other country, being a Nigerian increases the likelihood of China's acceptance. The results for South Africa and Uganda are particularly robust. Overall, the profile of an African acceptor of China (the African heart and mind being won) tends to be an educated, employed, relatively liberal younger man or woman, who is optimistic about his or her country's economic outlook and believes China has contributed to that success.

The country results are displayed in Table 5. These results mostly replicate the outcome noted in Table 4 with respect to the effects of China's role in the economy. China's role is not only positive and significant for each country, but the magnitude of its effect is substantially greater than anything recorded elsewhere for any other variable for the countries. We have already noted that Nigerians tend to accept China more than any other Africans. The marginal effect of this instrumental variable is also greatest for Nigeria ( $\beta = .49, p < .001$ ). Thus, the instrumentality hypothesis is also confirmed across all six countries. China scores highly across all the countries with respect to the education-level variable. Again, the effect of education is greatest for Nigeria ( $\beta = .17, p < .001$ ). A final factor in Nigeria is liberalization ( $\beta = .13, p < .001$ ).

Reviewing the results as a whole, an important dynamic appears to be what distinguishes Nigerian's greater acceptance of China. The effects of the factors that support Africans' acceptance of China are multiplied in Nigeria. At the same time, many of the factors that correlate with relative non-acceptance of China, such as gender, age, and poverty level are not operative. The negative effect of gender appears particularly salient in Ghana and Uganda, while that of poverty status appears in Uganda. Ghanaian women, older adults, the poor, and urban dwellers are less likely to accept China. Kenyan women, the poor, Muslims, and urbanites are also less likely to accept China. Only urban Nigerians are relatively less likely to accept China. In Senegal, older adults and the unemployed are less inclined to embrace China. In South Africa, older adults are less likely to accept China. Finally, Ugandan women, older adults, and the unemployed are less accepting of China. Obviously, these differences tap into ecological factors that, as designed, our comparative analysis cannot unravel.

## **The Policy Battle for Hearts and Minds and the Difference it Makes**

Our findings confirm that China is amassing goodwill in Africa. It is doing so with its investments in infrastructure and other commitments that impact local economies (Foster et al. 2007). Ordinary Africans are aware of, and welcome, both the extent and importance of China's role in their local economies. While the levels of inroads vary by country, it is clear that China has made its most impressive gains in Nigeria. China's triumphs in Nigeria are orchestrated by a simple dynamic, where the effects that contribute to Chinese acceptance are magnified, and the effects that detract from Chinese acceptance are minimized.

Overall, our work highlights the importance of what many Africans now call "stomach" infrastructure—that is, facilities that cater to the immediate needs of the population. Those who argue that the West is losing ground to China claim that abstract emphases on democracy, good governance, and healthcare neglects this fundamental need for stomach infrastructure. In fact, some argue that it is this vacuum that China recognized and

has exploited quite effectively (Nesbitt 2011).

**Table 4 OLS Analysis of Factors Explaining China's Acceptance by Africans**

Survey Item	All		Men		Women	
	Beta	t	Beta	t	Beta	T
China's econ role robust	.13***	8.39	.12***	5.69	.14***	6.20
China's econ role robust, positive	.39***	24.95	.12***	18.03	.38***	17.07
Gender (female=1)	-.05***	4.56	-	-	-	-
Age	-.05***	3.83	-.05*	2.53	-.05**	2.83
Education	.10***	7.60	.12***	6.29	.08***	4.07
Marital status (married)	-.00	0.31	-.02	1.03	.01	0.47
Poverty status (poor)	-.01	0.69	-.01	0.30	-.01	0.47
Unemployed	-.03*	2.40	-.03	1.56	-.04*	2.25
Religion (Muslim=1)	-.01	0.29	.02	0.90	-.03	1.37
Urban	-.01	1.04	-.00	0.40	-.02	1.37
Internet Freedom (liberal)	.06***	4.99	.05**	3.05	.07***	4.09
Personal econ situation good	.03 <sup>+</sup>	1.89	.03	1.38	.02	1.09
Country econ situation good	.06***	4.51	.08***	3.97	.05**	2.57
Country Dummies (Nigeria)						
Ghana	-.09***	6.64	-.08***	4.01	-.12***	5.59
Kenya	-.07***	4.57	-.08***	3.48	-.06**	2.82
Senegal	.00	0.24	-.02	0.88	.03	1.15
South Africa	-.20***	13.52	-.23***	10.42	-.19***	8.74
Uganda	-.16***	10.67	-.12***	5.51	-.20***	9.44
Intercept	3.42***	16.95	3.24***	11.84	3.47***	12.01
R-square (x100)		38.8		37.5		38.8
Adj. R-square (x100)		38.5		37.1		38.4



F-ratio	174.87***	87.81***	91.87***
N	4991	2507	2784

Each are standardized regression coefficients with t-values in parenthesis.  
 +p<.10; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*<.001; (two-tailed test).

**Table 5 OLS Analysis of Factors Explaining China's Acceptance Across Countries**

Variable	Ghana	Kenya	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Uganda
China's econ role robust	.03 (0.85)	.00 (0.06)	.07+ (1.78)	.28*** (6.49)	.19*** (5.88)	.19*** (4.37)
China's econ role robust, positive	.40*** (10.23)	.32*** (7.82)	.49*** (11.83)	.34*** (8.06)	.43*** (13.11)	.31*** (7.32)
Gender	-.13*** (3.88)	-.07* (2.11)	-.03 (1.18)	-.00 (0.16)	.00 (0.10)	-.16*** (5.06)
Age	-.08 (2.12)	-.04 (1.24)	-.01 (1.18)	-.05+ (0.16)	-.07* (0.10)	-.06+ (5.06)
Education	.06+ (1.72)	.09* (2.45)	.17*** (5.85)	-.09** (2.92)	.03 (0.92)	-.01 (0.19)
Marital status (married)	.03 (0.92)	-.01 (0.19)	-.04 (1.35)	.00 (0.07)	.04 (1.22)	-.02 (0.59)
Poverty status (poor)	-.09** (2.61)	-.11*** (3.58)	.02 (.77)	-.04 (1.26)	.09 (3.34)	.00 (0.04)
Employment status (unemployed)	.03 (0.95)	-.01 (0.26)	-.03 (1.07)	-.06* (2.16)	-.01 (0.35)	-.06+ (1.83)
Religion (Muslim=1)	.09* (2.45)	-.12*** (3.53)	.01 (0.17)	.00 (0.15)	-.01 (0.39)	.02 (0.60)
Urban	-.06+ (1.91)	-.10** (3.13)	-.09*** (3.73)	-.07* (2.53)	.03 (1.01)	.04 (1.32)
Internet freedom	.01 (0.18)	.01 (0.41)	.13*** (4.87)	.05 (1.62)	.08** (2.66)	.08** (2.62)
Personal economic situation good	.05 (1.30)	.05 (1.34)	-.01 (0.23)	.01 (0.14)	-.03 (0.65)	.07+ (1.92)
Country's economic situation good	.06 (1.48)	.16*** (4.06)	.01 (0.24)	.01 (0.28)	.14*** (3.38)	.01 (0.31)
Intercept	3.87***	4.24***	2.81***	3.32***	0.95	2.92***
R-square (x100)	24.9	24.9	42.9	41.9	42.2	33.0
Adj. R-square (x100)	23.6	23.6	42.2	41.0	41.2	31.9

F-ratio	19.55***	19.96***	58.31***	43.37***	44.22***	29.53***
N	780	797	1023	795	803	793

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Entries are standardized regression coefficients with t-values in parentheses.  
+ p<.10; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001; (two-tailed test).

Stephen Hayes, President and CEO of the Corporate Council on Africa expresses this sentiment: “African nations are grateful for the roads they (Chinese) have built when few others would do so, the same roads that World Bank planning teams once would talk about for years but never develop, and the African leaders are no doubt grateful for the new construction rising throughout the Continent” (2013).

The second question pertains to the significance of China’s influence in Africa. If China is winning African hearts and minds, does this mean that the U.S. might be usurped as the dominant force on the continent? Africans see the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power, but most also believe that China will displace the U.S. as the world’s superpower. If this is what Western critics bemoan in their contention of a Chinese takeover in Africa, then the data corroborate that contention. But we believe there is more to this story. The international scene is beset by the persistent zeal to spread influence and culture (Yangwen, Liu, and Szonyi 2010). For the last 50 years, the U.S. and its European allies have been trying to “transplant” Western values to Africa (Carothers 2006). To the extent Chinese values differ from Western values, China’s success in Africa should be interpreted as a supplanting of the latter by the former. So the question arises, are China’s values usurping Western values in Africa?

On many fronts, when given a choice between the U.S. and China, the average African prefers the U.S. Even among Nigerians, China’s greatest enthusiasts, China’s state capitalism is roundly rejected. Furthermore, Africans are not fervent about Chinese culture and its popular trappings. These impediments must be addressed if China is truly going to overtake the West. Of course, this is not to suggest necessarily that Africans embrace Western values completely. If that were the case, liberal democracy would be manifest across Africa (Cheru 2012). Nonetheless, that Africans clearly prefer the West’s liberal democratic and free-market economy traditions is an indication of the extent Western values have permeated the region.

### **Policy Implications for Africa**

Africans are in dire need of development assistance and appear ready to accept it from anyone willing to offer it. At the same time, these data indicate that Africans reject “recolonization” of their continent. Overall, though, our results suggest that Africans may be viewing their relationship with the U.S. and China through a completely different prism, one largely devoid of the cold war ideological meme some remain frozen in on the global stage. What is clear is that China appears to have met Africans on their own terms by advancing a no-strings-attached partnership where resources are provided largely without explicit conditions and certainly without the stringent conditions imposed by the West (Brautigam, 2010). Ideology is irrelevant and that is the difference between China’s spectacular inroads of the present and her largely spectator role of the past. Clearly, this ability to separate ideological concerns from the quest for resources for infrastructural development may open up a new vista of international engagement and cooperation for Africa. At the same time, it demands a close monitoring and auditing of what Africa surrenders vis-à-vis what it obtains in order to avoid

the kind of unbridled regional exploitation by outsiders widely chronicled throughout the region's history.

## **Conclusion**

The subject of our research, like many others that occupy social scientists, remains a moving target. What our effort here has done is to merely stop and hold that moving target in place and time long enough to address some important questions of now. Obviously, what happens to that target with time becomes a matter to be determined by both time and circumstances many of which may not even be in play at present. In the least then, our research establishes a baseline against which those future trajectories may be measured. As former United States President, Bill Clinton noted in our opening remark, a rendering further buttressed by Stephen Hays with his comments above regarding the World Bank, China is spending heavily in Africa and that expenditure is winning her friends among Africans. China is making friends among liberal, young, and educated African men and women who are optimistic about their nation's outlook, that optimism being driven primarily by what they see as China's generosity that also benefits them individually.

Meanwhile, we can at least confirm that if China went into Africa to "purchase" the "hearts and minds" of Africans—to undercut the U.S. and West—as some have alleged, China is receiving a lot of goodwill (and resources) for her money. However, if by winning hearts and minds we imply selling and acceptance of Chinese ideology and culture cold-war style that is clearly not the case. Correspondingly, if the proposition that China is overtaking the U.S. and the West as the dominant social, economic, and political force in Africa is anchored on this false premise of wholesale acceptance of Chinese over Western ideology by Africans, our research discredits it resoundingly. In fact, if the strident impediments uncovered by our research are anything to go by, one has no choice but to affirm that that proposition is utterly far-fetched. Perhaps this chilling nuance can now open the door for both a different kind of prospect and conversation about China's involvement in Africa.

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## APPENDIX PEW SURVEY QUESTIONS USED IN THE STUDY

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Q9 Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable

or very unfavorable opinion of (The United States; China)?

*Table Description: Favorable*

Q11 I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country). Do you think that (The United States' power and influence; China's power and influence) is a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to (survey country)?

*Table Description: Threat*

Q25 What's the best model economy for (survey country) to try to follow - a free market capitalist one such as in the United States or a state capitalist one such as in China?

*Table Description: Best model*

Q29 Today, which ONE of the following do you think is the world's leading economic power? (The United States; China)

*Table Description: Leading econ*

Q30 Which comes closest to your view – China will eventually replace the U.S. as the world's leading superpower; China has already replaced the U.S. as the world's leading superpower; or China will never replace the U.S. as the world's leading superpower?

*Table Description: Replace U.S.*

Q47 In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country) – a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all? and Q59 In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think China takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country) – a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all?

*Table Description: Consider others*

Q48 Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here. And Q60 Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that Chinese ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that Chinese ideas and customs are spreading here.

*Table Description: Ideas*

Q49 And which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ideas about democracy, OR I dislike American ideas about democracy.

*Table Description: Democracy*

Q50 Which comes closer to describing your view? I like American ways of doing business, OR I dislike American ways of doing business. And Q61 Which comes closer to describing your view? I like Chinese ways of doing business, OR I dislike Chinese ways of doing business.

*Table Description: B. model*

Q51 Which is closer to describing your view—I like American music, movies and television,

OR I dislike American music, movies and television. And Q62 Which is closer to describing your view—I like Chinese music, movies and television, OR I dislike Chinese music, movies and television.

*Table Description: Like music*

Q52 And which comes closer to describing your view? I admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances, OR I do not admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances. And Q63 And which comes closer to describing your view? I admire China for its technological and scientific advances, OR I do not admire China for its technological and scientific advances.

*Table Description: Admire tec*

Q58a Overall, would you say U.S. economic aid to (survey country) is having a mostly positive impact, a mostly negative impact, or no impact on the way things are going in (survey country)?

*Table Description: Good econ*

Q78 Overall, how much influence do you think the United States is having on the way things are going in our country? Would you say it is having a great deal of influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all? And Q79 How much influence do you think China is having on the way things are going in our country? Would you say it is having a great deal of influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all?

*Table Description: Influence*

Q78b ASK if “great deal” or “fair amount” in Q78 (Q78=1,2) Is this a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? And Q79b ASK if “great deal” or “fair amount” in Q79 (Q79=1,2) Is this a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

*Table Description: Inf. good*

Q80 And thinking specifically about our country’s economy, how much influence do you think the United States is having on economic conditions in (survey country)—a great deal of influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all? And Q81 And how much influence do you think China is having on economic conditions in (survey country)—a great deal of influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all?

*Table Description: Inf. econ*

Q80b ASK if “great deal” or “fair amount” in Q80 (Q80=1,2) Right now, is the United States having a positive or negative impact on economic conditions in (survey country)? And Q81b ASK if “great deal” or “fair amount” in Q81 (Q81=1,2) Right now, is China having a positive or negative impact on economic conditions in (survey country)?

*Table Description: Positive*

Q82 Is it more important for (survey country) to have strong ties with China or with the United States?

*Table Description: Country ties*

Q119 Overall, do you think of China as more of a partner of (survey country), more of an



enemy of (survey country), or neither? And Q120 Overall, do you think of the U.S. as more of a partner of (survey country), more of an enemy of (survey country), or neither?

*Table Description: Partner*

Q127 Do you think the government of (The United States; China) respects the personal freedoms of its people, or don't you think so?

*Table Description: Respect*



